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I. INTRODUCTION
In the almost two decades since the Supreme Court decided Employ-
ment Division v. Smith,' the standard academic commentary on the decision
has been harshly critical.2 As Professor Douglas Laycock put the matter in
the immediate aftermath of Smith's release, "Smith produced widespread
disbelief and outrage."3  More recently, Professor Kent Greenawalt de-
scribed Smith as having "eviscerated" the Free Exercise Clause and asked if
"anything that is not redundant remains."4 Smith squarely held that neutral
laws of general applicability that burden religiously mandated behaviors
1 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 145, 149-
51 (2004) (arguing that "[tihe Rehnquist Court has turned the constitutional law of religion nearly up-
side down," and noting that the Smith Court "strikingly[] abandoned the free exercise doctrine that pre-
vailed during the previous quarter century"); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2-3 (arguing that "Smith is probably wrong as a matter of original intent" and that "the
decision is inconsistent with the apparent meaning of the constitutional text"); Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 116-17 (1992) (objecting that the "Court
has adopted an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that permits the state to interfere with religious
practices ... without any substantial justification, so long as the regulation does not facially discriminate
against religion," and characterizing this position as "moving in the wrong direction").
3 Laycock, supra note 2, at 1.
4 Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 156-57 (discussing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), as illustrating how Smith adversely affected the scope of the Free Exer-
cise Clause).
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need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest
to survive review under the Free Exercise Clause.' The decision served as a
sharp break with the prior interpretive approach to the Free Exercise Clause
advocated by Justice Brennan in Sherbert v. Verner, holding neutral laws
burdening religious practice up to strict judicial scrutiny.'
Eminent constitutional scholars of the Religion Clauses,7 including
Judge Michael McConnell and Douglas Laycock, have excoriated Smith as
inconsistent with the text and original understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause, a sharp break with established precedent, and, ultimately, a naked
betrayal of basic human rights values.9 They argue that the decision renders
the Free Exercise Clause meaningless and, accordingly, that the Supreme
Court should abandon it.1" With recent changes in the Court's composition,
5 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-79.
6 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); McConnell, supra note 2, at 137-30, 170-75;
see also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise of Re-
ligion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1412-20 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins and Historical Un-
derstanding] (discussing Warren Court and Burger Court approach of constitutionally mandated
accommodations for religiously motivated conduct that transgresses neutral laws of general applicability
incident to the Sherbert decision and subsequent cases in the line, which created a right to judicially
crafted exemptions to laws burdening religiously motivated practices).
7 The Religion Clauses consist of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. See U.S.
CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the Free Exercise thereof .... ").
8 See Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Sicle Sketches, 75 IND.
L.J. 295, 305 n.34 (2000) (describing Laycock and McConnell as "the two most formidable religious
liberty scholars of their generation").
9 See Laycock, supra note 2, at 2-4, 7-10, 54-68 (noting the predominantly negative scholarly reac-
tion to Smith; discussing the case, and in his view, the unpersuasive nature of many of Justice Scalia's
arguments, including the restoration of the pre-Sherbert belief-conduct dichotomy, and the pernicious
enabling effect of Smith on would-be religious discriminators; and positing a series of objections that
characterize Smith as providing a "legal framework for persecution"); McConnell, supra note 2, at 137-
40, 170-75 (arguing that Smith effectively strands religious believers by treating religious exemption
claims as unjustifiable demands for "a special benefit," incorrectly reduces the Free Exercise Clause to a
"non-discrimination requirement," and creates a doctrinal framework that unduly empowers government
to "homogenize" religion by discriminating against religious groups with unusual or unpopular beliefs).
10 See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 233 (1991) ("Smith appears to leave the Free Exercise Clause without inde-
pendent constitutional content and thus, for practical purposes, largely meaningless."); see also Laycock,
supra note 2, at 2-4 (objecting to Smith as both "dubious" and "demonstrably wrong as a matter of text,
precedent, and original intent" and arguing that post-Smith "the Free Exercise Clause itself now has little
independent substantive value"); McConnell, supra note 2, at 138-40 (objecting to Smith on multiple
grounds and positing that "[t]he freedom of citizens to exercise their faith should not depend on the va-
garies of democratic politics, even if expressed through laws of general applicability"); Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (1990)
(questioning Smith's legitimacy because of its failure to use standard legal sources, including "text, his-
tory, and precedents," in support of its outcome and arguing that "Smith is contrary to the deep logic of
the First Amendment").
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the prospect of overturning Smith has become more plausible." In conse-
quence, it is an opportune moment to reexamine Smith and to consider
whether its approach to the Free Exercise Clause advances the values of re-
ligious liberty as effectively as the jurisprudence that it replaced.
There are two competing conceptions of the Free Exercise Clause.
First, one could conceive of the Free Exercise Clause as primarily promot-
ing religious autonomy-facilitating the ability of religious adherents to
practice their faiths, even when such practice entails violating generally ap-
plicable laws enacted without religiously discriminatory intent. The alter-
native approach would conceptualize the Clause in terms of enhancing
relative equality among and between religious sects.
Although the use of an autonomy rationale for considering free exer-
cise claims could be paired with an alternative standard of review, such as
rationality review 2 or intermediate scrutiny, 3 the Supreme Court's pre-
Smith jurisprudence paired the autonomy rationale with strict judicial scru-
tiny. 4 Under strict scrutiny, the government bears the burden of establish-
I I See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial De-
cisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 500 (2004)
("[T]here remains substantial sentiment on the Court to revisit the question of whether the Free Exercise
Clause mandates that the government provide some measure of justification before trespassing upon re-
ligious practice."). Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Smith and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
O'Connor dissented. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873 (1990). The Supreme Court
effectively reconsidered Smith in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In Boerne, six Justices
agreed that Smith correctly interpreted the Free Exercise Clause (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg), and three Justices urged that Smith be reconsidered
(Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer). Id. at 509. Assuming that the voting patterns of the incumbent
Justices have not changed in the last ten years, Smith appears to have the allegiance of five members of
the current Court (Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg) and to be opposed by two
members (Justices Souter and Breyer). The views of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito on Smith
are not yet known. Even if both new members of the Court vote to repudiate Smith, it would still be
necessary to obtain one additional vote to overturn the precedent.
12 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1993) (describing and applying
the traditional rationality review standard). Under true rationality review-also called rational basis re-
view-the plaintiff bears the burden of disproving any theoretical rational relationship between a gov-
ernmental enactment and a legitimate state purpose; the government has no burden of proof or
obligation to defend the enactment at all. See id.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) (describing the intermediate
scrutiny test as whether the government could establish a substantial relationship to an important gov-
ernmental interest, a burden requiring "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based
classification); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding that intermediate
scrutiny applies to test gender-based classifications and that this standard requires the government to es-
tablish a substantial relationship between the classification and achieving an important governmental
objective).
14 Hemandez v. Comn'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("The free exercise inquiry asks whether gov-
ernment has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if
so, whether a compelling government interest justifies that burden."); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (holding that laws burdening religiously motivated conduct "must
be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling inter-
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ing a compelling state interest and demonstrating that the means selected to
achieve that interest are narrowly tailored)5
Unlike other areas of constitutional law in which strict scrutiny ap-
plies, 6 however, strict scrutiny in the area of free exercise was quite far
from being "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." As Judge McConnell has ob-
served, "in the years between the test's formal appearance in 1963 and its
formal abandonment in 1990, the Supreme Court rejected all but one claim
for free exercise exemptions outside the field of unemployment compensa-
tion."17 He observes, correctly, that "[i]n every other case decided on the
merits, the Court found either that the claimant's exercise of religion was
not burdened or that the government's interest was compelling."' 8 Thus, in
free exercise cases at the federal Supreme Court level, unlike equal protec-
tion cases involving racial classifications, "enforcement [of the strict scru-
tiny standard] was half-hearted or worse.""
This Article posits two reasons for this result. First, pervasive social
hostility to religions that maintain nontraditional belief systems leads judges
to discount the relative importance of religiously motivated behavior that
conflicts with a neutral law of general applicability; courts either find that
the governmental policy in question does not "burden" the religion (or bur-
dens it only indirectly) or, alternatively, find that the legislative goals ad-
vanced by the law actually advance a compelling interest in a narrowly
tailored way."
Ironically, though, scholarly commentators like Judge McConnell and
Professor Laycock decried Smith's abolition of this ersatz regime of strict
scrutiny in favor of a more truth-in-labeling approach of traditional rational-
ity review. The argument in favor of strict scrutiny seems to be that if the
government adopts and enforces a law that prohibits religiously motivated
conduct (or that prescribes conduct offensive to religious beliefs such as us-
est'); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance the legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.");
Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (describing the inquiry as "whether some compelling in-
terest . . .justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right").
15 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220, 224, 227, 237 (1995); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). For a thought-
ful discussion of the Supreme Court's use of tiered scrutiny, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 494-515 (2004).
16 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing equal protection under the
Warren Court as "aggressive... with scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
17 McConnell, supra note 2, at 127-28 (footnotes omitted).
18 Id. at 128; see also infra text and accompanying notes 191-237.
19 McConnell, supra note 2, at 128.
20 See infra notes 191-237 and accompanying text.
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ing a social security number21), it should have a very good reason for so do-
ing.
2
Thus, the standard approach is to link the importance of religious
autonomy with a strict form of judicial scrutiny for governmental actions
that have the incidental effect of denying religionists, including but not lim-
ited to members of minority religions,23 the ability to engage in religiously
motivated conduct. Viewed from this vantage point, Smith is highly objec-
tionable because it makes successful free exercise challenges to general
laws virtually impossible to win. Even if the federal courts have not ap-
plied strict scrutiny in an exacting fashion, lowering the standard of review
to mere rationality virtually ensures that most free exercise claims will fail.
Thus, the Justices who support strict scrutiny of neutral laws of general ap-
plicability that burden religiously motivated practices, such as Justice Bren-
nan24 and Justice O'Connor,25 object strenuously to Smith's change in the
governing standard of review from earlier cases, such as Sherbert and Wis-
consin v. Yoder,26 the latter a case that upheld a free exercise claim brought
21 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986).
22 See Perry, supra note 8, at 301, 303-06 (arguing that government may not justly treat some relig-
ions and religionists with "diminished concern and respect" or act out of "hostility" toward a religion,
and that government should be able to proffer a "sufficiently good reason" for enforcing a rule when do-
ing so impedes religiously motivated conduct in order to ferret out governmental actions motivated by
"hostility and indifference").
23 In this Article, I use a variety of terms to describe individuals and groups that hold odd or nontra-
ditional religious convictions (at least when viewed through the prism of the dominant religious culture
in the contemporary United States). Terms such as "minority religion," "unpopular sects," "nondomi-
nant religion" "nonmainstream religion," and the like, including variations using "religionists" rather
than "religion," are meant to arrive at the same basic taxonomic concept: some religions have shorter,
newer histories in the United States and maintain belief systems that do not look very much like those of
preexisting religious denominations, and some religions have significantly fewer members than others.
These newer, smaller, "weirder" groups will face more difficulty in convincing legislators, judges, and
even fellow citizens to take seriously their claims for equal dignity and respect. Moreover, democratic
politics are an unlikely source of relief for such groups. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-81 (1980). And, although Ely-and most scholars of
the Free Exercise Clause-would argue that this state of affairs calls for more aggressive judicial review
of laws imposing burdens or withholding benefits for members of minority religions, this ignores the
basic fact that judges are no less a product of the common socio-legal culture and are subject to the same
fears, phobias, and prejudices as everyone else. See Christina Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitu-
tional Decision-Making, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 115, 117 ("Judges are ... human. They remain subject to
the same passions, fears, and prejudices that sweep the rest of the nation."); see also infra text and ac-
companying notes 236-89.
24 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (holding that any "incidental burden on the free
exercise of appellant's religion" must be justified "by a compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
25 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing
that the Free Exercise Clause's "express textual mandate" requires "the government to justify any sub-
stantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest").
26 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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by Amish parents who wished to remove their children from the public
schools after the eighth grade.27 If the Free Exercise Clause exists to facili-
tate absolute religious autonomy, the Sherbert approach advocated by Jus-
tices Brennan and O'Connor would better honor free exercise values.28 At
the very least, it certainly seems reasonable to frame the Free Exercise
Clause in terms of religious autonomy.29
Rather than as advancing religious liberty or autonomy values, one
could alternatively conceive of the Free Exercise Clause as primarily pro-
moting religious equality." If equality among sects is the primary purpose
of the Free Exercise Clause, the Smith test (or something like it) might offer
a better reading of the Clause than Sherbert and Yoder.3
Good reasons exist to question whether a compelling state interest test
actually furthers religious equality. If judges are unable or unwilling to
give the full benefit of the compelling state interest test to minority religion-
ists, this approach to the Free Exercise Clause has the perverse effect of ex-
acerbating, rather than remediating, the problem of religious discrimination.
To put the matter simply: if the government's interests in suppressing "odd"
or "weird" religions are held to be compelling, leaving minority religionists
without protection from the laws that burden their religious practices, but
mainstream religionists are able to obtain judicial relief from state-imposed
impediments to religious practices, the Free Exercise Clause itself would
actually contribute to the problem of religious discrimination. Moreover,
unlike "free speech," "religion" is a culturally loaded concept.32 Asking a
federal judge to draw a material equivalency between her, more likely
27 Id. at 218-20, 234.
28 See McConnell, supra note 2, at 172 ("On the other hand, some would expand the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause by treating the free exercise right as a right of personal autonomy or self-
definition.").
29 See id. at 188 ("A final threat to religious autonomy arises from governmental control over many
of the institutions of education and culture.").
30 See Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their His-
tory, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275, 306-12 (2006) (arguing that state practice prior to the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment under state constitutions and early federal practice under the First Amendment both
conceived of free exercise as an antidiscrimination, equality norm).
31 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 13-16 (2007) (arguing for an "Equal Liberty" approach to both of the Religion Clauses
and suggesting that "an equality-based approach to free exercise is fair and workable, and is likely in the
end to protect religious believers more effectively than the awkward idea that religiously-motivated
conduct should be presumptively exempt from legal regulation").
32 As Professor William Marshall has observed, for example, crediting a free speech claim as
"speech" is not the same as crediting a religious point of view, which implies divine sanction. "A hold-
ing under the Free Speech Clause that racist speech is protected does not have this same legitimizing
effect because, unlike the free exercise claim, the protection of racist speech does not require the court to
find that the idea in question stems from a divine belief." William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308, 323 n.79 (1991).
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mainstream, religious commitments and those of Gozer worshippers33 re-
quires a real leap of faith. Thus, if the primary function of the Free Exer-
cise Clause is to secure equality among religious sects, a test or framing
device that actually exacerbates inequality is deeply problematic and should
be avoided.34
In fact, the opinions of the Supreme Court in free exercise cases reflect
a strong pattern of cultural bias and religious insensitivity. 5 In the pre-
Smith era, minority religionists often were told that their religious claims
did not trigger the application of the Free Exercise Clause; and even when
the Justices agreed that the Clause was at issue in these cases, the Justices
routinely found that the government's interests were compelling.36 If the
Sherbert approach to the Free Exercise Clause would actually diminish re-
ligious equality, as this evidence suggests, it should be rejected in favor of
an approach that promotes equality, but that also addresses the problem of
legal discrimination-and the concomitant fact of social discrimination-
against religious minorities.
33 "Gozer" worshippers provided the main antagonists in director Ivan Reitman's 1984 comic mas-
terpiece Ghostbusters and, in the movie, were seeking to bring about the end of days by uniting two fic-
tional Sumerian deities, "Zuul" and "Gozer," in contemporary New York City's fashionable Central
Park West district (and at 55 Central Park West, to be precise). See Synopsis for Ghost Busters [sic]
(1984), www.imdb.com/title/tt0087332/synopsis (last visited May 19, 2008); see also GHOSTBUSTERS
(Sony Pictures 1984). Although Ghostbusters was an entirely fictional work, people do sometimes take
fictional sources of religious inspiration more seriously than the author probably intended. For example,
the creators of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster clearly intended it as a snide attack on the
proponents of Intelligent Design (and nothing more). See Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster,
www.venganza.org (last visited May 19, 2008) (home site of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Mon-
ster, including links to Church dogma and accepted forms of worship). Oddly enough, however,
"FSM," as its adherents call it, has taken on many of the attributes of a real religion (albeit a kind of fer-
vent antireligion). See Justin Pope, Pasta Theology: Scholars Mull Spaghetti Monster, USA TODAY,
Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2007-11-16-spaghettimontsterN.htm (describ-
ing FSM and noting that some experts on religion argue that "Flying Spaghetti Monsterism exhibits at
least some of the traits of a traditional religion-including, perhaps, that deep human need to feel like
there's something bigger than oneself out there"); see also Dan Vergano, Insta-Faith: Just Add Hot Wa-
ter; Internet Fuels Cheesy Spoof of Evolution-Creation Wars, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 2006, at DI. Al-
though my research assistant and I could not find evidence of active Gozer worship in the contemporary
United States, there are signs that the Ghostbusters fictional Sumerian deities have attained at least some
measure of acceptance and legitimacy. See, e.g., Necronomicon Transhumanism-Glossary,
http://necronomicontranshumanism.com/glossary.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2008) (listing "Gozer" on a
list of mythological deities and using the descriptions from the motion picture).
34 In fact, although the political economy of this proposition might seem deeply counterintuitive,
equality would be enhanced, not reduced, if no group received exemptions from neutral laws of general
applicability. From my perspective, however, this is not a troubling proposition because a serious com-
mitment to prohibiting both overt and covert discrimination against unpopular minority religions and
religionists would do a better job of securing both equality and significant breathing room for religiously
motivated practices. Thus, the "no religious freedom for anyone" objection to an equality approach fails
to take into account the potential power of the antidiscrimination regime that this Article advocates. See
infra text and accompanying notes 405-27.
35 See infra notes 148-90 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 190-237 and accompanying text.
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Even if equality is the goal, rather than some notion of absolute auton-
omy to pursue religiously motivated conduct, Smith does not go far enough
in advancing the equality project because traditional rationality review per-
mits clever discriminators to escape legal detection. Overt discrimination
against particular religions is relatively rare. Adopting a test that places no
burden whatsoever on the government to demonstrate that the law at issue
actually advances a legitimate state interest creates a real risk that clever
discriminators will beat the rap. The risk of clever discriminators, however,
cannot justify the adoption of the Sherbert test, a test that, as applied, actu-
ally facilitates governmental discrimination against minority religionists.
Accordingly, the Justices should not restore the Sherbert-Yoder strict scru-
tiny standard. Rather, the Court should adopt a more demanding standard
of review than Smith propounds, something akin to "rationality with bite,"
to govern free exercise challenges.37
Traditional rational basis review only asks whether any theoretical, or
hypothesized, rational relationship exists to a legitimate governmental in-
terest; the challenger must essentially prove a negative by eliminating any
real or imagined basis for the enactment." By way of contrast, under "ra-
tionality with bite," the government bears the burden of establishing the ac-
tual reason for the law that would be advanced by applying the law on the
facts presented at bar.39 Although the standard of judicial review ostensibly
remains the same-rationality-shifting the burden of proof to the govern-
ment significantly improves the odds of success for plaintiffs, as does the
requirement that the government establish the actual reason for the enact-
ment. Thus, the government's obligation goes well beyond merely suggest-
ing a purely theoretical interest that might or might not have actually
motivated the legislative body that adopted the law in the first place. This
shift, in the context of free exercise claims, could provide a powerful tool
for rooting out more subtle forms of discrimination against unpopular mi-
nority religions and religionists.
37 See infra notes 383-404 and accompanying text.
38 See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-16, 320 (1993); Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal, 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955). But cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-33 (1996) (purporting to
apply mere rationality review, but shifting the burden to the government to demonstrate the actual rea-
son for its decision and furthermore requiring a basis other than fear or prejudice against gay or lesbian
persons); City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-45 (1985) (same with re-
spect to mentally retarded persons); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("When a law exhibits ... a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have ap-
plied a more searching form of rational basis review."); Goldberg, supra note 15, at 512-18 (describing
and critiquing enhanced rationality review).
39 See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33; Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440-45; U.S. Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973); see also Goldberg, supra note 15, at 534-41 (questioning
the merits and analytical power of tiered scrutiny given the Supreme Court's consistent cheating with
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Thus, reviewing courts should require the federal and state govern-
ments, in enforcing neutral laws of general applicability, to shoulder the
burden of establishing that the enforcement effort rationally advances the
state's interest in maintaining the policy. Moreover, it might also be neces-
sary to permit plaintiffs to rebut the government's initial showing of ration-
ality by establishing that, on the facts presented, the government would
likely not enforce the policy against secular violators. The focus of the in-
quiry should not be on whether religious autonomy values have been unrea-
sonably squelched, but rather on whether covert discrimination animated
(or even seriously influenced) the government's action. In other words, the
gravamen of a free exercise claim should be denial of equal treatment,
rather than respect for religious autonomy.
An equalitarian reading of the Free Exercise Clause is necessary be-
cause federal and state court judges have proven incapable of evenhanded
enforcement of an autonomy-based understanding of the Clause. Simply
put, empirical data show conclusively that minority religionists brought
more cases pre-Smith, and lost a much higher percentage of them, than did
majority religious groups, such as mainline Protestants. 0 The Free Exercise
Clause should enhance the equal dignity of all sects, and not serve to am-
plify the preferred position of sects associated with dominant groups within
the community.
Moreover, and contrary to Judge Michael McConnell's thesis,4' the
legislative history of the Free Exercise Clause establishes that the Framers
of the Clause, and particularly James Madison, understood the provision in
equalitarian, rather than autonomy-enhancing, terms. 2 Accordingly, if one
believes that contemporary understandings of the Constitution should in-
corporate, to the extent feasible, the intentions of the Framers, one should
prefer the equalitarian interpretation to the autonomy-enhancing interpreta-
tion. Thus, my argument in favor of an equalitarian reading of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause rests on both normative and empirical arguments in addition
to the historical evidence regarding the Framers' views. The Free Exercise
40 See infra text and accompanying notes 284-315; see also Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 11,
at 501 ("[R]eligion-based variables proved to be steady influences on judicial disposition of religious
freedom claims, emerging as statistically significant across multiple models and independent of other
background and political variables commonly used in empirical tests ofjudicial behavior.").
41 McConnell, supra note 2, at 116-17, 137-40 (arguing that Smith adopts an "interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause that permits the state to interfere with religious practices ... without any substan-
tial justification, that a better reading of the Clause would "preserve what Madison called 'the full and
equal rights of conscience' of religious believers and communities to define their way of life, so long as
they do not interfere with the rights of others," and that Smith makes the state "more powerful" to ad-
vance "homogenization" of religion, by marginalizing unpopular religions with nontraditional practices,
treating free exercise as an unwarranted "special benefit," and rendering the Free Exercise Clause little
more than a weak "nondiscrimination" requirement); McConnell, Origins and Historical Understand-
ing, supra note 6, at 1413-16 (arguing that the historical evidence supports "Sherbert's interpretation of
the free exercise clause").
42 See infra notes 325-71 and accompanying text.
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Clause should be interpreted and applied in a way that will advance the
equal dignity of all religious sects, rather than in a fashion that enhances the
religious liberty of some, but not all, religionists. Applying rationality with
bite, rather than traditional rationality review, would significantly advance
the core values of the Free Exercise Clause without creating the serious
risks of discriminatory enforcement associated with the pre-Smith Sherbert-
Yoder regime that relied on generic strict scrutiny review of all free exercise
claims. Thus, a more narrowly tailored theory of the Free Exercise Clause
(equality rather than autonomy), coupled with a less demanding standard of
review (rationality with bite, rather than strict scrutiny), would actually bet-
ter secure religious liberty for unpopular minority religions and religionists.
Part II considers the Supreme Court's efforts to define and enforce the
Free Exercise Clause, the sustained scholarly support for Sherbert and Yo-
der, and the consistent scholarly disapprobation of Smith. Part III examines
the plausibility of religious autonomy as the principal animating purpose of
the Free Exercise Clause. It finds this approach unpersuasive, particularly
when considered in light of the Supreme Court's alarmingly consistent eth-
nocentric rhetoric and the results in free exercise cases. This Part also
brings to bear social science literature that strongly suggests that judges
simply are not capable of treating culturally transgressive religions and re-
ligionists at full parity with more mainstream religions and religionists. In
addition, Part III considers empirical evidence demonstrating persistent ju-
dicial bias in deciding free exercise claims under the strict scrutiny regime:
in the pre-Smith era, minority religionists brought a disproportionate num-
ber of free exercise claims and lost a much higher proportion of these
claims than members of more mainstream sects.
Part IV presents an alternative, equality-based theory of the Free Exer-
cise Clause and, using original source materials, suggests that an equali-
tarian conception of the Clause better comports with the original intent of
the Framers. This Part also argues that an equalitarian reading of the Free
Exercise Clause helps to resolve the inherent tension between the Free Ex-
ercise and Establishment Clauses, and that Smith better advances equality
among religious sects than did Sherbert and Yoder. Finally, in Part V, the
Article advances some preliminary thoughts on how an equalitarian vision
of the Free Exercise Clause might be operationalized in doctrinal terms.
II. FREE EXERCISE AND RELIGIOUS AUTONOMY
The Free Exercise Clause, according to one interpretation, creates a
substantive right to exemptions from generally applicable laws that burden
religious practice. Under this "religious autonomy" view, the Free Exercise
Clause exists to protect religionists from choosing between their duties to
God and their duties to the government. Many contemporary academics
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support theorizing the Free Exercise Clause in autonomy terms, but doctri-
nally, this approach represents something of a newcomer.43
A. From Reynolds to Sherbert: Doctrinal Evolution of the Free Exercise
Clause as Rights-Generating
The Supreme Court initially rejected, rather flatly, any suggestion that
the Free Exercise Clause created exemptions from general laws. In 1879, in
the case of Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that
"[1]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot in-
terfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."'
In rejecting a Free Exercise Clause defense to a criminal conviction for po-
lygamy in the territorial courts of Utah, the Court drew a strong distinction
between belief and action premised on belief: "Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."45 Be-
cause of longstanding legal proscriptions against polygamy in the United
States and the United Kingdom, the Court reasoned that it was "impossible
to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended
to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social
life., 46
Reynolds remained the Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause for many years. Almost seventy years later, in
Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court invoked Reynolds in rejecting
a free exercise challenge to a state child labor law that prohibited minors
from selling religious tracts on the public streets. 47  And, in a reprise of
Reynolds in a Mann Act prosecution," the Supreme Court rejected a limited
reading of the Act in order to sustain convictions premised not on prostitu-
tion, but rather on polygamy.49
43 See infra notes 49-69 and accompanying text.
44 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
45 Id. at 164.
46 Id. at 165.
47 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
48 White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2422 (2000); see also Hoke & Economides
v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1913) (upholding the constitutional validity of the Mann Act).
The Mann Act, also known as the "White Slavery Act," prohibited the transportation of a woman across
state lines "for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or any other immoral purpose." Polygamy, un-
like prostitution or "debauchery," can occur in a stable set of consenting relationships and does not nec-
essarily imply promiscuity or sexual licentiousness. In other words, fidelity within a polygamous
relationship is not an oxymoron and arguably distinguishes such relationships in a material way from
prostitution and debauchery. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 26-27 (1946) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that polygamy is an accepted part of some cultures and that it is entirely distin-
guishable from prostitution, debauchery, or "immoral purposes," and that to classify polygamy with
these practices "do[es] violence to the anthropological factors involved").
49 Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 18-19.
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Indeed, as late as 1961, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the central hold-
ing of Reynolds in rejecting a challenge to Pennsylvania's Sunday closing
law." The plaintiffs, Orthodox Jews, sought an exemption from the law be-
cause they voluntarily closed on Saturdays (their day of religious obliga-
tion). " Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren explained that
"[c]ompulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship is strictly forbidden," and "[t]he freedom to hold religious
beliefs and opinions is absolute."52 Even so, "the freedom to act, even when
the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, is not totally free
from legislative restrictions."53 Invoking Reynolds,54 the majority ridiculed
the idea of a religious exemption from the Sunday closing law because "[t]o
strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes
only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion. . would radically re-
strict the operating latitude of the legislature."55
Chief Justice Warren stated the test for a Free Exercise Clause viola-
tion as follows:
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all relig-
ions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitu-
tionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect. But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals,
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless
the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a
burden. 6
Chief Justice Warren's test generally would insulate neutral laws of general
applicability from serious free exercise challenges.
Justice William Brennan wrote a partial dissent criticizing the major-
ity's stated standard of review. 7 Justice Brennan contended that "the ap-
propriate standard of constitutional adjudication" in free exercise cases is
neither "whether the challenged law is rationally related to some legitimate
legislative end," nor whether "the State's interest is substantial and impor-
50 Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
51 Id. at 601-02.
52 Id. at 603.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 603, 605.
55 Id. at 606.
56 Id. at 607.
57 Id. at 610 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pail).
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tant, as well as rationally justifiable." 8 Instead, Justice Brennan argued that
the "compelling state interest" test should govern such cases. 9
It was not until Sherbert v. Verner,6" in 1963, that the Supreme Court
held the Free Exercise Clause to require the government to recognize ex-
emptions to general laws in order to facilitate private religious practice. In
Sherbert, Justice Brennan mustered a majority in favor of the proposition
that if a neutral law of general applicability burdens religiously motivated
conduct, the law must serve "some compelling state interest."'"
Indeed, because Sherbert could be read as addressing religious dis-
crimination," one could date the idea of the Free Exercise Clause as a shield
against general laws that inhibit religiously motivated behavior even later,
to 1972 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.63 In Yoder, the Supreme Court invalidated,
at least as applied to members of the Old Order Amish faith, a Wisconsin
compulsory school attendance law that generally required minors to attend
high school until the age of sixteen.' In doing so, Chief Justice Burger
squarely rejected the central holding of Reynolds. He stated:
But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the
broad police power of the state is not to deny that there are areas of conduct
58 Id. at 611.
59 Id. at 612-14 (arguing that strict judicial scrutiny should apply "as the test of legislation under all
clauses of the First Amendment" and then asking, "What, then, is the compelling state interest which
impels the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impede appellants' freedom of worship?").
60 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
61 Id. at 406; see id. at 403 (quoting the compelling state interest test as used in free speech and free
association cases, and holding it to be applicable in context of free exercise claims). South Carolina ar-
gued that maintaining the financial solvency of the state unemployment program and avoiding fraudu-
lent claims required categorical exclusion of all persons able, but unwilling, to work in an otherwise
available job (for whatever reason). Id. at 407-08. Justice Brennan found that the interest asserted was
not sufficient and, moreover, that the means selected were not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in
preserving the solvency of the fund. See id. at 407 ("For even if the possibility of spurious claims did
threaten to dilute the fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the
appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without in-
fringing First Amendment rights.").
62 See id. at 406 ("Significantly South Carolina expressly saves the Sunday worshipper from having
to make the kind of choice which we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian's religious liberty."); id ("The
unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus compounded by the religious dis-
crimination which South Carolina's general statutory scheme necessarily effects.").
63 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that
only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion."). To be sure, it would be plausible to cite Sherbert as establish-
ing a generic rule of strict scrutiny review for laws that prohibit or impede religiously motivated behav-
iors. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 ("We must next consider whether some compelling state interest
enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement
of appellant's First Amendment right.").
64 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-08.
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protected by the Free Exercise Clause... and thus beyond the power of the
State to control, even under regulations of general applicability.65
The Court had a duty to consider "the State's broader contention that its in-
terest in its system of compulsory education is so compelling that even the
established religious practices of the Amish must give way."66 Thus, Yoder
squarely rejected the Reynolds belief-conduct dichotomy and established a
regime of strict scrutiny of neutral laws of general applicability that materi-
ally burden religiously motivated conduct.
Thus, no later than 1972, and arguably as early as 1963, the Supreme
Court embraced a broader conception of the Free Exercise Clause-indeed,
a conception that applied the most demanding standard of review known to
American constitutional jurisprudence.67 This development was a complete
revolution in free exercise doctrine. The reason for the change was clear:
the Supreme Court asserted that religious minorities required the protection
of the Free Exercise Clause because legislative bodies could not be relied
upon to vindicate the rights of such groups.68
The problem with this approach, however, is that it assumes that judges
are capable of applying strict scrutiny in free exercise disputes in an even-
handed and principled fashion. The subsequent cases in the Sherbert-Yoder
line strongly suggest that "religion" is such a culturally defined concept that
judges simply will not extend the full protection of the law to new, non-
traditional religious movements.69 Moreover, the devices used to deny pro-
tection, including finding no burden on religion, only an "indirect" burden
on a religion, or that the government's interest is sufficiently compelling to
overbear whatever burden the policy imposes on the religion and its adher-
ents, degrade and marginalize minority religionists.7t  The result is highly
ironic: a jurisprudence developed ostensibly to protect the autonomy of re-
ligious minorities results in a greater, rather than lesser, disparity in reli-
gious freedom for members of minority (or nontraditional) religions.
65 Id. at 220.
66 Id. at 221.
67 See supra text and accompanying notes 12-16.
68 See ELY, supra note 23, at 75-77, 87-88, 101-03, 116-17, 135-79 (arguing that constitutional
text should be interpreted to facilitate "representation reinforcement" by correcting for systematic fail-
ures of democratic institutions to protect minority groups); see also United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (noting that courts generally will presume the constitutional valid-
ity of legislative classifications provided that they rationally relate to a legitimate state purpose, but that
courts must engage in more careful judicial review when a classification burdens a "discrete and insular
minority" that might face systemic prejudice in a democratically elected legislature or when a law in-
fringes a "fundamental right," such as the freedom of speech).
69 See infra text and accompanying notes 191-237.
70 See infra text and accompanying notes 212-37.
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B. Smith and Free Exercise Clause Atavism
The religious autonomy approach of Sherbert and Yoder did not pre-
vail for long. In 1990, the Supreme Court effectively abandoned the Sher-
bert-Yoder line of cases and restored Reynolds.' Writing for the majority
in Smith, Justice Scalia explained that "[t]he free exercise of religion means,
first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doc-
trine one desires," so that governmental efforts to regulate or compel reli-
gious beliefs are facially unconstitutional." On the other hand, if a law
"prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the object of the [law] but
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.""3 Invoking Rey-
nolds,74 Justice Scalia concluded that the Supreme Court's decisions "have
consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individ-
ual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general ap-
plicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes). ,"
75
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's opinion in Smith returned free exer-
cise jurisprudence to its pre-Warren Court form. 76 In this sense, then, Smith
constitutes a major revision of the Supreme Court's free exercise jurispru-
dence. One should also recognize, however, that Sherbert and Yoder were
themselves departures from the baseline established in Reynolds in 1879,
which was followed consistently until 1963.
After Smith the Supreme Court embraced an equalitarian vision of the
Free Exercise Clause, rather than a theory of free exercise rooted in reli-
71 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
72 Id. at 877.
73 Id. at 878.
74 See id. at 879 ("We first had occasion to assert [the belief-conduct dichotomy] in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), where we rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy
could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice.").
75 Id. at 879 (citations omitted).
76 It bears noting that Justice Scalia did not formally overrule any prior precedents in Smith, but in-
stead made nominal efforts to distinguish specific cases in the Sherbert-Yoder line that granted religious
exemptions. See id. at 881-85. With respect to the unemployment cases, he argued that the programs
involved individualized determinations not present in "a generally applicable criminal law" banning the
possession or use of peyote, see id. at 884-85; with respect to the other exemption-granting cases, like
Yoder itself, Justice Scalia argued that they all involved "hybrid" claims that implicated the Free Exer-
cise Clause and some other substantive constitutional right, such as fundamental substantive due process
rights, see id. at 881-82. The dissenting members of the Supreme Court, including Justices O'Connor
and Blackmun, persuasively refuted these arguments. See id. at 895-97, 900-02 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 908-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, scholarly commentary on this aspect of Smith
has been uniformly critical. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 2, at 2-4, 7-10, 12, 17-21, 41-53 (critiquing
both the merits of Smith and Justice Scalia's treatment of past precedent); Marshall, supra note 32, at
308-09 ("The Smith opinion itself, however, cannot be readily defended. The decision, as written, is
neither persuasive nor well crafted. It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exercise jurispru-
dence and its use of precedent borders on fiction.").
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gious autonomy.77 Thus, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, the Supreme Court found that a series of local ordinances de-
signed and enacted to prohibit Santerians from practicing ritual animal sac-
rifice violated the Free Exercise Clause." The Supreme Court reasoned
that, although neutral laws of general applicability incidentally burdening
religious practices need "not be justified by a compelling governmental in-
terest," "[a] law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance
that interest."79 In conducting an inquiry into a law's neutrality, the Su-
preme Court ruled that "[f]acial neutrality is not determinative."8 A re-
viewing court must consider not only the text of the law, but also the
legislative history, to determine if a facially neutral law was the product of
religious bias."'
The ordinances at issue in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye were nei-
ther neutral nor of general applicability. 2 Nor did the laws advance a com-
pelling governmental interest in a narrowly tailored way; the laws
specifically targeted Santerian practices and specifically exempted virtually
all animal slaughter practices, save Santerian ritual animal sacrifice. 3 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court invalidated the local ordinances on Free Ex-
ercise Clause grounds because they were adopted expressly to extirpate
Santerian religious rites within the municipality and had the effect of ban-
ning Santerian, but no other, animal slaughter practices.
The key to the outcome in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was not
an autonomy interest in practicing animal sacrifice incident to Santerian
rites. A generic animal cruelty law might well prohibit Santerian religious
practices, and such a law would be constitutional against a free exercise ob-
jection if adopted without animus toward the Santerian (or another) sect.
Rather, the outcome turned on the presence of overt religious discrimination
against the Santerian faith. The Supreme Court reasoned that the govern-
ment has an obligation to refrain from overtly discriminatory regulations of
77 See Meyler, supra note 30, at 276 ("Recent religion clause jurisprudence has placed a priority
upon equality-whether rejecting only those laws targeted against, rather than those burdening, the prac-
tices of minority religions or upholding the evenhanded distribution of public funds to religious and non-
religious providers.").
78 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
79 Id. at 531-32.
80 Id. at 534. Justice Scalia objected to this methodology because it shifts the focus from "the object
of the laws at issue to consider the subjective motivation of the lawmakers." Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., con-
curring). Because the legislative enactments themselves reflected facial discrimination based on reli-
gious belief, for example by specifying only animal "sacrifice" for proscription and then exempting all
other slaughter methods, including other religiously inspired methods, such as those associated with ko-
sher food preparation, Justice Scalia argued that the strict scrutiny standard of review applied and that
Hialeah's ordinances failed to meet this standard of review. Id.
81 See id. at 534-42 (majority opinion).
82 Id. at 545-46.
83 See id. at 546-47.
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religious practices.8 4 This approach to conceptualizing the Free Exercise
Clause plainly rests on an equalitarian, rather than libertarian, basis.85
Even if the Free Exercise Clause should be read as a mandate for reli-
gious equality, Smith might be insufficiently demanding of government.
The City of Hialeah's bias was overt, outrageous, and glaringly obvious.86
Not all discriminators will approach their objective so transparently or even
so self-consciously. Even if one agrees with Smith's equalitarian orienta-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause, one should question whether the Supreme
Court's current nondiscrimination rules are sufficiently robust to protect
adequately against clever religious discriminators.
In cases decided subsequent to Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the
Supreme Court has made clear that the rule against religious discrimination
does not compel governmental funding of religion, religious institutions, or
religious studies.88 Characterizing "the State's disfavor of religion (if it can
be called that)" as being "a far milder kind," the Court in Locke v. Davey
noted that the funding program at issue did not impose "criminal [or] civil
sanctions on any type of religious service or rite," nor did it "deny to minis-
ters the right to participate in the political affairs of the community," and "it
[did] not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and re-
ceiving a government benefit."89 Accordingly, "[t]he State has merely cho-
sen not to fund a distinct category of instruction," a policy not inconsistent
with the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause.9
All the while, Smith has remained a viable judicial precedent. At the
same time, however, the Justices have held that legislatures may enact ge-
neric religious exemptions to general laws in order to safeguard religiously
motivated conduct.9 Although Smith has generated a great deal of negative
scholarly commentary, the Supreme Court seems committed to its holding.
84 Id. at 533-35, 540.
85 In fact, the majority even invokes equal protection reasoning, and case law, in support of its gen-
eral analysis of the Church's Free Exercise Clause claim. See id at 540-41.
86 The case also shows that the standard of review can be decoupled from the underlying theory of
the Free Exercise Clause; in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Supreme Court deployed strict scru-
tiny in the service of promoting equality, rather than autonomy. See id. at 533-42. Obviously, though,
even if one applied rationality with bite, Hialeah still would have lost the case because hatred of Santeria
is not a legitimate governmental interest. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); see also U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973). Even if one applies
strict scrutiny in cases involving overt forms of religious discrimination, this does not answer the ques-
tion of the most appropriate standard of review in a case where the facts do not provide a "smoking
gun." To make the framework a binary one-strict review or no review-underprotects religious mi-
norities from clever discriminators.
87 See infra notes 383-404 and accompanying text.
88 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004).
89 Id. at 720-21.
90 Id. at 721.
91 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714-16 (2005).
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The Justices essentially reaffirmed Smith in 199792 and again in 2006-
although it bears noting that some members of the Court have expressed
continuing misgivings about the holding.94
C. Scholarly Support for an Autonomy-Enhancing Reading of the
Free Exercise Clause
Contemporary scholarly commentary has been harshly critical of Smith
and generally more sympathetic to Sherbert and Yoder. The dominant view
is that the Free Exercise Clause should be read as creating a substantive
right to pursue one's religion-not merely by protecting an individual's
ability to believe in a religious doctrine, but also by allowing one to con-
form her actions to the dictates of her religion.95 In other words, the right to
free exercise should extend to protect religiously motivated conduct and
should support religious exemptions from neutral laws of general applica-
bility.
Professor Laycock, for example, asserts that Smith left the Free Exer-
cise Clause with "little independent substantive content" and opened the
door to religious discrimination. 6 He argues that "[i]f the Court intends to
defer to any formally neutral law restricting religion, then it has created a
legal framework for persecution, and persecutions will result."97 Laycock's
recommendation necessarily assumes that if the Supreme Court restored the
Sherbert-Yoder approach to free exercise claims, federal and state court
judges would enforce the pre-Smith regime of strict scrutiny in an even-
handed fashion.
Even Laycock, however, admits that an evenhanded application of
Sherbert is unlikely, because "judges are more likely to respond sympa-
thetically to religious claims that are familiar, easily understood, and un-
92 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-34 (1997).
93 See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
94 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that Smith
adopted an improper standard for deciding free exercise claims.); id at 565-66 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Smith was wrongly decided and noting the existence of "serious doubts about the prece-
dential value of the Smith rule and its entitlement to adherence"); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I
agree with Justice O'Connor that the Court should direct the parties to brief the question whether [Smith]
was correctly decided, and set the case for reargument."); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 564, 570-71 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (calling for reconsideration
of Smith). 0 Centro Espirita cited Smith in a neutral fashion and treated it as a background principle of
law without provoking a concurring opinion. See 0 Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 424, 431-32, 439.
Whether this says anything about a change of heart among the Smith skeptics is open to serious doubt
because the case involved a purely statutory claim, involving the application of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act to the federal government, rather than the Free Exercise Clause itself.
95 But cf EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 31, at 81-90, 93-120 (defending Smith in a limited way
and arguing that "an equality-based approach can provide a robust basis for accommodating religious
conduct").
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threatening."98 He suggests, however, that this "problem cannot be solved
by judicial abdication, because legislators are even more likely to favor fa-
miliar faiths with enough adherents to matter at the polls."99 Yet even if ju-
dicial enforcement of free exercise rights is necessary because the political
process cannot be relied upon to protect marginal or unpopular religious
minorities,' 0 this reality does not address whether Sherbert-Yoder's auton-
omy-based vision, enforced through a strict scrutiny test, most effectively
minimizes the risk of judicial bias. Acknowledging the problem of bias in
both judicial and legislative actors, but not addressing the problem in a seri-
ous way, represents an insufficient response to the problem-even if judges
are relatively less biased than legislators (a proposition that Laycock does
not support empirically), the problem of judicial bias constitutes a signifi-
cant unresolved issue for any regime of selective exemptions from general
laws.
Laycock argues that, even assuming that Smith correctly identified
equality as the animating purpose of the Free Exercise Clause, Smith never-
theless fails adequately to advance religious equality. He states: "A serious
requirement of formal neutrality must consider legislative motive, religious
gerrymanders, exceptions, exemptions, defenses, gaps in coverage, actual or
potential bias in enforcement, and whether the state regulates comparable
secular conduct or pursues its alleged interests in secular contexts."'' ° Lay-
cock is concerned that Justice Scalia's desire in Smith to keep exemption
cases out of the courts might result in courts failing to vigorously check for
"bad motive or religious gerrymander."'' Deference to a legislature should
not extend, even under an equality-based approach to the Free Exercise
Clause, to facially neutral laws that suffer from a discriminatory purpose
and that also have a discriminatory effect on religious minorities. He ar-
gues that "[t]he Court must perform at least this task, and insist that trial
judges perform it" because "[i]f the Court will not do this much, it has cre-
ated a legal framework for persecution."''
Despite Laycock's criticism of Smith, his argument for a meaningful
commitment to religious equality does not necessarily require adherence to
the strict scrutiny regime of Sherbert and Yoder. If the use of strict scrutiny
incident to an autonomy-based construction of free exercise rights actually
results in less religious equality because of culturally biased judges, a rea-
98 Id. at 14.
99 Id. at 14-15.
100 See generally ELY, supra note 23.
101 Laycock, supra note 2, at 42; see also id. at 54 (warning that post-Smith the federal courts "may
be myopic or deferential in considering claims that analogous secular behavior has gone unregulated");
id. at 59 (arguing that a meaningful commitment to religious equality requires that "laws that burden re-
ligious practice ... be scrutinized for evidence of anti-religious motive, religious gerrymander, or secu-
lar exemptions not available to churches or believers").
102 Id. at 54.
103 Id. at 59.
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sonable observer might reject Justice Brennan's preferred doctrinal means
of achieving the substantive end of equality.
Like Professor Laycock, Professor Greenawalt endorses the regime of
strict scrutiny that existed before Smith because "[a]part from genuinely
neutral laws, we must worry that if the majority of the population is re-
pelled by a religious faith, a legislature may cleverly adopt a law to discour-
age its exercise, but do so in an ostensibly neutral way that successfully
disguises its real motivation."' 4 He argues that unless "the administrative
problems with a more protective standard are truly overwhelming," strict
scrutiny review of neutral laws of general applicability would best protect
minority religionists. 1°5 For Greenawalt (as well as for Laycock and
McConnell) the problem of cultural bias among governmental officers gen-
erally (and presumably including not only legislators, but also judges and
executive officers drawn from the same political community as legislators),
although acknowledged, is not sufficiently pressing to justify a less de-
manding regime than strict judicial review." 6
Interestingly, both McConnell and Laycock slide into the trap of judg-
ing religious claimants by the vintage of their faith. In criticizing Smith,
McConnell objects that the Supreme Court "has adopted an interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause that permits the state to interfere with religious
practices-even to make the central ceremonies of some ancient faiths ille-
gal or impossible-without any substantial justification."'0 7  In a similar
fashion, Laycock observes that the Smith Court "held that criminal punish-
ment of the central religious ritual of an ancient faith raises no issue under
the free exercise clause and requires no governmental justification."'0 8
Why do both McConnell and Laycock, much like Chief Justice Burger
in Yoder,"°9 invoke the "ancient" nature of the particular sect denied relief in
Smith? If a primary reason for extending judicial protection to minority re-
ligionists relates to the insensitivity of elected legislative and executive
branch officials, why would advocates of religious tolerance themselves
suggest the age of a religion as an appropriate marker of a bona fide relig-
ion? Arguably, newly founded religions should have a stronger claim on
judicial protection under the Free Exercise Clause than longstanding or an-
cient religions, precisely because new religious organizations will have the
least cultural salience, and therefore have the lowest standing before popu-
larly elected governmental officials.
104 Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 154.
105 Id. at 155.
106 See id at 154; Laycock, supra note 2, at 1-4, 7-10, 59-68; McConnell, supra note 2, at 172-75.
107 McConnell, supra note 2, at 116 (emphasis added).
108 Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1000 (1990) (emphasis added).
109 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 225, 227, 229 (1972) (invoking the age of the religion as
reason for taking seriously the request for an exemption from a neutral law that prohibits truancy).
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A related problem arises from the precise reason for embracing strict
scrutiny. McConnell initially objects to characterizing free exercise claims
in terms of "autonomy": "Rather than understanding religion as a matter
over which we have no control-the demands of a transcendent authority-
it has become common to regard religion as valuable and important only
because it is what we choose..". ° Rejecting "the free exercise right as a
right of personal autonomy or self-definition," McConnell suggests that re-
ligion is not "an individualistic choice" but rather "the irresistible convic-
tion of the authority of God."'' Accordingly, "[t]he Free Exercise Clause
does not protect autonomy; it protects obligation." '112
Of course, whether one views religiously motivated behavior as voli-
tional or not, from the perspective of a court considering a litigant's claim
for a judicial exemption from a neutral law of general applicability, the
claimant squarely presents an autonomy claim. Indeed, after so carefully
rejecting the framing of free exercise claims in libertarian terms, McConnell
himself slips into this same nomenclature: "A final threat to religious
autonomy arises from governmental control over many of the institutions of
education and culture.' 13  Thus even McConnell, speaking in ordinary lan-
guage, frames the interests of religious communities in the language of
autonomy, rather than the language of obligation.
It thus should not be surprising that judges reviewing free exercise
claims under the Sherbert-Yoder regime framed and analyzed claims in
terms of autonomy or liberty, rather than obligation. And in weighing the
merits of such claims against general community regulations, autonomy
claims are plainly less pressing to most judges than claims seeking not spe-
cial treatment, but merely equal treatment.114 If I am correct in thinking that
110 McConnell, supra note 2, at 172.
III Id.
112 Id. at 173.
113 Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
114 A comparison of statutory enactments that define rights by reference to equality norms with
statutes that define abstract rights to equality and invite open-ended balancing of autonomy claims
against general governmental or social interests is highly instructive. Compare, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2000), and id § 1982, and Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6, with, e.g., Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213, and Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb-1 to cc-5, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)() (proscription of discrimination based on re-
ligion, which is subject to an "accommodation" standard). See also Laura S. Underkuffler, "Discrimi-
nation" on the Basis of Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment,
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 581, 581-96, 610-11,615-19, 624-25 (1989) (examining the phenomenon of
employers with overtly religious identities and proposing that "[a]n employer's religious policies or
practices should be considered discriminatory" only when they effectively preclude "equal employment
opportunity" but suggesting that religious "reasonable accommodation" rules should protect a worker
who "objects to exposure to a religious work environment," and canvassing the statutory rules and case
law on this subject, because "religious neutrality" in employment cannot, and perhaps should not, be the
goal of Title VII). Asking what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation" is a far less choate and lim-
ited inquiry than determining if African Americans have the same rights to "make and enforce con-
tracts" as "white citizens," see 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or whether election officials in Bolivar County,
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claims to equal treatment present themselves as less demanding of the gen-
eral community, a doctrinal approach to free exercise that frames claims in
equalitarian terms might result in greater respect for religious minorities
than a doctrinal approach that nominally facially grants strong protection
(strict scrutiny) but in reality cannot be used in a fashion that ensures this
result.
Professor Michael Perry does not go as far as Laycock and McConnell
in arguing for the use of a strict scrutiny standard of review in free exercise
cases. Indeed, Perry frames free exercise interests in expressly equalitarian
concerns: "Government may not discriminate against religion in the guise
of protecting an interest it may legitimately protect.""' 5 As he puts the mat-
ter, "[w]hether or not [the free exercise norm] is more than an antidiscrimi-
nation norm, the free exercise norm is an antidiscrimination norm.""'6
Perry's application of the antidiscrimination norm, however, is rela-
tively demanding of the government. He explains that "if government
wants to ban conduct that is a religious practice for some who engage in it,
the free exercise norm requires that government do so for some reason other
than diminished respect and concern for, much less outright hostility to, the
religious group for whom the conduct is a religious practice.""' 7  Once
again, the problem arises that this approach requires a person (whether a po-
lice officer, a public prosecutor, a judge, or a member of a jury), who likely
shares the general community's hostility toward the religionists, to respect
Mississippi, are applying different registration rules based on race. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535
U.S. 391, 396-98 (2002) (discussing the reasonable accommodation concept in the context of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 475, 477-89 (1999)
(reading the ADA narrowly to exclude correctable conditions from the scope of the Act); cf St. Francis
Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-13 (1987) (discussing scope of § 1981 and defining "racial dis-
crimination" very broadly, to include all forms of ethnicity, as ethnicity was understood in the nine-
teenth century when Congress enacted § 1981); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78
(1980) (discussing and applying section 1 of the Voting Rights Act, which bans racially discriminatory
voting practices, and the cases arising under it, and concluding that section 1 prohibits practices that
have a discriminatory impact on voting based on race); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-69
(1976) (holding that § 1981 of Title 42 provides a private right of action for racial discrimination in the
making or enforcement of private contracts). Leveling up to the standard that the majority sets for itself
is an easier task than asking abstractly "what's fair?" Of course equality can be complicated too, be-
cause sometimes equal treatment requires different treatment. See Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power,
and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L.
REV. 1111, 1123-25 (2006); E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII and the "Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 80-89
(1997).
115 Perry, supra note 8, at 299; see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 13-14, 24-29 (1997) (arguing that, at a minimum, the
Free Exercise Clause prohibits governmental discrimination based on religious belief, and might also
conceivably require some affirmative accommodations of religionists).
116 Perry, supra note 8, at 299.
7 Id. at 301.
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an autonomy claim by the religionists in the face of widespread and gener-
alized public hostility.
To illustrate this point, consider a religionist who claims that God re-
quired him to beat his wife because she appeared in public without wearing
a burqa; neither a judge presiding over a criminal trial for assault and bat-
tery nor a jury empanelled to determine the facts would seriously credit the
claim that a religious exemption from the general criminal law should apply
on these facts. Strong cultural norms associated with promoting gender
equality and discouraging spousal abuse will certainly overwhelm any con-
sideration of religious autonomy; moreover, the discounting of the religious
liberty claim will occur in a reflexive, largely unself-conscious fashion.
Were the analysis to occur at a conscious level, it would look something
like this: "Whether or not he believes God so commands him, a matter on
which I harbor doubts, for God does not so command, the state's interest
here clearly outweighs any crazy claim that assault and battery should be
immune from criminal punishment." "Respect and concern" can apply only
to religious claims that do not trespass against deeply held cultural norms."8
Similarly, no matter how innocuous, for example, genital kissing"9 might
be in its local cultural context, "respect and concern" for the practice would
difficult, if not impossible, to secure in the contemporary United States. 2 °
A doctrinal test that requires less of the government might well deliver
more to minority religionists, if judges could apply it with less ethnocentric
bias. A test that asks merely for equality, rather than "respect and concern,"
stands a better chance of evenhanded application. "Respectful" treatment
requires members of the dominant culture to take seriously claims by reli-
gious minorities that seem strange, counterintuitive, or even deeply offen-
sive. In an ideal world, "respect and concern" would be attainable goal, not
only for judges, but also for legislators and executive officials. Sadly, we
do not live in an ideal world.'
118 See WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1-2, 8 (2005)
(discussing the existence and effects of cultural bias on religious autonomy claims and positing that
"[w]hat is arguably impossible is justly enforcing laws granting persons rights that are defined with re-
spect to their religious beliefs or practices"); see also id. at 154 (noting that "religion is not always, in
fact, absolutely free, legally speaking," and that "[t]he right kind of religion, the approved religion, is
always that which is protected, while the wrong kind, whether popular or unpopular, is always restricted
or even prohibited").
119 State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996) (reversing a criminal conviction for genital kissing after
reviewing evidence regarding prevailing Afghan cultural practices).
120 See Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139, 1144-52 (1998) (ex-
amining the importance of cultural understandings of sexual behavior in the specific context of a tradi-
tional Pacific Island culture with non-Western adulthood rites). But cf. Kargar, 629 A.2d at 82-83
(discussing decision to charge and prosecute a Maine father for kissing his son's penis in public).
121 See SULLIVAN, supra note 118, at 151 ("While the legal protection of religious freedom as a po-
litical idea was arguably once a force for tolerance, it has now arguably become a force for intoler-
ance.").
1212
If Judges Were Angels
Even so, I generally endorse Perry's suggestion that free exercise
claimants should be permitted "the possibility of establishing and discern-
ing indirectly that the challenged government action is based on, that it pre-
supposes, diminished respect and concern for the religious group whose
practice is banned,"'' and would suggest that some burden of justification
should rest with the government, rather than leaving it solely with the relig-
ionist. Perry seems to share this view, and takes it a step further by propos-
ing a presumption that:
If government could exempt a religious practice from a ban to which the prac-
tice is subject without seriously compromising either the objective the ban is
designed to serve or any other important governmental objective, but govern-
ment nonetheless refuses to do so, it shall be presumed that the refusal is based
on diminished respect and concern for the religious group whose practice is
banned."'
This interpretative rule, in practice, restores a standard of strict scrutiny for
claims of religious-based exemptions. Although framed in equalitarian
terms, the social costs of such an approach-tolerating deeply offensive
conduct or behavior, such as polygamy or spousal abuse, because a relig-
ionist sincerely believes that God commands it-are likely to lead judges to
reject most claims brought by unpopular minority religionists.'24
Professor Perry is correct to posit equality, rather than autonomy or ab-
solute religious liberty, as the animating purpose of the Free Exercise
Clause. That said, his proposal to effect the antidiscrimination norm is so
demanding of government that it essentially collapses back into a general-
ized grant of autonomy to religionists. The antidiscrimination norm cannot
be so demanding that it renders enforcement of neutral laws of general ap-
plicability against religious objectors impossible.
D. The Textual Objection to Smith
Professors Laycock and Greenawalt both strongly object to Smith on
textual grounds. Greenawalt observes that "[w]ere there no Free Exercise
Clause, targeting of religious practices and discrimination among religions
might well violate the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause,
and in some instances the Free Speech Clause."'25 He then asks post-Smith,
"[w]hat, then, does the Free Exercise Clause do that would be left undone in
122 Perry, supra note 8, at 303.
123 Id. (footnote omitted).
124 In his book, Perry argues that a meaningful commitment to equality requires "government to
maximize the space for religious practice by exempting religious practice from an otherwise applicable
ban or other regulatory restraint that would interfere substantially with a person's ability to engage in the
practice, unless the exemption would seriously compromise an important public interest." PERRY, supra
note 115, at 25. This formulation of the test entirely tracks Justice Brennan's regime of strict scrutiny,
and would accordingly lead to the same results in the real world.
125 Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 159.
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its absence?"' 26 He suggests that "[p]erhaps the Free Exercise Clause helps
a court to decide that targeting and religious discrimination are 'suspect,'
but it hardly seems necessary for that purpose."'27 Greenawalt concludes
that, under Smith, the Free Exercise Clause "now does little work that could
not arguably be done by some other provision, and the Rehnquist Court
opinions have not undertaken to explain what work it does do. Given
Smith, its importance has diminished radically."'28 Greenawalt argues that a
reading of the Free Exercise Clause that limits its effect so drastically
should be rejected in favor of an interpretation that gives the Clause greater
force.
Professor Laycock advances similar objections in support of a textual-
ist objection to Smith. He argues that "[i]f the Court feels free to enforce
the unenumerated rights it likes, and to strip nearly all independent meaning
from the enumerated rights it does not like, it is hard to see how the exis-
tence of a written Constitution affects its decisions." '129 In Laycock's view,
"[t]he point of enumerating certain rights was to ensure that at least those
rights get enforced."'3 ° He characterizes Smith as a rejection of a textual
right "because it does not fit the Court's conception of neutrality" and ob-
jects that the decision "unabashedly substitutes the Court's preferences for
the text of the Constitution," an outcome that "the opponents of judicial ac-
tivism say they most fear."''
These textual objections to Smith, although not without some persua-
sive force, do not raise insurmountable obstacles to Smith's interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause. At the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights,
no Equal Protection Clause existed. Given the history of religious estab-
lishments in the colonies and early Republic,'32 it would not be unreason-
able for the Framers to seek not only to prohibit the creation of an official
national church, but also any governmental effort to create preferences for
particular sects. Viewed from this perspective, the Free Exercise Clause
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 160.
129 Laycock, supra note 2, at 37.
130 Id.; see RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 185-89, 215-17 (2006)
(discussing the importance and limitations of constitutional text in protecting human rights).
131 Laycock, supra note 2, at 38. Laycock actually answers his own objection later in the same arti-
cle, arguing that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause stands as textual evidence that religious speech is central to
the First Amendment, like fully protected political speech and not like commercial speech, obscenity, or
other categories of speech with only limited constitutional protection." Id. at 45. Thus, Laycock ac-
knowledges that establishing the centrality of religious speech constitutes work that the Free Exercise
Clause undertakes post-Smith.
132 See Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate
Law?, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 239, 302 n.69 (2003) (collecting and describing authorities on the common-
place practice of maintaining an established, official church in the states in the pre-Revolutionary and
even post-Revolutionary period).
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would be the mirror image of the Establishment Clause; both clauses exist
to advance a project fundamentally rooted in equality, rather than an abso-
lute liberty for religionists (whether to seek the support of the state or to
seek freedom from government-imposed strictures). 33 Nevertheless, the
Smith skeptics argue that an interpretation of constitutional text that leaves
it without meaning should be rejected.'
The textual objection that Smith's reading of the Free Exercise Clause
unduly robs it of any substantive import is not a particularly compelling
one. The Supreme Court leaves some clauses to the political branches;
other times it chooses to ignore constitutional text in favor of achieving the
same end using alternate text. An objection as to means seems far less
compelling than an objection that relates to ends. If the Supreme Court
permitted overt forms of religious discrimination, that policy would be
highly objectionable. But if the Justices choose to rely on equal protection,
due process, or free speech principles to ward off such discrimination, an
objection as to the precise means used to achieve the end is neither a serious
nor meaningful substantive objection.
Likewise, the textual objection that Smith's reading of the Free Exer-
cise Clause leaves the Clause without meaning is not especially persuasive.
Of course, the objection to Smith cannot be that Congress, the President, or
the state governments cannot respect or enforce the Free Exercise Clause
because each coordinate branch of the federal government and the state
governments remain free post-Smith to rely on the Free Exercise Clause as a
basis for supporting or opposing particular policies that affect religious
practices.'35 The Free Exercise Clause matters, and has important legal ef-
133 For evidence that this interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause enjoys substantial support in the
legislative history of the First Amendment, see infra text and accompanying notes 325-73.
134 See, e.g., Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REv. 299,
308 ("As the analysis implied above suggests, including religion with race as suspect classifications un-
der the equal protection clause has the same effect under modem doctrine as does such a limited inter-
pretation of the free exercise clause."). Of course, Pepper's argument presumes either a facial religious
classification or that the plaintiff can establish religiously discriminatory intent with respect to a facially
neutral classification. It would be possible to read the Free Exercise Clause to impose a burden of justi-
fication on the government even where discriminatory purpose is not evident on the face of a classifica-
tion or in its legislative history. See infra text and accompanying notes 381-404. Such an approach
would give the Free Exercise Clause an independent effect that would go well beyond existing Equal
Protection Clause doctrine. Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-43, 247-48 (1976).
135 See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 346-47, 353-56 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that legislators are no less bound to enforce constitutional norms, and no less capable of this
duty, than are judges; that courts should not invalidate a law "if that law has been passed according the
forms established in the constitution"; and that "it rests with the people [rather than the courts], in whom
full and absolute sovereign power resides to correct legislation, by instructing their representatives to
repeal the obnoxious act"); see William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DUKE L.J. 1, 16-29 (noting that the fact that "the Constitution is a 'written' one yields little or nothing
as to whether acts of Congress may be given the force of positive law notwithstanding the opinion of
judges," that "[u]nwillingness of the courts to give effect to acts of Congress which the Supreme Court
might conclude were repugnant to the Constitution is thus quite unnecessary to the accomplishment of
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fects, if it influences legislative and executive action more frequently than it
receives judicial enforcement. Moreover, there are many provisions of the
Constitution that do not enjoy judicial enforcement.
For example, the Constitution vests the Senate with "the sole power to
try impeachments."' 36 In Nixon v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that the Senate could define an impeachment "trial" in any way that it
wished; the matter was nonjusticiable because of an absence of clear stan-
dards for defining "trial" and the textual commitment of the matter to the
Senate.137 One could reject the Impeachment Trial Clause as a useful ana-
logue on the theory that the Free Exercise Clause, unlike the Impeachment
Trial Clause, does not lack judicially enforceable standards and its en-
forcement is not demonstrably textually committed to a coordinate branch
of the federal government. Although these objections have some merit, the
fact remains that the power of removing a federal executive or judicial offi-
cial from office through impeachment is not judicially reviewable. This
important, indeed crucial, structural right that goes to the very legitimacy of
the federal government is not subject to judicial superintendence. In light
of this fact, is it so untenable to vest primary responsibility for the enforce-
ment of the Free Exercise Clause in the political branches?
The Guaranty Clause138 perhaps provides a better analogue to the Free
Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court consistently has held that the Guar-
anty Clause is not judicially enforceable;'39 enforcement of the Clause rests
with Congress and the President. The Supreme Court's reasoning for this
approach relates to the lack of clear standards regarding whether a particu-
lar state government is "republican" in nature and the difficulties associated
with divergent pronouncements regarding the legitimate government of a
state. '40
several significant purposes which might still be served," and that nothing in the text of the Constitution
itself compels the conclusion that the Judiciary must enjoy primacy over the executive and legislative
branches in interpreting and enforcing constitutional limitations on the federal and state governments);
cf id. at 34-45 (arguing that the merits lie with Chief Justice John Marshall's claim for judicial suprem-
acy in interpreting the Constitution if one takes into account extratextual sources, such as James Madi-
son's Notes on the Federal Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the contemporary practice at the time
of the Framing in several state supreme courts, which enjoyed the power of judicial review).
136 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeach-
ments.").
137 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-38 (1993). Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist explained that in addition to the clear "textual commitment" of the issue to the Senate, id.
at 236, there was no "judicially manageable standard" to apply in policing the metes and bounds of the
power "to try," id at 230, and the Constitution's language "does not provide an identifiable textual limit
on the authority which is committed to the Senate," id. at 238.
138 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (providing, in relevant part, that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government").
139 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42-45 (1849); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
218-26 (1962) (discussing Luther and the other cases holding the Guaranty Clause to be nonjusticiable).
140 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 220-22; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 165-67
(1803) (observing in dicta that "the President is invested with certain important political powers in the
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Again, however, advocates of a stronger judicial role in the enforce-
ment of the Free Exercise Clause could object that the Guaranty Clause is a
structural provision of the Constitution rather than a discrete human right.
Judicial policing of the metes and bounds of political structures might be
seen as less essential than enforcement of basic human rights. Although the
ability to ensure some measure of political accountability from state and lo-
cal governments may actually constitute an important human right, one can
concede the imprecise nature of the analogy and still not concede the entire
argument. One could draw a distinction, for example, between collective
human rights (the Guaranty Clause) and individual human rights (the Free
Exercise Clause). However, this objection also can be met, at least in part.
Even constitutional provisions securing individual human rights, how-
ever, are not uniformly subject to stringent judicial enforcement. The fed-
eral Judiciary has made little, if any, sustained effort to enforce the
strictures of the Ninth Amendment. 4' Although the Casey and Roe courts
invoked the Ninth Amendment in passing,' the Amendment has never
served as the basis for any majority opinion protecting a fundamental, yet
unenumerated, human right. Instead, the Equal Protection Clause and the
Due Process Clauses have been deployed in a fashion that essentially ren-
ders the Ninth Amendment nugatory. Interestingly, not all advocates of
vigorous enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause consistently champion
the forlorn Ninth Amendment. If no rights-granting provision should be
rendered "redundant" with other constitutional provisions, the judicial
stranding of the Ninth Amendment is very difficult to explain.
The Petition Clause 43 presents an even clearer example of a rights-
granting provision that lacks significant judicial enforcement.' 1  The Su-
preme Court has merged the Petition Clause into the other provisions of the
First Amendment, holding that these rights are all "cut from the same
exercise of which he is to use his discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political char-
acter, and to his own conscience"; that the Judiciary possesses "no power to control that discretion"; and
accordingly that "the decision of the executive is conclusive" over such matters, thus establishing the
theoretical, textual, and doctrinal basis for the political question doctrine, under which the Supreme
Court subsequently has held that the Guaranty Clause is not subject to judicial enforcement).
141 U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). For an argument that the federal courts
should undertake greater efforts to enforce the Ninth Amendment, see Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth
Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006). See also BENNETT B. PATTERSON, THE
FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS
UNDER SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF TODAY (1955); Knowlton H. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution, II IND. L.J. 309 (1936).
142 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120-22 (1973).
143 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging... the right of the people
... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
14 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L.
REv. 1239 (2008); see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1985).
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cloth" '145 and "inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that
gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble."'46 Thus, the Su-
preme Court routinely dismisses Petition Clause claims, invoking the "cut
from the same cloth" language as a justification for refusing to give the Pe-
tition Clause a significant doctrinal role in securing expressive freedom
separate and distinct from the Speech, Press, and Assembly Clauses. Why
is the Free Exercise Clause more important than the Ninth Amendment or
the Petition Clause, if the objection rests on a rule that all provisions of the
Bill of Rights must do significant independent work?
One could object that the Ninth Amendment, unlike the Free Exercise
Clause, does not guarantee any particular right, but rather states a truism-
that matters not left to the federal or state governments remain vested with
the people. But this interpretation of the Ninth Amendment makes the
Amendment largely redundant with the Tenth Amendment,'47 which di-
rectly addresses the notion of vertical federalism's requirement of limited
and separated powers between the federal and state governments. More-
over, a generic guarantee of fundamental rights seems essentially more, not
less, important than a more specific guarantee. If the Ninth Amendment's
banishment to the constitutional closet is not a cause for righteous indigna-
tion, then one should question whether an interpretation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause that limits its importance (in light of the Free Speech, Equal
Protection, and Due Process Clauses) should be rejected out of hand as
anomalous. But the Petition Clause is the first cousin of the Free Exercise
Clause; clearly no absolute textual imperative exists for giving every provi-
sion of the Bill of Rights, or even the First Amendment itself, strong judicial
enforcement.
Moreover, in the case of the Free Exercise Clause, reliance on alternate
constitutional text to protect against religious discrimination has the salu-
tary effect of resolving the potential tension that otherwise might exist be-
tween the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Compelling
governments to accommodate religious practices that transgress neutral
laws of general applicability would entail at least some measure of privileg-
ing, if not "establishing," religion. Reliance on free speech, equal protec-
tion, and due process principles avoids this tension.
All of this said, however, the critics of Smith nevertheless put forth a
serious objection with substantial merit-although it does not rest on a tex-
tualist basis. Even if the Free Exercise Clause retains independent meaning
post-Smith, and even if the absence of such meaning would not make the
Smith decision self-evidently wrong, Smith does suffer from a significant
drawback. It frames the equality project in far too narrow of terms, leaving
145 McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482.
146 Id. at 485.
147 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
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the road relatively clear for clever discriminators. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has not modified due process, equal protection, or free speech juris-
prudence to take into account this potential for discrimination. Thus, even
though, as the subsequent materials show, the compelling state interest test
under Sherbert and Yoder disserved equality values, Smith's reflexive def-
erence to government underenforces the Free Exercise Clause's antidis-
crimination mandate.
III. THE IRONY OF AUTONOMY AS A MODEL FOR THE
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Before embracing Sherbert-Yoder's strict scrutiny regime as an essen-
tial means of protecting religious liberty, one should first consider the pos-
sibility that the Sherbert-Yoder approach actually decreased, rather than
increased, the religious liberty enjoyed by members of minority religious
sects. If use of the compelling state interest test in practice subordinated re-
ligious minorities relative to nonminorities, the test would be a poor means
of advancing religious equality, even if the approach provided benefits to
members of traditional religious groups.4
The pre-Smith approach led to more successful free exercise claims.
Nevertheless, two troubling disparities exist. One relates to the attitude of
the Supreme Court toward nontraditional religions and claims by nontradi-
tional religionists. In many cases, both the results and the rhetoric used to
support the results arguably reflect consistent patterns of cultural bias. Sec-
ond, empirical analysis of outcomes in pre-Smith free exercise cases estab-
lishes that minority religionists fared significantly less well than adherents
of more traditional religious faiths. Thus, the pattern of winners and losers
supports the argument that the Sherbert-Yoder approach actually increased,
rather than decreased, inequality of religious liberty between majority and
minority religious sects.
This Part begins with an examination of the Supreme Court's rhetoric
about nonconforming religious groups, both before and during the Sherbert-
Yoder era. This examination establishes a systematic and consistent pattern
of cultural bias that begins in the nineteenth century and continues to the
present. Next, this Part considers psychological, anthropological, and cul-
tural reasons for the Court's expressed hostility toward nonconforming reli-
gious groups. It then reviews empirical research data, which demonstrate
that the problem of judicial bias in applying Sherbert-Yoder heightened
scrutiny to free exercise claims is both real and pressing, rather than merely
hypothetical.
148 Of course, the test might still be defensible as a method of advancing the sum total of religious
autonomy-if any sect wins claims against the government that would not be viable under Smith, then
the Sherbert-Yoder approach enhances and advances religious liberty/autonomy. The identity of the
winners and losers only matters if one thinks that the Free Exercise Clause should advance religious
equality at least as much as it advances religious liberty.
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A. "Good" and "Bad" Religions: The Supreme Court ' Rhetorical and
Substantive Treatment of Minority and Majority Religionists
Beyond the discrepancies in outcomes, the Supreme Court's rhetoric in
Free Exercise Clause cases reflects a disturbingly judgmental tone. The
Justices seem to take some religions more seriously than others. This eth-
nocentrism ill serves both the equality and the autonomy project. If the
Free Exercise Clause exists to advance equality, then all religions should be
treated with equal dignity when they seek to invoke the protection of the
Clause. If the Clause exists to advance autonomy, the autonomy claims of
minority religions of recent vintage should be no less important or pressing
than those advanced by majority religions of ancient vintage. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court's rhetoric strongly suggests that the Justices take some
religions more seriously than others.
Late nineteenth century cases involving the early Mormon Church pro-
vide perhaps the best exemplars of pejorative rhetoric. In discussing the
Mormon practice of polygamy, Justice Field in Davis v. Beason observed
that "[b]igamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and
Christian countries."'49 The practice "tend[s] to destroy the purity of the
marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman[,] and
to debase man.' 150 He went on to attack the effort to link polygamy to
genuine religious duty: "To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to of-
fend the common sense of mankind."'' He observed that:
Probably never before in the history of this country has it been seriously con-
tended that the whole punitive power of the government for acts, recognized
by the general consent of the Christian world in modem times as proper mat-
ters for prohibitory legislation, must be suspended in order that the tenets of a
religious sect encouraging crime [polygamy] may be carried out without hin-
drance.1
52
Davis sustained an Idaho territorial law that stripped voting rights not only
from those convicted of practicing polygamy but also from any person who
merely advocated it or refused to take an oath denouncing the practice."'
The Supreme Court considered the practice and advocacy of polygamy as
mere crimes, simply rejecting out of hand the notion that either could be as-
similated into the concept of "religion."
The Davis Court not only defined the Mormon Church's advocacy of
polygamy as outside the proper bounds of religion but also self-consciously
identified the United States as a "Christian" nation. Thus, the Supreme
149 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890).
ISO Id.
151 Id at 341-42.
152 Id. at 343.
153 Id. at 345-47.
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Court drew two different circles: one of exclusion ("polygamy") and one of
inclusion ("Christian" nationhood).
Eleven years earlier, in Reynolds, Chief Justice Waite rejected the no-
tion that polygamy could be protected as an incident of the right to free ex-
ercise of religion."' He observed that "[p]olygamy has always been odious
among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establish-
ment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of
Asiatic and of African people."'55 Once again, the Supreme Court drew
boundary lines that limited the notion of legitimate religious practice to ma-
joritarian traditions. The foreign nature of the practice of polygamy, and its
observance in non-European cultures, made the claim for a religious ex-
emption from general laws prohibiting the practice entirely implausible to
Chief Justice Waite.
Indeed, Mormonism was so unpopular that Congress legislated to abol-
ish the Church and seize its assets for the public treasury.'5 6 In sustaining
Congress's action, Justice Bradley heaped scorn on Mormonism because of
its "belief in the practice of polygamy, or in the right to indulge in it" and
the related assertion that polygamy "is a religious belief, and, therefore, un-
der the protection of the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. This
is altogether a sophistical plea."' 57 The Court had "no doubt of the power of
Congress to do as it did."'5
One might suggest that the nineteenth century decisions involving po-
lygamy simply represent a more ethnocentric time; those decisions no
longer signify the attitude of the federal courts toward minority religionists
with odd practices. The hue and cry associated with Warren Jeffs and his
polygamist cult,'59 however, suggests that cultural norms still play an impor-
154 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1879).
"' Id. at 164.
156 See The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 5-8 (1890); see also Laycock, supra note 2, at 62-63 (discussing the pervasive persecution of the
Mormons by both the federal and the state governments).
'57 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 49.
158 Id. at 64.
159 See John Dougherty, After Polygamist Leader's Arrest, Community Carries On, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2006, at AI0 (discussing Jeffs and what many term his "polygamous cult"). The recent travails
of the members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Days Saints (FLDS), in Eldo-
rado, Texas, provide a powerful example of how highly transgressive behavior can bring down a heavy
state response. On April 3, 2008, the Texas Department of Family Protective Services raided the Yearn-
ing for Zion Ranch, a compound on which FLDS church members and their children lived, and "took
possession of all 468 children at the Ranch without a court order." In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protec-
tive Servs., 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 967, slip op. at 2 (Tex. May 29, 2008) (per curiam), available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historicalU2008/may/080391 .pdf. Although a local trial court sus-
tained the ex parte seizure of all 468 children on an "emergency basis," resting the decision on the the-
ory that the FLDS parents would subject the girls to sexual abuse and inculcate the sexual abuse of
women as a religious precept in the boys, see In Re Sara Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3652, *4-5 (Tex. Civ. App. May 22, 2008), mandamus denied sub nom In re Tex. Dep 't of Fam-
ily & Protective Servs., 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 967, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed this order and re-
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tant role in defining the scope of "legitimate" religious beliefs. Moreover,
decisions of the Supreme Court well into the twentieth century also reflect a
highly ethnocentric conception of religion.
In Cleveland v. United States,16 ° the Supreme Court adopted an expan-
sive reading of the Mann Act'61 to reach the transportation of a woman
across state lines for the purpose of cohabitating in a polygamous relation-
ship. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas explained that "[t]he estab-
lishment or maintenance of polygamous households is a notorious example
of promiscuity," and that accordingly, "[t]hough they have different ramifi-
cations, [polygamous practices] are in the same genus as the other immoral
practices covered by the [Mann] Act," such as prostitution.'62 Although the
rule of lenity ostensibly requires criminal laws to be construed favorably to
the defendant,'63 the Cleveland Court broadly construed the Mann Act's
prohibitions to bring interstate travel that facilitates polygamous cohabita-
tion within the scope of federal criminal law.
Justice Murphy authored a very interesting dissenting opinion in Cleve-
land. Writing as the sole dissenter, Murphy noted that he disagreed "with
the conclusion that polygamy is 'in the same genus' as prostitution and de-
bauchery."'" His stated purpose was not "to defend the practice of polyg-
amy or to claim that it is morally the equivalent of monogamy." '65 Yet he
went on to describe the "four fundamental forms of marriage" and sug-
gested that "[w]e must recognize, then, that polygyny, like other forms of
marriage, is basically a cultural institution rooted deeply in the religious be-
quired the Department to immediately return the children to their parents. See id at *8-15. The Texas
Supreme Court subsequently declined to review the Court of Appeals decision. See In re Tex. Dep 't of
Family & Protective Servs., 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 967, slip op. at 5.
The FLDS parents litigated and won the appeal not on the basis of religious freedom, but rather on
the state's violation of more general parental rights protected under both the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Texas Family Code. Moreover, the Texas appellate courts considered
and decided the appeal solely on the basis of parental rights and Texas statutory protections of those
rights.
This approach to the litigation reflects a very prudent strategic decision by the lawyers for the FLDS
parents: it is much easier to successfully invoke a right to equal treatment than it is to demand respect
for highly transgressive religious beliefs and the conduct that such beliefs mandate. See Stephanie
Simon, Role of Belief in Polygamy Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2008, at A10 (discussing the litigation
strategy of the FLDS parents and the Department's view that the inculcation of the FLDS beliefs consti-
tuted a serious form of child abuse).
160 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
161 For a description of the Mann Act, also known as the "White Slavery Act," see supra note 48.
162 Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 19.
163 See James v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1586, 1603 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The rule of
lenity, grounded in part on the need to give 'fair warning' of what is encompassed by a criminal statute,
demands that we give [an ambiguous criminal statute] the more narrow reading of which it is suscepti-
ble." (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
164 Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 25 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
165 Id.
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liefs and social mores of those societies in which it appears. '  Although
"[ijt is equally true that the beliefs and mores of the dominant culture of the
contemporary world condemn the practice as immoral and substitute mo-
nogamy in its place," this "does not alter the fact that polygyny is a form of
marriage built upon a set of social and moral principles.' ' 67 He urged that
"[i]t must be recognized and treated as such."'68
Justice Murphy directly accused the majority of ethnocentrism. He ar-
gued in favor of cultural and religious pluralism, observing that "[i]t takes
no elaboration here to point out that marriage, even when it occurs in a form
of which we disapprove, is not to be compared with prostitution or de-
bauchery or other immoralities of that character."' 69  He concluded that
"[t]he Court's failure to recognize this vital distinction and its insistence
that polygyny is 'in the same genus' as prostitution and debauchery do vio-
lence to the anthropological factors involved."' 70
Justice Murphy exhibited a consistent concern for respecting cultural
and religious pluralism. In Prince v. Massachusetts,' he objected to the
majority's cavalier dismissal of Mrs. Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, who
claimed that her niece had a religious duty to proselytize on the public
streets and sidewalks. Murphy argued that "[t]he sidewalk, no less than the
cathedral or the evangelist's tent, is a proper place, under the Constitution,
for the orderly worship of God."'72 Murphy viewed the prosecution as a
form of religious harassment: "No chapter in human history has been so
largely written in terms of persecution and intolerance as the one dealing
with religious freedom."' 73 He wrote movingly of the danger of religious
intolerance:
From ancient times to the present day, the ingenuity of man has known no lim-
its in its ability to forge weapons of oppression for use against those who dare
to express or practice unorthodox religious beliefs. And the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses are living proof of the fact that even in this nation, conceived as it was
in the ideals of freedom, the right to practice religion in unconventional ways
is still far from secure. Theirs is a militant and unpopular faith, pursued with a
fanatical zeal. They have suffered brutal beatings; their property has been de-
stroyed; they have been harassed at every turn by the resurrection and en-
forcement of little used ordinances and statutes. To them, along with other
present-day religious minorities, befalls the burden of testing our devotion to
the ideals and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. We should
166 Id. at 25-26.




171 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
172 Id. at 174 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 175.
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therefore hesitate before approving the application of a statute that might be
used as another instrument of oppression.'74
The majority took a somewhat different view of the case, concluding that
"[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves," but "it does not fol-
low they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their chil-
dren."'75
The problem with any system of balancing exemption claims against
general legal requirements is that judges do not exist in a cultural vacuum;
they bring to bear a host of political, moral, and religious commitments
when hearing and deciding cases. Consider, for example, Justice Suther-
land's response, writing for the Court, to Douglas C. Macintosh's free exer-
cise claim to refuse an oath to bear arms incident to naturalization:
When [Macintosh] speaks of putting his allegiance to the will of God above
his allegiance to the government, it is evident, in light of his entire statement,
that he means to make his own interpretation of the will of God the decisive
test which shall conclude the government and stay its hand. We are a Chris-
tian people, according to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and
acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God. But,
also, we are a Nation with the duty to survive; a Nation whose Constitution
contemplates war as well as peace; whose government must go forward upon
the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that unqualified alle-
giance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as
well those made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with the
will of God.'76
Macintosh was a professor of theology at the Yale Divinity School and a
citizen of Canada. Moreover, he served as a chaplain for the Canadian
army during World War I. In completing a questionnaire incident to his
application for U.S. citizenship, he provided a qualified answer to the ques-
tion: "If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this coun-
try?" He responded, "Yes; but I should want to be free to judge of the
necessity."'77 Justice Sutherland's majority opinion simply dismissed the
notion that duty to God could preclude taking up arms when commanded to
do so by the federal government; as Sutherland put it, calls to arms made by
the general government simply are "not inconsistent with the will of God."
Evidently, according to the Court, Macintosh was mistaken to think other-
wise.
The price of Macintosh's conscience was his U.S. citizenship. Suther-
land noted that "[i]t is not within the province of the courts to make bar-
gains with those who seek naturalization."' 78 Instead, an applicant "must
174 Id. at 175-76 (citation omitted).
175 Id. at 170 (majority opinion).
176 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931) (citation omitted).
177 Id. at 617-18.
178 Id. at 626.
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accept the grant and take the oath in accordance with the terms fixed by
law, or forego the privilege of citizenship. There is no middle choice." '179
But what should strike the careful reader as particularly troubling is the ma-
jority's flat rejection of Macintosh's religious proposition, i.e., that the U.S.
government might prosecute a war not consistent with God's will. Not only
does the majority disregard Macintosh's religious beliefs, but it asserts a
contrary view as a theological truth.
More recently still, the Supreme Court had to decide whether a mem-
ber of the Jehovah's Witnesses had a right to collect unemployment benefits
after refusing to work on a production line making munitions at the Blaw-
Knox Foundry & Machinery Company, even though other members of the
religion employed at the plant did not think that the work in question vio-
lated the tenets of the faith. 8° Chief Justice Burger, in granting the free ex-
ercise claim to the unemployment benefits, noted in passing that "[o]ne can,
of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in
motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise
Clause." '' This is a telling passage, for it reflects an innate bias of the Ju-
diciary that burdens the ability of minority religionists to claim a full and
equal share in the free exercise project. It most likely will be small, minor-
ity religions, perhaps of recent vintage, whose beliefs will strike the average
federal or state court judge as too "bizarre" to be "entitled to protection."'
82
Conversely, religions with deep roots in American culture, or those whose
beliefs and ethics are consistent with dominant moral and social norms,
should fare better. One could read Yoder as a confirmation of these predic-
tions.
In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger references the 300-year history of the
Old Order Amish in the United States not once,'83 not twice, 84 but three
179 Id.
180 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 709-11 (1981).
181 Id. at 715.
182 See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 304-05 (1985) ("Even
if the Foundation were to pay wages in cash, or if the associates' beliefs precluded them from accepting
the statutory amount, there is nothing in the Act to prevent the associates from returning the amounts to
the Foundation, provided that they do so voluntarily. We therefore fail to perceive how application of
the Act would interfere with the associates' right to freely exercise their religious beliefs." (footnote
omitted)). Justice White essentially rewrites the associates' theology to permit them to accept payment
for good works provided that they relinquish the payment. A religious commitment could plausibly
prohibit even the initial receipt of wages for good works-the very contention asserted by the Alamo
Foundation with respect to its members' beliefs. Needless to say, it seems odd for the Supreme Court to
school a religion on the proper interpretation of its own doctrines. Justice White provides a ef citation
to United States v. Lee, a case in which the Court accepted as valid a religious objection by the Old Or-
der Amish against paying into or receiving benefits from the Social Security system. See id. at 305 (cit-
ing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982)). Thus, the Old Order Amish enjoy a presumption of
doctrinal legitimacy that the Supreme Court proves unwilling to afford the Alamo Foundation.
183 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("We come then to the quality of the claims of
respondents concerning the alleged encroachment of Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance statute
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times. 5 The age of a religion, however, has nothing to do with the impact
of a neutral law of general applicability on sect members' observation of
their religious duties. Nor does it have anything to do with the burden that
a religious exemption from the law would place on the state's ability to
achieve the objective sought to be advanced by enacting and enforcing the
law in the first place. But Chief Justice Burger's ethnocentrism runs much
deeper than this.
Burger both celebrated and idealized the Amish, even as he disparaged
other, more recently founded religious sects: "It cannot be overemphasized
that we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group
claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlight-
ened process for rearing children for modem life."' 6 He also suggested
"that probably few other religious groups or sects could make" a showing
sufficient to justify the exemption at issue in Yoder. 1"7  The Old Order
Amish, after all, "singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of Jef-
ferson's ideal of the 'sturdy yeoman' who would form the basis of what he
considered as the ideal of a democratic society."'' 8 And he emphasized we
should not forget that "[i]ts members are productive and very law-abiding
members of society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modem
forms."'89 In sum, he stated, "[e]ven their idiosyncratic separateness exem-
plifies the diversity we profess to admire and encourage."9'
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Yoder is a portrait of unself-
conscious ethnocentrism. It applies viewpoint- and content-based standards
in weighing the merits of the free exercise claim at bar, and appears to con-
dition the existence of free exercise rights on the vintage of the group press-
ing the claim and a host of other irrelevancies, such as whether the group
believes in taking public assistance or engages in agricultural pursuits.
Such an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause-that it exists simply to
amplify the rights of politically popular religious sects holding inoffensive
on their rights ... to the free exercise of the religious beliefs they and their forebears have adhered to for
almost three centuries.").
184 Id. at 226-27 ("The independence and successful social functioning of the Amish community for
a period approaching almost three centuries and more than 200 years in this country are strong evidence
that there is at best a speculative gain, in terms of meeting the duties of citizenship, from an additional
one or two years of compulsory formal education.").
185 Id. at 235 ("Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long his-
tory as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish in this case have con-
vincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their
mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order
Amish communities . . ., and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally
valid as to others.").
186 ld. at 235.
187 Id. at 236.
j8s Id. at 225-26.
189 Id. at 222.
190 ld. at 226.
1226
If Judges Were Angels
theological viewpoints-grossly disserves the equalitarian concerns of its
Framers, including James Madison.19 '
The problem with any effort to interpret and apply the Free Exercise
Clause as creating a right to religious autonomy is the inability of judges
drawn from the majority culture to accept fully the legitimacy of new,
seemingly oddball religionists. Macintosh's views, for example, were not
particularly idiosyncratic; many religious groups, such as the Quakers, have
a history of refusing to participate in wars prosecuted by the U.S. federal
government.19 Nevertheless, his fit of conscience was sufficiently offen-
sive to the reviewing district court that it chose to deny his citizenship ap-
plication. Moreover, the more deeply contrarian a religious sect's views-
and hence the less likely the sect can obtain protection through the majori-
tarian political process-the less likely that judges will take the religionists'
claims seriously.
It may be tempting to dismiss the rawest language in Davis and Rey-
nolds as nothing more than relics of a less noble time. More recent cases,
however, continue to disparage the practices of religious minorities, even if
they do not use equally disparaging language. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass 'n, the Court told Native Americans seeking to pre-
serve a sacred mountain that "[h]owever much we might wish that it were
otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to sat-
isfy every citizen's religious needs and desires." '193 The Court held that the
destruction of a government-owned site crucial to the religious practices of
the tribes did not even constitute a valid free exercise claim because the
"incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more diffi-
cult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce indi-
viduals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs" do not "prohibit" the
free exercise of religion.9 Thus, "[w]hatever may be the exact line be-
tween unconstitutional prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the
legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs, the location of the line
cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a reli-
gious objector's spiritual development." '95 Yet, in Sherbert and subsequent
cases in the Sherbert line, the Court held that the government was required
to provide unemployment benefits to Saturday Sabbatarians. Thus, while
191 See supra text and accompanying notes 318-73.
192 See MULFORD Q. SIBLEY & PHILIP E. JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE 18-36 (1952); see
also Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Syn-
thesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 166-67 (1990) ("Given
the centrality of non-violence to the religious beliefs of many pacifist sects and the long history of po-
litical acceptance of religiously based exemptions from conscription, a strong case may be made on bal-
ance that these exemptions should be sustained against establishment clause challenge." (footnote
omitted)).
193 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
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destruction of a religious site did not trigger the Free Exercise Clause, state
unemployment programs that provided benefits in some cases but not others
and that did not order anyone to work on a Saturday did trigger the Free
Exercise Clause.
96
In Bowen v. Roy, 97 the Supreme Court held that a Native American's
refusal to seek or use a Social Security number for his daughter, Little Bird
of the Snow, incident to an application for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children benefits, did not raise a meritorious free exercise objection.'98
Roy, a member of the Abenaki tribe, believed that obtaining and using a
Social Security number for his daughter would "'rob the spirit' of his
daughter and prevent her from attaining spiritual power.'"99 Once again, the
strictness of strict scrutiny did not demand much of the government. Chief
Justice Burger flatly rejected Roy's free exercise claim, explaining that
"[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with
the religious beliefs of particular citizens.""2 The Roy majority placed great
emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff did not assert a claim of discrimina-
tion2'0 or an affirmative compulsion to either refrain from religiously moti-
vated conduct or to engage in religiously prohibited conduct.2 2 Of course,
cases in the Sherbert line involved a denial of benefits rather than overt dis-
crimination or governmental compulsions by threat of sanctions.2 3 The real
196 Cf id. at 465-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The land-use decision challenged here will restrain
respondents from practicing their religion as surely and completely as any of the governmental actions
we have struck down in the past, and the Court's efforts simply to define away respondents' injury as
nonconstitutional are both unjustified and ultimately unpersuasive.").
197 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
198 See id. at 699-701.
199 Id. at 696.
200 Id. at 699; see id. at 700 ("The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from cer-
tain forms of government compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of
the Government's internal procedures.").
201 Id. at 703 ("There is no claim that there is any attempt by Congress to discriminate invidiously
or any covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.").
202 Id. ("It may indeed confront some applicants for benefits with choices, but in no sense does it af-
firmatively compel appellees, by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct or to
engage in conduct that they find objectionable for religious reasons." (footnotes omitted)).
203 See, e.g., Frazee v. I11. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Sherbert itself, a claim of differential treatment could have served as the basis
for the decision in favor of Sherbert. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("Significantly,
South Carolina expressly saves the Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind of choice which
we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian's religious liberty."). Chief Justice Burger expressly acknowl-
edges this point in Roy: "We conclude then that government regulation that indirectly and incidentally
calls for a choice between securing a governmental benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is wholly
different from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or ines-
capably compels conduct that some find objectionable for religious reasons." Roy, 476 U.S. at 706. In
turn, this difference in the import of direct versus indirect burden free exercise claims "is relevant to the
standard that the government must meet to justify the burden," id. at 707, which must mean that some
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difference seems to be more cultural than legal; refusing to obtain or use a
Social Security number is too weird to be creditable as a sincere religious
belief, whereas having an objection to working on Saturday is not.
Another interesting aspect of Roy involves Chief Justice Burger's
framing of the burden on the government, were Little Bird of the Snow to
win a religious exemption from using a Social Security number when ap-
plying for welfare benefits. He observed that "[t]he Social Security number
requirement clearly promotes a legitimate and important public interest"
and that "[n]o one can doubt that preventing fraud in these benefits pro-
grams is an important goal."2" In analyzing the burden on the government,
however, Chief Justice Burger made no effort to establish how many reli-
gious objectors would refuse to use Social Security numbers. Instead, he
seemed to assume that regardless of whether a large number of persons
would object, any objection resulting in noncompliance would create an in-
tolerable burden on the government. 5 Given this method of analysis, his
conclusion was forgone that "[a]ppellees may not use the Free Exercise
Clause to demand Government benefits, but only on their own terms, par-
ticularly where that insistence works a demonstrable disadvantage to the
Government in the administration of the programs."206
But this measure of the burden on the government improperly stacks
the deck by assuming that any exemption will fatally undermine the gov-
ernment's interest in fiscal accountability. Even if "the Government"2"7
must process claims by "roughly 3.8 million families" for benefits worth
"$7.8 billion through federally funded AFDC programs" and claims by an-
other "20 million persons" for "$11 billion in food stamps,"2 8 this tells us
absolutely nothing about how many of the 23.8 million recipient households
and individuals would, like Little Bird of the Snow and her father, refuse to
use a Social Security number incident to the application process. If the
compelling state interest test in the Free Exercise Clause context assumes
that everyone will demand an exemption, the government's interest in the
status quo will likely always be compelling. And, if even one exemption,
presenting a "slight risk" 29 to the government's interests, justifies a slippery
slope argument 2t0 that "if we allow one, how many more will surely fol-
sort of "strict scrutiny lite" applies in indirect burden cases (Sherbert's language to the contrary notwith-
standing).
204 Roy, 476 U.S. at 709.
205 Id. at 709-11.
206 Id. at 711-12.
207 Indeed, Chief Justice Burger's odd-and consistent-capitalization of "government" is itself
meant to signify where the merits lie.
208 Roy, 476 U.S. at 710.
209 Id. at 711-12.
210 See Courtney Megan Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of
Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1543, 1544-45, 1550-54 (2005) (describing, discussing, and critiquing the "slippery slope" trope
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low?," strict scrutiny review reduces to a weak form of rationality review;
only if there is no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest will the
risk of mass noncompliance not justify refusing the first exemption (which
opens the floodgates to subsequent exemption claims).
The Supreme Court also deployed a similar, and equally pernicious,
standard analytical move during the pre-Smith era: in applying the strict
scrutiny test, the Justices would measure the burden on the government of a
religious exemption on the assumption that no one would agree to meet the
government's condition."' Thus, for example, in United States v. Lee, the
Supreme Court rejected an effort by an Old Order Amish farmer to avoid
the payment of payroll taxes for his workers."' Chief Justice Burger found
that the federal government had a compelling interest in the collection of
such taxes because:
The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge
the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their
religious belief. Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax
system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of
taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.'
At least the Amish, unlike the Native Americans in Lyng, were credited
with a genuine free exercise claim."'
The real question is not whether government would have a compelling
interest in mandatory participation if everyone opted out, but rather how
disruptive it would be if religiously motivated objectors opted out. Chief
Justice Burger made no effort to isolate the claim or the burden. If the Su-
preme Court had adopted the same analytical approach in Yoder, it would
as a rhetorical feature of legal arguments and decisions, with particular focus on its use in the context of
same-sex marriage).
211 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988); Roy,
476 U.S. at 709-11; Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (rejecting a free exercise
exemption from Air Force regulations that prohibited a Jewish officer from wearing a yarmulke while
on duty and measuring the burden of an exemption to the dress code on the military by positing a kind of
dress code free-for-all); id. at 512-13 (Stevens, J., concurring) (warning that religious exemptions from
the Air Force dress code regulations would result in a rag tag military or require unjustified discrimina-
tion against some religionists); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961); see also Employ-
ment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 905-06 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (analyzing the social cost
of exemption from a general criminal ban on peyote for members of the Native American Church by
assuming a generalized social effect flowing from the exemption, rather than measuring the social effect
based on the very small number of number of persons belonging to the Native American Church, and
therefore, entitled to the exemption were the courts to recognize one); cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 228-29 (1972) (balancing the social cost of a limited exemption from the state's truancy laws for
the Old Order Amish, but no other groups, when determining the potential social cost of recognizing an
exemption from the state's general policy).
212 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
2"3 Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
214 See id. at 257 ("Because the payment of the taxes or receipt of benefits violates Amish religious
beliefs, compulsory participation in the social security system interferes with their free exercise rights.").
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not have asked if Wisconsin had a compelling interest in forcing Amish
children to attend school to age sixteen, but rather whether Wisconsin had a
compelling interest in making any children attend school to age sixteen.
Framing the burden on an as-applied versus universal basis prefigures the
outcome of the balancing exercise. Simply put, "strict scrutiny" meant dif-
ferent things for different religions, a state of affairs that hardly advanced
the goal of religious nondiscrimination; preferred religions, like the Qld Or-
der Amish, benefited whereas dispreferred religions and religionists, like
the Scientologists, did not. In the pre-Smith era, the Justices routinely ma-
nipulated the burden in order to force congenial outcomes.215
Native Americans and the Amish were not the only groups that failed
to realize the benefit of the Sherbert-Yoder line of cases in circumstances
where the religionists' interests seemed reasonably strong but the govern-
ment's interest appeared less than compelling (at least if one measured the
numerator of the burden by counting only those seeking an exemption
based on a sincere religious belief). During the pre-Smith era, the Supreme
Court in Goldman v. Weinberger rejected a devout Jew's desire to wear a
yarmulke while in military uniform on a stateside base." 6 Then-Justice
Rehnquist did not declare the nation to be a Christian one, perhaps because
he did not have to do so; the regulations at issue, which permitted religious
apparel that was not visible (such as a scapular), did not burden the wearing
of Christian religious garb.217 He did explain that "[t]he desirability of dress
regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military officials,
and they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered
professional judgment.""2 8 This result obtained because "the First Amend-
ment does not require the military to accommodate [religious] practices in
the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by
the dress regulations."2 9 Goldman demonstrates how easily strict scrutiny
can be evaded through the twin devices of generalizing the exemption to
create a parade of horribles and overtly placing a thumb on the scale in fa-
vor of the government's interests. If one steps back, it is exceedingly diffi-
cult to fathom why a ban on yarmulkes on the facts presented advanced a
significant governmental interest; indeed, Congress itself ultimately legis-
lated to overturn the result in Goldman.22°
215 See supra note 211.
216 475 U.S. 503.
217 Id. at 504-05.
218 Id. at 509.
219 Id. at 509-10. Justice Stevens reached the same result, but used overtly equalitarian reasoning to
support his conclusion: "If exceptions from dress code regulations are to be granted on the basis of a
multifactored test..., inevitably the decisionmaker's evaluation of the character and the sincerity of the
requestor's faith-as well as the probable reaction of the majority to the favored treatment of a member
of that faith-will play a critical part in the decision." Id. at 512-13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
220 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180,
§ 508, 101 Stat. 1019, 1086-87 (1987) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2000)).
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Hernandez v. Commissioner22' provides perhaps the most glaring mod-
em example of religious bias by the Supreme Court when considering a free
exercise claim. In rejecting the Church of Scientology's claim that dona-
tions to the Church for auditing sessions should be treated as charitable con-
tributions for personal income tax purposes, Justice Marshall cast a blind
eye on the tax treatment of other kinds of quid pro quo donative arrange-
ments, such as pew fees, mandatory tithes, and intercessionary masses. The
majority squarely held that auditing session "payments are not deducti-
ble '" because "these payments were part of a quintessential quidpro quo
exchange: in return for their money, petitioners received an identifiable
benefit, namely, auditing and training sessions.'"2
According to the Court, the IRS's unfavorable tax treatment of the
Church of Scientology did not even represent a viable free exercise claim
because "[n]either the payment nor the receipt of taxes is forbidden by the
Scientology faith generally, and Scientology does not proscribe the pay-
ment of taxes in connection with auditing or training sessions specifi-
cally." '224 Even if the Court conceded, for the sake of argument, a
cognizable free exercise burden, "even a substantial burden would be justi-
fied by the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system." '225 Fi-
nally, the majority declined to consider the claim of unfair differential
treatment: "We do not know, for example, whether payments for other
faiths' services are truly obligatory or whether any or all of these services
are generally provided whether or not the encouraged 'mandatory' payment
is made. 226
Justice O'Connor authored a powerful dissent that had at its heart the
idea that "the IRS cannot constitutionally be allowed to select which relig-
ions will receive the benefit of its past rulings. 227 Citing multiple examples
of quid pro quo donative arrangements involving pew rents, tickets to par-
ticular services, mandatory tithes for access to religious facilities, and mass
stipends, she found "no discernible reason why there is a more rigid con-
nection between payment and services in the religious practices of Scientol-
ogy than in the religious practices of the faiths described above. '28 The
reason for the differential treatment is self-evident: many people in the
United States (and evidently on the Supreme Court and at the IRS) do not
221 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
222 Id. at 684.
223 Id. at 691.
224 Id. at 699.
225 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
226 Id. at 702.
227 Id. at 704 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 709-11.
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view the Church of Scientology as a legitimate religion and are unwilling to
treat it at parity with Methodism, Judaism, or Roman Catholicism.
2 9
To be sure, the federal government did not declare the Church of Sci-
entology an illegal institution and declare its assets forfeited to the state-a
fate suffered by the Mormon Church in the late nineteenth century.230 The
IRS simply withheld from members of the Church of Scientology a valu-
able tax benefit that was routinely available to members of other faiths who
made mandatory financial contributions for religious services (such as
tithes, pew rents, and fees for intercessional masses). Nor did the Hernan-
dez Court resort to name calling or vilification.23' But the fact that Justice
Marshall's discrimination came in a civil wrapper does not alter the fact that
the Church of Scientology was not treated at parity with the Old Order
Amish (at least in Yoder) or the Seventh Day Adventists.
Other cases reflect the Court's failures to give the full benefit of strict
scrutiny to religionists with unpopular viewpoints. For example, Bob Jones
University faced the loss of "charitable" status as a 501(c)(3) entity because
of its racially discriminatory policies; this, in turn, would have ended the
deductibility of gifts made to the university for purposes of the federal in-
come tax.232 In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court
found that "[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact
on the operation of private religious schools [that practice racial discrimina-
tion], but will not prevent those schools from observing their religious ten-
ets. 233  Thus, Bob Jones University did not even make the threshold of
229 See Elbert Lin et al., Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political Future of Federally-Funded
Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 183, 223 (2002) ("[W]hile the idea of funding main-
stream churches is exceedingly popular, only 38% of Americans approve of giving federal money to
mosques, only 29% of Americans are willing to support the Nation of Islam with taxpayer[] dollars, and
26% support granting public funds to the Church of Scientology."). See generally Paul Horwitz, Scien-
tology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some Thoughts on Selected Issues in Law and Religion, 47
DEPAUL L. REv. 85 (1997).
230 See The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 5-8 (1890) (describing legislation enacted by Congress disbanding the Mormon Church and seizing
its assets for the public treasury).
231 Cf id at 48-50 (attacking the Mormon faith for advocating the practice of polygamy and analo-
gizing the practice to the "right of assassination," the "practice of suttee by the Hindu widows," and the
"offering of human sacrifices," and sustaining the federal government's seizure of Church property and
revocation of the Church's corporate charter).
232 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577-82 (1983).
233 Id. at 603-04. This was the same methodology that Chief Justice Warren deployed in Braunfield
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfield, Orthodox Jews objected to being forced to close on Sun-
days under Pennsylvania state law when their day of worship ran from sundown Friday to sundown Sat-
urday, rather than on Sunday. Id. at 601-02. Rejecting a free exercise claim, Chief Justice Warren
explained that "[clompulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of wor-
ship is strictly forbidden," but "this is not the case at bar." Id. at 603. According to Warren, "the statute
before us does not make criminal the holding of any religious belief or opinion, nor does it force anyone
to embrace any religious belief or to say or believe anything in conflict with his religious tenets." Id.
"[Tihe Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to
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establishing a viable free exercise claim-unlike Mrs. Sherbert or any of the
other plaintiffs denied benefits as a result of practicing their religious tenets.
Moreover, even if the Court assumed the existence of a viable claim, "[t]he
government interest at stake here [in eradicating racial discrimination] is
compelling." '234 Thus, as in Lee and Roy, the government's interest was
compelling, so the existence or nonexistence of a viable free exercise claim
did not matter: "That government interest [in eradicating racial discrimina-
tion] substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places
on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs." '235 Once again, the Court
made no effort to ascertain with precision the nature of the burden that
granting the free exercise claim would place on the government's goal of
nondiscrimination.
Thus, in the pre-Smith era, the Supreme Court routinely rejected claims
by minority religionists whose beliefs seemed nonmainstream.236 Moreover,
the Court often did this without even crediting the existence of a viable free
exercise claim. In some instances, the Justices found that the government
had not "prohibited" the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion (for example,
Lyng, Roy, and Hernandez). In other cases, the Court found a viable free
exercise claim but then proceeded to measure the burden on the government
on the assumption that any noncompliance would be unduly burdensome
(for example, Lee and Roy).237
make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive." Id. at 605. He concluded that "[t]o strike
down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exer-
cise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radi-
cally restrict the operating latitude of the legislature." Id. at 606.
234 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604.
235 Id.
236 One particularly disturbing consideration relates to the pattern of claimants whom the Supreme
Court finds have properly invoked the Free Exercise Clause versus those it views as complaining only
about an "indirect burden." See, e.g., Braunfield, 366 U.S. at 603, 605-07. The religions that fail to es-
tablish a claim are almost uniformly non-Christian; the only Christian groups that fail to at least cross
the threshold of invoking the Free Exercise Clause are racial discriminators (Bob Jones University). The
non-Christian plaintiffs in Braunfield, Lyng, and Hernandez all evidently complained of merely noncog-
nizable "indirect burdens," whereas the plaintiffs in cases like Sherbert, Frasee, Thomas, Hobbie, Yoder,
and Lee all raised complaints about "direct" burdens that were sufficient to trigger the application of the
Free Exercise Clause. As Mark Tushnet observes, "the pattern of the Court's results in mandatory ac-
commodation is troubling because, put bluntly, the pattern is that sometimes Christians win but non-
Christians never do." Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court ": Kurland Revis-
ited, 1989 SUP. CT. REv. 373, 381. Tushnet overstates the matter somewhat-it would be more accurate
to say that Christians were more successful at invoking the Clause, even when the facts suggested that
only an indirect burden on religious practice existed (for example, Sherbert). This is, of course, quite
significant because the benefit of heightened scrutiny will only obtain if the plaintiffs meet the threshold
requirement of establishing a "prohibition" on the free exercise of their religious beliefs.
237 For another example of this approach, see OLone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In
Estate of Shabazz, the Supreme Court sustained New Jersey prison offsite work regulations that effec-
tively precluded Muslim prisoners from observing mandatory Friday prayers (Jumu'ah). Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote that "[w]hile we in no way minimize the central importance of Jumu'ah to respondents,
we are unwilling to hold that prison officials are required by the Constitution to sacrifice legitimate pe-
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In short, the Supreme Court's rhetoric and practice during the Sher-
bert-Yoder era reflected ethnocentric conceptions of "valid" and "invalid"
religious precepts, and the Court's application of the compelling state inter-
est test to minority religionists and majority religionists was far from con-
sistent. These trends should raise serious concerns regarding the
fundamental fairness of the Sherbert- Yoder approach to free exercise claims
for minority religionists.
B. Cognitive Dissonance and the Problem of Distinguishing Genuine
"Religions "from Illegitimate "Cults"
The Supreme Court's bias in favor of well-established, well-accepted
religious sects should not be surprising. The very notion of "religion" trig-
gers deep-seated, largely unconscious cultural associations and understand-
ings." 8 To ask someone to characterize a particular group as a "religion"
requires her to draw a material equivalency between the beliefs of the group
in question and her own beliefs; if the equivalency seems unwarranted be-
cause of the bizarre nature of the group's theology, she might well prove
unwilling to accept that the other group is a legitimate "religion" in the
same way as her own. "The attitude that most affects social and political
behavior is prejudice against people who are different." '239
If one considers the psychological and anthropological literature on the
recognition and acceptance of religious beliefs, it becomes increasingly
clear that any effort to protect religious minorities from majoritarian hostil-
ity or indifference cannot rest on an autonomy-based theory. Although we
could establish rules that require judges to treat minority religions as fully
nological objectives to that end." Id. at 351-52. New Jersey accommodated Christian religious obser-
vance by not scheduling offsite work details on Sunday; the Muslim religionists could have been ac-
commodated by a rule exempting them from offsite work details on Friday. The burden was direct, and
the state prison officials protected Christian prisoners from being excluded from Sunday services. An
equalitarian focus would likely produce a different outcome in Estate of Shabazz, in that the differential
treatment seems to suggest discrimination against a non-Christian sect. See id at 361-63 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Muslim prisoners throughout the federal penitentiary system are permitted to
participate in Jumu'ah and that this accommodation has not proven unduly disruptive to "safety, secu-
rity, and good order" in the federal prison system); Richard Delgado, Organically Induced Behavioral
Change in Correctional Institutions: Release Decisions and the "New Man" Phenomenon, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 215, 243-44 (1977) (discussing systematic discrimination against African-American Muslims in
state prison systems and the failure of the lower federal courts to reliably remediate this discrimination
via the Free Exercise Clause).
238 See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 118. Professor Sullivan served as an expert witness in the
Warner case, a small but highly telling free exercise case arising under Florida's state Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act; the case involved efforts by the city of Boca Raton, Florida, to force the families
of persons buried in a city-owned cemetery to remove "vertical" (i.e., raised) memorials and shrines.
See id. at 9-12, 82-88. Her experience as an expert witness in this case led Professor Sullivan to be-
come deeply skeptical about the ability of the legal system in the contemporary United States to protect
idiosyncratic and highly individualized forms of religion and religious expression. Id at 1-9, 138-39,
147-59.
239 JOSEPH F. BYRNES, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 151 (1984).
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equal to their own, it is highly unlikely that such an admonition would be
honored in practice.
1. Religion and Religious Concepts Are Deeply Culturally Embed-
ded.-Unlike the concept of "speech," people have fixed and largely sub-
conscious understandings of "religion."24 A person can credit the ravings
of the Ku Klux Klan or the World Church of the Creator as "speech" with-
out necessarily disparaging or undermining her own viewpoints. Unlike
speech, however, "[r]eligious ideas and behavior are part of the surrounding
world, in relation to which people define themselves."24' When a person is
confronted with religious propositions that seem odd, foreign, or even of-
fensive, cognitive dissonance can result.242 "When dissonance is present, in
addition to trying to reduce it[,] the person will actively avoid situations and
information likely to increase the dissonance." '243 For most people, most of
the time, "[e]mphasis is on the compatibility of different thoughts or differ-
ent feelings."2" When faced with beliefs radically inconsistent with one's
own, one will likely attempt to resolve "discrepancies, whether large or
small, [that] produce discomfort, anxiety, and tension" by engaging in "be-
havior aimed at reducing the discrepancy and ensuring that it will not occur
in the future." '245 Although a person "is not merely the product of his cul-
ture, . . . it has undoubtedly provided him with much evidence of what is
240 SULLIVAN, supra note 118, at 147-49 (noting that "there is no religious center in the United
States" today, that because of this "lines must be drawn," and that "[d]ecisions about legal accommoda-
tion can be an appropriate acknowledgment of differences but they can also be discriminatory, giving
legal muscle to only some easy competing anti-egalitarian normative regulatory schemes"); see also
Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Note, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of
Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Dichotomy, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295,
1310-19 (1998) (discussing psychological, anthropological, and economic causes for hostility toward
strange or offensive religious beliefs in general and toward the now-abandoned practice of polygamy in
particular). Professor Sullivan also observes that judges do not necessarily shrink from the prospect of
"talking theology all day" and applying their own religious experiences and beliefs to judge the value, if
not the legitimacy, of the beliefs held by plaintiffs seeking religiously motivated accommodations. See
SULLIVAN, supra note 118, at 136-37. Deep-seated cultural understandings operate at both a conscious
and an unconscious level to shape the metes and bounds of both "religion" and religiously motivated
behavior-something that worked very much to the detriment of the Warner plaintiffs. See id at 1-8,
96-99, 108-09,133-37, 147-59.
241 BYRNES, supra note 239, at 157.
242 In fact, Professor Leon Festinger, the originator of the concept of "cognitive dissonance," based
his early work on the idea of a doomsday cult and its reaction when the ostensible day of absolute reck-
oning came-and went-without incident. See LEON FESTINGER, WHEN PROPHECY FAILS (1956); see
also LEON FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE (1964).
243 BYRNES, supra note 239, at 153 (quoting LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE 3 (1957)). For a discussion of cognitive dissonance theory, see JACK W. BREHM &
ARTHUR R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962). See also Stephanie Stem, Cog-
nitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITr. L. REV. 589, 618-
20 (2002).
244 BYRNES, supra note 239, at 152.
245 Id. at 156.
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'true' and much of the data which his personal construct system has had to
keep in systematic order." '246 In turn, "[r]eligious sects and denominations
frequently represent the characteristic cultural controls which operate in the
construct systems of a group of people." '247
The effect of cultural learning on one's attitudes toward nonconform-
ing individuals and groups occurs across a culture.48 Thus, "[e]ven when
people are not formal adherents of a given powerful religious tradition, they
cannot help but be affected by it through the surrounding culture." '249 There-
fore, even someone who does not accept majority religions is influenced by
their traditions and could undergo cognitive dissonance from exposure to a
minority religion's practice or belief.
The most transgressive religious organizations find themselves ex-
cluded from the construct of religion entirely and saddled with the pejora-
tive label of "cult."25 These groups resist the dominant social order and
make such resistance sacred. 51 Professors Bromley and Melton observe
that "[t]he challenge these movements pose is therefore fundamental in na-
ture, as they threaten the logic and organizational forms through which the
dominant social order is maintained. At the same time, these movements
typically possess few allies and consequently are vulnerable to imposition
246 Id. at 157-58 (quoting 2 GEORGE A. KELLY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS 688
(1955)).
247 Id. at 158 (quoting 2 KELLY, supra note 246, at 702).
248 See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 240, at 1310-15, 1319-40 (discussing sources of religious
prejudice and belief and examining the social and political history of the early Mormon Church's advo-
cacy of polygamy as a prism for ways in which culture and belief can conflict, with the Mormon Church
ultimately abandoning its endorsement of polygamy as a theological necessity in order to avoid further
governmental efforts at suppression of the group and also to achieve broader social acceptance within
the national community); see also Stem, supra note 243, at 619-20 (describing and explaining psycho-
logical research that shows how individuals within larger groups take their cues from other group mem-
bers, and how shared points of view can provide powerful reinforcement to "groupthink"; and
concluding that "there is a bias in favor of belief perseverance," that "people strive for consistency be-
tween their attitudes and behaviors," and that "public commitments exacerbate the consistency bias").
Whether the efforts of the Mormon Church and its members to achieve broad-based acceptance within
the national culture has been successful unfortunately remains open to serious doubt. See Laurie Good-
stein, Romney's Run Has Mormons Wary of Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2007, at Al (discussing the
pride of Church members in Governor Mitt Romney's (ultimately unsuccessful) bid for the GOP presi-
dential nomination but noting also that "the moment is fraught with anxiety because his candidacy is
bringing intense scrutiny to their church, and could exacerbate longstanding bigotry," and noting that
"many Mormons hope that Romney's candidacy will re-introduce Americans to a church that has been
maligned and misunderstood").
249 BYRNES, supra note 239, at 158.
250 As Professor Davis explains, "[n]ew religions which demand a high degree of commitment from
adherents are bound to be disturbing to outsiders, especially to family members of those who join."
Dena S. Davis, Joining a "Cult": Religious Choice or Psychological Aberration?, 11 IJ.L. & HEALTH
145, 172 (1996-1997).
251 David G. Bromley & J. Gordon Melton, Violence and Religion in Perspective, in CULTS,
RELIGION, AND VIOLENCE 1, 2 (David G. Bromley & J. Gordon Melton eds., 2002).
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of social control." '252 Even so, Professor Davis suggests that "[i]t is impos-
sible, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, to draw a bright line be-
tween 'real' religions and 'destructive cults,' or between sincere conversion
to a religious belief and being the object of 'coercive persuasion."'253
Nevertheless, in the 1970s and 1980s, mainstream politicians and aca-
demics embraced a strong anticult sentiment.254 The "anticult movement
developed its own apocalyptic ideology which created the specter of a pro-
liferation of rapidly growing, destructive cults that were accumulating eco-
nomic and political power .... The key elements in this ideology were
'cults' and 'brainwashing' that permitted the linking of diverse movements
and organizational practices." '255 The goal of the movement, of course, was
to establish and enforce a firm wall of separation between legitimate and il-
legitimate religious sects. The anticult movement advocated a variety of
cultural and legal responses to suppress, if not eliminate, new religious
movements, such as the Unification Church (commonly known as "the
Moonies"), seen as incompatible with American culture.256 "Perhaps the an-
ticult movement's greatest success was the cultural diffusion of the cult-
brainwashing symbols that became the lens through which a diverse array
of groups and events were thematized." '257
A broad-based cultural, political, governmental, and media effort
worked to publicize the dangers of new religious movements and to dis-
courage participation in them.5 "Parents of converts to new religious
movements have banded together to form an anticult movement that has re-
jected the religious legitimacy of the groups and affiliations with them." '259
252 Id.; see also Cynthia Norman Williams, Note, America's Opposition to New Religious Move-
ments: Limiting the Freedom of Religion, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 171, 173 (2003) ("Whichever defi-
nition is chosen, a cult is a religious practice that goes against the mainstream by displacing the ideals of
the majority and embracing its own unique brand of worship.").
253 Davis, supra note 250, at 172.
254 See David G. Bromley, Dramatic Denouements, in CULTS, RELIGION, AND VIOLENCE, supra
note 251, at 11, 20-23; see also Davis, supra note 250, at 147-51; James T. Richardson & Mary White
Stewart, Medicalization and Regulation of Deviant Religions: An Application of Conrad and Schnei-
der's Model, in REGULATING RELIGION: CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE 507, 521-23 (James
T. Richardson ed., 2004).
255 Bromley, supra note 254, at 21.
256 See id. at 21-23. On the history of the Unification Church in the United States, and its generally
hostile reception in many quarters, see generally CARLTON SHERWOOD, INQUISITION: THE PERSECUTION
AND PROSECUTION OF THE REVEREND SUN MYUNG MOON (1991); for a more negative and critical ap-
proach to the subject, see ERICA HEFTMANN, DARK SIDE OF THE MOONIES (1982).
257 Bromley, supra note 254, at 23.
258 J. Gordon Melton & David G. Bromley, Challenging Misconceptions About the New Religions-
Violence Connection, in CULTS, RELIGION, AND VIOLENCE, supra note 251, at 42, 42.
259 Id.; see also Davis, supra note 250, at 145-46 (noting that parents justified abusive deprogram-
ming for their children in part by claiming that "these were not 'genuine' religious movements-i.e., not
worthy of tolerance and respect-and the converts' choices were not actually free choices at all, but the
result of 'brainwashing,' sometimes called 'coercive persuasion,' 'thought reform,' or 'mind control."').
For an argument that coercive deprogramming efforts should not be viewed as violative of Establish-
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But "there are few truly new religions. '26° "For example, Hare Krishna
derives from Bengali Hinduism; Aum Shinriky6 from Buddhism; the
Church Universal and Triumphant from Theosophy; the Branch Davidians
from Adventism; the United Order from Mormonism; Happy, Healthy,
Holy from Sikhism; Mahikari from Shintoism; and ECKANKAR from Sant
Mat. '26' Professors Melton and Bromley suggest that "the criteria for dis-
tinguishing newness are much more complex than can be conveyed through
any simple dichotomy. '262  Moreover, as Professor Davis has observed,
"even if one posited that there could be a demonstrable theoretical differ-
ence between exercising one's 'religion' and joining a 'cult,' in practice it
turns out that one person's cult is another's valid religion.
263
Existing religious groups often react with hostility to perceived new-
comers. "[T]he resistance that new religious movements offer to the estab-
lished order [can be characterized] as political, albeit through a religious
format. '264  Professor Lionel Rothkrug drives even more directly at this
point: "Evangelicals, Fundamentalists, and other militant Protestant groups
exemplify a mentality prepared to make a public issue out of practices,
however trifling, that are deemed to be contrary to their convictions. 265
The unwillingness of some religious organizations to accept same-sex mar-
riage and the concerted legal effort to establish and enforce constitutional
prohibitions against state recognition of such relationships exemplify this
phenomenon.266
ment Clause principles, see Richard Delgado, When Religious Exercise is Not Free: Deprogramming
and the Constitutional Status of Coercively Induced Belief 37 VAND. L. REv. 1071 (1984).
260 Melton & Bromley, supra note 258, at 43.
261 Id; see also Davis, supra note 250, at 149 ("Anti-cult evangelicals, not surprisingly, while vo-
ciferous against groups such as DLM [Divine Light Movement] and the 'Moonies' [the Unification
Church], protest that 'aggressiveness and proselytizing... are basic to authentic Christianity,' and that
Jews for Jesus and Campus Crusade for Christ are not to be labeled as cults.").
262 Melton & Bromley, supra note 258, at 43.
263 Davis, supra note 250, at 149.
264 Melton & Bromley, supra note 258, at 45.
265 LIONEL ROTHKRUG, DEATH, TRUST, & SOCIETY: MAPPING RELIGION & CULTURE 39 (2006); see
also Williams, supra note 252, at 174 ("Mainstream America feels threatened by new religious move-
ments that allow and even encourage physical and sexual abuse, sexual deviation and experimentation,
and mass suicides.").
266 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETrER OR FOR
WORSE? 20-31, 39-41 (2006); see also Justin T. Wilson, Note, Preservationism, or the Elephant in the
Room: How Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage Deceive Us into Establishing Religion, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 561 (2007). See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES:
WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES (2006).
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Over time, of course, the unfamiliar becomes less so."' As one com-
mentator notes, "there are widely accepted religious groups that are no
longer thought of as cults in the negative connotation of the word." '268 This
set of now-accepted groups includes "Mormonism, the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, and the Masonic Lodge." '269 Even so, this is of little comfort to
groups that have not yet achieved mainstream acceptability. "Today there
pervades a hatred and distrust for marginal religious groups that are seen as
destructive to [their] members, and the controls placed on such groups are
not seen as burdens by the courts. 270
2. Both Academics and Average Citizens Use Nomenclature Strate-
gically to Separate "Real" Religions from Bogus Ones.-As detailed above,
the Supreme Court's nomenclature and doctrine reflect the de facto exis-
tence of a tiered understanding of religionists."' Longstanding religions
that maintain belief systems largely consistent with dominant political, eco-
nomic, and cultural views might not always win, but they uniformly receive
a respectful hearing. For example, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Yoder
puts great weight on the age of the Old Order Amish and on the consistency
of the Old Order Amish with traditional ideals of the Protestant work ethic.
By way of contrast, both nineteenth and twentieth century decisions involv-
ing the Mormon practice of polygamy do not take seriously the plausibility
of a religious obligation to practice polygyny.272 Indeed, Justice Murphy's
dissent in Cleveland is remarkable for its willingness to consider carefully
the practice of polygamy in overtly sociological and anthropological terms,
largely divorced from the contemporary cultural significance of the practice
in the United States.273 Although the Supreme Court has never adopted la-
bels for various religious sects, the broader culture maintains a careful no-
menclature to distinguish legitimate religious groups from groups perceived
267 See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 240, at 1332-40 (canvassing the history of polygamy in the
Mormon Church and the decision to abandon the tenets of the faith requiring the practice of polygamy
as part of a "radical assimilation and accommodation" effort that "secularized Mormon theology, turning
it toward Protestant neoorthodoxy," thereby becoming "models of patriotic, law-abiding citizenship"
with Church leadership "no longer composed of radical visionaries, but rather.., drawn from the ranks
of successful businessman, attorneys, scholars, and LDS church bureaucrats"). As Harmer-Dionne ar-
gues, "for a liberal polity such as the United States that purports to value the freedom of religion,
speech, and conscience, there is a marked philosophical difference between theological developments
that result from organic evolution and those that result from massive persecution and forced cessation of
social customs and marital practices." Id. at 1339; see also Goodstein, supra note 248, at Al (noting
that "[t]he Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints... has been fighting for legitimacy since its
founding 177 years ago in upstate New York" but that "Mormons are by now successfully integrated
and prospering in the American mix"; even so, however, "memories of that persecution are still fresh").
268 Williams, supra note 252, at 176.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 182.
27t See supra notes 147-94 and accompanying text.
272 See supra text and accompanying notes 147-68.
273 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 24-27 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
1240
If Judges Were Angels
to be illegitimate. Studies of religion themselves involve "sociological dis-
cussions of 'churches,' 'sects,' and 'cults'---definition of the different types
of religious groups being the main problem. '274 No truly objective defini-
tion of a "religion" that distinguishes it from a "cult" exists; any effort to
establish such definitions involves the adoption and application of essen-
tially subjective criteria. Notwithstanding the definitional difficulties, some
countries have tried to distinguish religious groups by their characteristics
and label them as "cults," "sects," or "destructive/dangerous groups. '"275
The decisions of the federal courts reflect the same sort of effort to
classify religion into acceptable denominations verses unacceptable cults.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has assumed that it would be possible to prose-
cute the subjective good faith belief of a religious leader without putting the
faith itself on trial .1 6  The Ballard family--Guy, Edna, and Donald-
operated a religious organization called the "I Am," in which Guy claimed
to communicate with the deity through the active intercession of "St. Ger-
main. 2 7   The Ballards actively solicited financial contributions and
claimed that devotees would obtain myriad benefits, including good health
and financial rewards. 27' The government brought federal criminal fraud
charges against all the Ballards, alleging that they did not in fact believe
what they preached. 79
Although Justice Douglas proclaimed that "[h]eresy trials are foreign
to our Constitution, "25 ° he wrote a majority opinion in Ballard that effec-
tively permits the government to deploy the criminal law of fraud as a
weapon against oddball minority religions and religionists. Justice Jackson
had the better of the argument in Ballard when, in dissent, he countered that
"I do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from con-
siderations as to what is believable. '28' The Supreme Court's opinions illus-
trate that this problem of cultural bias is not limited to laypeople or juries.
Indeed, as Professor Mark Tushnet has argued, the "men and women who
are our judges ... are situated with respect to religion," and this fact will
"induce predictable and normatively troubling distortions in outcome. 282
274 BYRNES, supra note 239, at 167.
275 Brornely & Melton, supra note 251, at 3; see Horwitz, supra note 229, at 118-27 (discussing
Germany's efforts to proscribe the Church of Scientology); see also Michael Browne, Should Germany
Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Octopus? Freedom of Religion and the Church of Scientology in
the United States, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 155 (1998); Michael Cieply & Mark Landler, Plot
Thickens in a Tom Cruise Film, Long Before Cameras Begin to Roll, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at B7.
276 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
277 Id. at 79-80.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 80-81.
280 Id. at 86.
281 Id. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
282 Tushnet, supra note 236, at 400.
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3. Because Judges Are Part of the Culture, They Are Generally In-
capable of Escaping Their Own Cultural Biases.-Judges do not exist sepa-
rate and apart from the general culture. Accordingly, a judge cannot avoid
bringing cultural bias to the bench when confronted with a novel claim by a
new religious movement. 83 Moreover, the plausibility and importance of
the movement's beliefs will be measured against a yardstick derived from
religions familiar to those within the culture.
If this is so, then no governmental effort to protect minority religion-
ists-whether a judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause or statu-
tory civil rights enactments, whether at the federal, state, or local level-
will necessarily prove reliable. In court, these claims will either be rejected
as too extravagant to be credited, or the government's interests in regulation
will easily outweigh the burden on the minority group's religious practices.
The problem inheres in the very nature of the concept of religion, and un-
less judges are somehow able to remove themselves from the general cul-
ture, this bias may prove to be entirely unavoidable. Indeed, a review of the
Supreme Court's opinions over time suggests that highly transgressive re-
ligions have difficulty invoking the Free Exercise Clause at all because the
burden on their religious practice is merely "indirect" rather than "direct.""2 4
Alternatively, should the group establish a claim, the government's interests
nearly always prove to be sufficiently "compelling," "important," or "sub-
stantial" to justify applying the law against members of the sect.2"5
Professor Ira Lupu warns that "the question of what counts as religios-
ity for purposes of free exercise" presents a difficult "definitional problem,"
a problem "compounded by its relation to the likelihood of discrimination
against unusual spiritual claims. 28 6 He suggests that "[i]n the absence of
objective criteria, decisionmakers tend to fall back on the familiar experi-
ence or the romantic ideal."2 7 This approach results in "at best, reasoning
by induction from conventional Western patterns of religion, and, at worst,
simple equations of religion with Christianity.
288
The problem, however, is that truly neutral rules simply do not exist
that allow for the easy categorization of groups as "religions," "sects," or,
more pejoratively, "cults." In practice, contrary to Lupu's admonition
against the use of "ethnocentric models of religion" in analyzing free exer-
283 See Marshall, supra note 32, at 311 ("A court is more likely to find against a claimant on defini-
tional grounds when the religion is bizarre, relative to the cultural norm .... "); Tushnet, supra note 236,
at 381-83 ("[A] subtle preference for claims readily understandable by those adherents of mainstream
religion .... occurs because it is a normal human reaction to be skeptical about the sincerity of a person
who claims to hold unconventional beliefs.").
284 See supra notes 193-203, 221-31, and accompanying text; supra note 236.
285 See supra text and accompanying notes 192-216.
286 Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion,
102 HARv. L. REv. 933, 957-58 (1989).
287 Id. at 958.
288 Id. (footnote omitted).
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cise claims, 8 9 such models are commonplace and probably largely unavoid-
able.
4. Any Autonomy-Based Iteration of the Free Exercise Clause Will
Privilege Majoritarian Religionists.-The necessary conclusion to be drawn
is that any effort to frame the Free Exercise Clause as promoting religious
autonomy will have the perverse effect of increasing, rather than decreas-
ing, the differential in religious liberty enjoyed by majority and minority re-
ligionists. This is so because many judges are unlikely to credit outlandish
beliefs as sincerely held, are unwilling to credit offensive beliefs as really
enjoying divine sanction (that is, the beliefs, even if sincerely held, are
clearly mistaken), or find in any event that the general social interest in en-
forcing the regulation at issue simply overwhelms whatever meager auton-
omy interest might exist. A test that restricts government in the name of
religious autonomy will expand the rights of dominant sects, but will have
far less effect on the de facto rights of minority religious sects.
Where beliefs are familiar, a court is more likely to take them seriously
and to consider ordering accommodations (whether under the Free Exercise
Clause or a civil rights statute, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, that provides a statutory right to exemptions). The whole purpose of
judicially enforced human rights, however, is not so much to better secure
the rights of popular groups (who can seek relief through legislatures and
the democratic process), but rather to ensure that unpopular minorities do
not suffer unduly from the caprice of democratically elected governmental
officials. An approach to free exercise that makes effectively securing the
rights of unpopular religious minorities the central project of the Free Exer-
cise Clause would better achieve the core purpose of the Clause.
C. Empirical Evidence Demonstrates that the Sherbert-Yoder Approach
Systematically Disadvantages Minority Religionists Vs-6- Vis
Majority Religionists
Up to this point, the argument against an autonomy-based approach to
theorizing free exercise principles has rested on largely normative and so-
cial science arguments. Empirical data also confirm that Sherbert-Yoder's
autonomy-based conception of the Free Exercise Clause increased, rather
than decreased, the differential treatment of minority sects.
Professors John Wybraniec and Roger Finke undertook a comprehen-
sive empirical examination of free exercise cases during the pre-Smith,
post-Smith, and Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) periods.29°
Their findings are highly instructive on the questions of which religions win
289 Id.
290 John Wybraniec & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: The Judiciary's Chang-
ing Role in Protecting Minority Religions from Majoritarian Rule, in REGULATING RELIGION: CASE
STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE, supra note 254, at 535.
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and which religions lose under a strict scrutiny approach. Using a sample
comprised of cases reported in The Religious Freedom Reporter, Wy-
braniec and Finke coded the cases for the religious affiliation of the plain-
tiffs and for the eventual outcome of the litigation."' They coded the
religious groups "according to whether the group (or the individual's af-
filiation) was a church, sect, cult, or another non-Christian tradition." '292
The results are striking. Their findings "indicate that religions in ten-
sion with society are more likely to be involved with the judiciary." '293 For
example, Protestant sects constitute only "15% of the total U.S. church
membership," but were "involved in almost 27% of the free exercise
claims.1294 New religious movements (pejoratively labeled "cults") present
an even starker disparity between number of adherents and claims: "Only
representing 1% of church membership, they are involved in over 16% of
the free exercise court cases. 295 Although Jews, Muslims, and Native
American religions make up only 3% of the religious population, these
groups account for 18% of the free exercise claims brought to court.296 Wy-
braniec and Finke observe that if one aggregates these and other minority
religious groups, they comprise "only about 18% of the church membership
in the U.S., but together they account for nearly 62% of the free exercise
cases coming to the courts, and nearly one half of all court cases on relig-
" 297ion.
The contrary pattern holds true for "mainline" Protestant churches. Al-
though membership in mainline Protestant sects represents 21% of total
church membership, these groups account for "only 4% of the cases on re-
ligion, including free exercise cases."29' Similarly, Roman Catholics pro-
vide 38% of national church membership, but account for only 8% of free
exercise cases.
299
The pattern is reasonably clear: minority religious groups bring far
more cases than do more traditional majority religious groups. But even
though minority religionists bring far more cases, their success rate in the
federal courts is much lower."' Minority religionists bring and lose more
cases; majority religionists bring fewer cases and win a larger percentage of
them.30' Wybraniec and Finke report that "higher tension religions are less
291 Id. at 54042.








300 Id. at 542-49.
301 Id.
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likely to receive a favorable decision" than are more culturally familiar
sects." 2
Over the entire period, cults won around 37% of their free exercise
cases, whereas mainline Protestants won about 65% of their cases. 3 How-
ever, "the statistics do not explore the consequences of the Smith decision
or the [RFRA]."' If one takes Smith and the RFRA into account, the net
disparity between minority and nonminority religions decreases. Thus,
Smith had the effect of lowering success rates for free exercise cases across
the board. This decrease in overall success rates resulted in a decrease in
the net difference between successful claims brought by the majority relig-
ionists and those brought by minority religionists. Wybraniec and Finke
explain that "the odds of a favorable decision for religious freedom cases
outside of the Smith-period were almost 2 to 1 for cases prior to Smith and
were over 2 to 1 for the RFRA period following Smith."3 5 Success rates
fell significantly after Smith and before enactment of the RFRA, to success
rates of around 30% (as opposed to 66%)."6 The statistical models found "a
strong negative relationship between the citing of Smith and favorable deci-
sions by the courts, even when controlling for exogenous and other control
variables.""3 7
Surprisingly, the authors found that the RFRA did not return success
rates to pre-Smith levels. "In fact, the striking finding is that [the] RFRA,
though not significant, is negatively related to a positive outcome in court
decisions."308 Wybraniec and Finke explain that "citing Smith remained
significant," and "even when Smith and [the] RFRA are placed in the equa-
tion together, the more powerful factor is the original decision from
Smith."3 9 They conclude that the "RFRA, a legislative act, has apparently
not been able to counteract the strength of the legal ruling of Smith."3 '
This conclusion suggests that the underlying content of free exercise
doctrine plays a significant role in the adjudication of statutory civil rights
cases that involve free exercise claims. Even if Congress or a state legisla-
ture wishes to use statutory means to expand the scope of religious freedom,
Wybraniec and Finke's study suggest that these means are less effective
than one would otherwise assume.3"' If courts apply statutory protections
302 Id. at 542.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 543-44.
305 Id. at 545.
306 See id. at 546-48.
307 Id. at 548.
308 Id. at 549.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 The empirical study undertaken by Professors Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, which considered both
constitutional and statutory claims for religious exemptions at the state and federal level, found that "re-
ligious affiliation variables-both those of judges and of claimants-were the most consistently signifi-
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that secure religious exemptions in the same way that they applied the Free
Exercise Clause itself pre-Smith, unpopular minority religious groups,
which are most in need of protection from hostile or indifferent legislative
or executive officials, would probably receive the least net benefit from the
statute (whereas more traditional religious groups would likely bring fewer
net claims and yet win a higher percentage of those cases).
Looking at cases in the pre-Smith era, the authors found that:
[H]igh-tension faiths (i.e., religions holding a high level of separation, antago-
nism, and distinctiveness within the surrounding social-cultural environment),
were more likely to be involved in court cases and to receive unfavorable rul-
ings.... [T]he overall trend shows sects, cults, and other minority religions
holding high rates of involvement in court cases and a low rate of favorable
rulings [pre-Smith]. By contrast, the mainline Protestants seldom appeared in
the courts and their rate of favorable rulings towered over all other religious
groups.
312
Because Smith decreased favorable decisions for all religious groups prior
to the RFRA, it necessarily reduced the net disparity between mainline Pro-
testants (part of the cultural mainstream) and unpopular minority sects. Be-
cause majority religionists enjoyed a substantial advantage in winning
cases, any reduction in the net number of wins reduced the disparity be-
tween the winners and the losers. That is to say, unpopular minorities lost
most of the many cases they brought prior to Smith, whereas members of
mainline religious groups brought fewer cases and won a much greater per-
centage of them. Smith reduced the differential win-loss ratios and thereby
advanced equal treatment among sects.
Wybraniec and Finke's study raises a serious question about the as-
sumption that strict scrutiny of neutral laws of general applicability will ac-
cant influences on judicial votes in the religious freedom cases included in [the] study." Sisk, Heise &
Morriss, supra note 11, at 501. It bears noting, then, that the problem of judicial bias might depend on
the precise source of the legal claims at bar; the Sisk, Heise, and Morriss study found higher success
rates for minority religionists than other studies found, but it also considered statutory and other consti-
tutional avenues of seeking relief. Id. at 567-71. Because the study considered multiple means of se-
curing judicial protection, including pure equal protection and free speech claims, it is less useful in
isolating the question of judicial bias with respect to only those litigants asserting a free exercise claim.
See id (positing that clever litigants would adopt alternative theories to support their legal claims, find-
ing a "notable change in litigant strategy" along these lines because of the reduced "litigative potential
of the Free Exercise Clause" post-Smith, and noting that their study "considered not only multiple claim
cases in which religious expression or religious discrimination claims were raised in addition to Free
Exercise claims, but also those cases in which litigants sought to bypass Smith altogether by eschewing
any reliance on the Free Exercise Clause and instead couching a claim solely upon free speech or equal-
ity principles"). These findings tend to support, rather than undermine, my argument that enforcement
of the Free Exercise Clause vel non presents cultural difficulties not present with respect to minority re-
ligionists raising free speech or equal protection claims. In other words, asking a court to vindicate a
free exercise claim triggers a different judicial reaction than asking a judge to validate a free speech or
equal protection claim.
312 Wybraniec & Finke, supra note 290, at 549.
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tually protect highly unpopular religious minorities. The radical disjunction
in the number of cases brought and the success rate for those cases suggests
that unpopular minority religious groups simply did not receive the full
benefit of Sherbert- Yoder autonomy-based strict scrutiny doctrine.313
A second study, undertaken by Professor James Richardson, consid-
ered the exercise of discretion within the legal system. He analyzed
whether "controversial religious groups" faced bias in the federal and state
courts."' Richardson found pervasive bias against adherents of unpopular
religious faiths:
Problems of either accepting questionable evidence where its introduction
might undercut rights of a minority religious group, or refusing to accept evi-
dence that could support claims by such a group, can result in court decisions
that can be characterized as discriminatory, and not in the interest of social jus-
tice or religious freedom.315
In sum, Richardson's work and conclusions are entirely consistent with the
Wybraniec and Finke study.
31 6
Proponents of a return to the Sherbert-Yoder approach should explain
why a rule that in practice produced such skewed results represents a better
approach than Smith. Surely the religious autonomy of religious minorities
is no less deserving of respect than are the rights of members of more popu-
lar sects. Yet this is precisely how the regime of strict scrutiny pre-Smith
worked. In a perverse way, strict scrutiny enhanced the religious liberties
of groups that have the least to fear from democratically elected legislators
and executive branch personnel.
Of course, one might attempt to find fault with either the Wybraniec
and Finke or the Richardson study. As a means of checking their results,
my research assistant and I conducted an empirical analysis of pre- and
post-Smith free exercise cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth,
313 Again, one cannot overestimate the importance of culture in prefiguring the ability of a judge to
credit a claim that God commands a particular course of conduct (regardless of its legal status). As Pro-
fessor Stephen Carter has noted, "[a] devout Christian will not see the world the same way as a devout
Muslim, who will not see the world the same was as a devout Jew, who will not see the world the same
way as a devout Hindu." STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF
RELIGION IN POLITICs 30 (2000). Carter suggests that differences between and among communities of
faith "are not trivial" and that they fundamentally affect the way a person exists in the world; in a word,
"[they are about life." Id.
314 James T. Richardson, Regulating Religion: A Sociological and Historical Introduction, in
REGULATING RELIGION: CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE, supra note 254, at 1, 8.
315 Id.
316 The conclusions are also consistent with the larger findings of the Sisk, Heise, and Morriss em-
pirical study. See Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 11, at 614 ("In our study of religious freedom deci-
sions, the single most prominent, salient, and consistent influence on judicial decisionmaking was
religion-religion in terms of affiliation of the claimant, the background of the judge, and the demo-
graphics of the community.").
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Sixth, and Ninth Circuits." 7 The selection of these particular courts was not
accidental. Most commentators perceive the Fourth Circuit to be a conser-
vative bench,3"' the Ninth Circuit to be a progressive or liberal bench," 9 and
the Sixth Circuit to lack (at least historically) a firm ideological personal-
ity.32° By examining the decisions from ideologically diverse courts, we
hoped to control for the possibility of ideological bias by judges in applying
Sherbert-Yoder and Smith.
As the table in the Appendix shows,32 our study generally confirms the
findings of the Wybraniec and Finke study. Members of majority religions
bring fewer claims and win more of them than do minority religions. Smith
had the effect of lowering success rates across the board, and this in turn re-
duced the relative disparity in successful claims between majority and mi-
nority religionists.
The one exception to this pattern is the Ninth Circuit, in which minor-
ity religionists actually won a greater percentage of their claims pre-Smith
than did majority group religionists. This would support the argument that
strict scrutiny, applied with sufficient sensitivity to the dangers of unreflec-
tive ethnocentrism and with greater respect for cultural difference, might
advance, rather than retard, both religious equality and religious autonomy.
Whether because of its liberal bent322 or its diverse population, or perhaps
some combination of both, the Ninth Circuit seems to be less biased against
minority religions (or perhaps is more hostile to traditional religious
groups). Perhaps heterogeneity helps to secure a more culturally sensitive
Judiciary; that is to say, familiarity might breed respect, rather than con-
tempt. Whatever the precise reason, the Ninth Circuit was less likely to rule
in favor of dominant religious groups and against minority religious groups
in free exercise cases. The results from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, how-
317 The results of this study appear in a grid form in the Appendix.
318 See Robert L. Boone, Comment, Booker Defined: Examining the Application of United States v.
Booker in the Nation's Most Divergent Circuit Courts, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1079, 1094 (2007) ("As legal
scholars and practitioners are aware, the Fourth Circuit has come to be known as the most conservative
federal court of appeals. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has a reputation as the most liberal circuit
court.").
319 See Stephen J. Wermeil, Exploring the Myths About the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 355,
355-58 (2006) (arguing that, although there is a tendency to overstate the degree to which the Ninth Cir-
cuit is a relatively liberal bench, careful examination of decisions does reflect a progressive cast to this
Court of Appeals; and introducing an entire symposium dedicated to the normative and empirical study
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial Circuit that generally bears out this assertion).
320 See Melanie D. Winegar, Note, Big Talk, Broken Promises: How Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Failed Disabled Workers, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1267, 1295 (2006) (describing the Sixth
Circuit as "usually moderate"); see also Pierre H. Bergeron, En Banc Practice in the Sixth Circuit: An
Empirical Study, 1990-2000, 68 TENN. L. REv. 771 (2001); Emery G. Lee, III, Horizontal Stare Decisis
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 92 KY. L.J. 767 (2003) (noting the stability of in-
tracircuit precedent in the Sixth Circuit).
321 See infra Appendix.
322 See supra note 319.
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ever, squarely reconfirm Wybraniec and Finke's findings. Accordingly, we
found that Smith had the effect of increasing religious equality because
overall it significantly reduced the differential success rates that prevailed
under the pre-Smith regime.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: FREE
EXERCISE AS AN EQUALITARIAN GUARANTEE
This Part considers the original understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause and, relying on the legislative history of the Clause in the House of
Representatives, argues that an equalitarian understanding of the Clause
better comports with these historical materials than does an autonomy-
based conception of the Clause. Although Judge McConnell's contrary in-
terpretation of the available record is plausible,323 his reading of the record
fails to account completely for all the available evidence and engages in
more spin than may be warranted. I readily will concede that reading the
Free Exercise Clause to encompass exemptions from general laws is not ut-
terly implausible. Nevertheless, a fuller review of the House debates makes
the case in favor of mandatory exemptions much more difficult to make
than McConnell admits.
In fact, the legislative history of the Free Exercise Clause in the House
of Representatives establishes that the Framers, particularly Madison, un-
derstood the Clause in equalitarian terms. Moreover, the subsequent
changes in Madison's nomenclature that the House considered during the
debates do not appear to have carried with them any substantive import;
certainly, there is no recorded debate to this effect.324 Further, the phrases
"rights of conscience," "free and equal rights of conscience," and "free ex-
ercise" all seem to have been used interchangeably over the course of the
summer of 1789.325 Indeed, Madison himself, in proposing a free exercise
guarantee, used "full and equal rights of conscience" and "equal rights of
conscience" as synonyms.326 Given that Madison himself did not attach any
323 See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 6, at 1473-1513.
324 See infra notes 330-60.
325 See infra Part IV.A.
326 See I THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 434-35 (Jo-
seph Gales & W.W. Seaton eds., 1834) (June 8, 1789) [hereinafter ANNALS OF CONG.] ("The civil rights
of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, in-
fringed.... No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial
by jury in criminal cases.").
Note that two printings exist of the first two volumes of the Annals of Congress. They contain dif-
ferent pagination, running heads, and back titles. The printing with the running head "History of Con-
gress" conforms to the remaining volumes of the series, while the printing with the running head "Gales
& Seaton's History of Debates in Congress" is unique. All page citations herein are to the former print-
ing. Readers with the "Gales & Seaton's History" printing can most easily find parallel citations by re-
ferring to the date. See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 6, at 1427 n.84.
1249
102:1189 (2008)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
particular importance to the precise language used to express the concept of
religious equality, the best reading of the record is that the varying nomen-
clature did not signify any substantive differences in meaning.327
After considering the legislative history of the Clause, this Part offers
additional normative and policy arguments in favor of an equalitarian read-
ing of the Free Exercise Clause. Beyond the intentions of Madison, and the
other Framers, an equality-based approach would help to resolve tension
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause: The Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits government from favoring any particular reli-
gious group or organization, whereas the Free Exercise Clause prevents
government from attempting to squelch or discourage religious groups that
it disfavors.32 This Part concludes that, under an equalitarian reading of the
Free Exercise Clause, Smith arguably advances the core purpose of the
Clause, equality, more effectively than did the Sherbert-Yoder regime that it
displaced. 29
A. The Original Understanding: Madison and an Equalitarian Reading of
the Free Exercise Clause
The legislative history of the Free Exercise Clause suggests that its
purpose was to prevent religious discrimination, rather than to create some
sort of generalized right to religious autonomy. James Madison, the princi-
327 In a similar fashion, some state constitutions use the phrase "law of the land," rather than "due
process of law," to express the concept that government must act in a fundamentally just fashion. See
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 592-94 & n.247 (1997).
The use of "law of the land," dating back to the Magna Carta, rather than the use of the more contempo-
rary "due process of law," does not indicate a difference in substantive content; rather, it is simply an-
other means of expressing the same basic concept of rational, fundamentally fair governance. See id. at
593 n.247; see also Edwin S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARV. L. REV. 366, 380-84 (1911) (discussing the "law of the land" clause in the North Carolina bill of
rights as endowing rights equivalent to those guaranteed by clauses requiring "due process of law");
A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REV. 873, 881-82 (1976) ("Long before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, state courts had
begun to develop a body of substantive due process law, drawing on state constitutional due process or
'law of the land' provisions."); Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word "'Due," 38 AKRON L. REV. 1, 10-11
(2005) ("It is well-known that the federal Due Process Clause has its origins in the 'Law of the Land'
clause of Magna Carta."); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941,
948-84 (tracing the development of the concept of due process from Magna Carta's "law of the land"
clause in Chapter 39 to the early years of the Republic and concluding that state law cases from the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries "unquestionably establish that law of the land clauses and
other provisions in state constitutions protecting life, liberty, and property could be treated by courts as
limitations upon legislative competence" and that some of the cases "suggest an underlying theory
closely akin to substantive due process"). See generally Hyman, supra, at 10-20 (discussing "law of the
land" clauses in state constitutions in the early years of the Republic).
328 See infra notes 381-85, 425-26 and accompanying text.
329 See infra notes 374-380 and accompanying text.
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pal architect of the amendments that were to become the Bill of Rights," '
introduced language that reflects an equalitarian, rather than libertarian,
purpose.
Madison introduced a resolution containing the first draft of the Free
Exercise Clause on Monday, June 8, 1789. The fourth amendment that
Madison proposed provided:
That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, be inserted these
clauses, to wit: The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of reli-
gious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, in-
fringed.33'
This language is significant in that it casts the right to free exercise in
overtly equalitarian terms---"full and equal rights of conscience." Unlike
the final language adopted by Congress and submitted to the states ("free
exercise of religion"), the original draft expressly referenced equality con-
cerns.
McConnell suggests that this original language proposed by Madison
necessarily offers mandatory exemptions from general laws, arguing that
the language "implies that the liberty has both a substantive and an equality
component: the rights must be both 'full' and 'equal."' 332 He concludes that
"[h]ence, the liberty of conscience is entitled not only to equal protection,
but also to some absolute measure of protection apart from mere govern-
mental neutrality."' 3  Yet nothing in the immediate context of Madison in-
troducing the resolution suggests this highly expansive interpretation of the
language. Moreover, "full" could simply be a description of the level of
equality required; partial equality, or a reduced measure of religious equal-
ity, would not be sufficient. In other words, the language "full rights of
conscience" could be interpreted as synonymous with "equal rights of con-
science." Neither verbal formulation necessarily implies anything more
than freedom of belief, as opposed to freedom of conduct.
Further, the language of another proposed amendment addressing the
states supports this equalitarian conception of the Free Exercise Clause.
Madison's preferred approach to amendments was to insert them into the
330 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97-98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that James
Madison "undoubtedly was the most important architect among the members of the House of the
Amendments which became the Bill of Rights"); see Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heri-
tage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1586-87 (1982) ("No Founder contributed to the
cause of religious liberty more than Madison, who is considered the chief architect of the Constitution
and prime drafter of the Bill of Rights."); Bruce Fein, On Reading the Constitution, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1225, 1227 (1992) (describing Madison as the "chief architect of the Bill of Rights"). See generally
JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEALS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1996).
331 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 326, at 434 (June 8, 1789).
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preexisting text of the Constitution, rather than to incorporate them as a
separate series of amendments."' Article I, Section 9 contains limitations
on the scope of federal legislative power; Madison's text if adopted would
have appeared after the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses, and be-
fore the prohibition against direct taxes. In addition to the above proscrip-
tion against federal legislation that would deny religious equality, Madison
also proposed an amendment to Article I, Section 10, which contains limita-
tions on the scope of state legislative powers: "Fifthly. That in article 1st,
section 10, between clauses 1 and 2, be inserted this clause, to wit: No State
shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or
the trial by jury in criminal cases." '335 Thus, the language employed with re-
spect to state governments omitted the "full" language, and relied entirely
on the "equal" clause.
McConnell simply ignores this text, focusing exclusively on the text
related to the federal government.336 If the additional language "full" car-
ried the weight that McConnell suggests, it seems odd that Madison would
have omitted it from the version of the clause he proposed to apply to the
states. After all, state governments presented a far greater threat to religious
freedom in Madison's view than did the federal government;337 writing a
weaker form of the clause with respect to the states would have done little
to secure meaningful religious equality.338
In discussing his proposed amendments, Madison did not suggest that
he intended to hold the federal government to a higher standard than the
state governments with respect to rights of conscience. In fact, he made ex-
actly the opposite argument. Madison observed:
Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the
press, or liberty of conscience come in question in that body [the Parliament of
Great Britain], the invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their
Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of those
rights, respecting which the people of America are most alarmed.339
He emphasized that "[t]he freedom of the press and rights of conscience,
those choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the British consti-
334 See I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 326, at 434-35 (June 8, 1789) (suggesting the amendments
as modifications to existing text).
335 Id. at 435.
336 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 6, at 1481-83.
337 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 326, at 440-41 (June 8, 1789) (noting his fear that "there is
more danger of those powers being abused by the State Governments than by the Government of the
United States" and specifically reiterating the need to prohibit states from "violat[ing] the equal right of
conscience").
338 Id.
339 Id. at 436.
1252
If Judges Were Angels
tution."34 This language, of course, tracks the text of Madison's proposed
amendment to Article I, Section 10, that would bind the state governments.
If the "equal rights of conscience," along with the right to a free press
and jury trial in a criminal case represent the "choicest" of rights, it seems
odd that Madison would protect those rights imperfectly against the states,
but completely against the federal government. In light of this discussion,
the best interpretation of the proposed amendments is that they were in-
tended to have equivalent effect, and to secure equal rights of conscience
for all citizens, against both the federal and state governments.
Madison later addresses this very point, noting that if amendments are
necessary to secure the liberties of the people, "I wish also, in revising the
constitution, we may throw into that section, which interdicts the abuse of
certain powers in the State Legislatures, some other provisions of equal, if
not greater importance than those already made."34' "I think that there is
more danger of those powers being abused by the State Governments than
by the Government of the United States." '342 He explains that "I should
therefore wish to extend this interdiction, and add, as I have stated in the
5th resolution, that no State shall violate the equal right of conscience, free-
dom of the press, or trial by jury in criminal cases; because it is proper that
every Government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those
particular rights." '343 Madison emphasized the real threat that state govern-
ments presented to securing fundamental human rights:
I cannot see any reason against obtaining even a double security on those
points; and nothing can give a more sincere proof of the attachment of those
who opposed this Constitution to these great and important rights, than to see
them join in obtaining the security I have now proposed; because it must be
admitted, on all hands, that the State Governments are as liable to attack these
invaluable privileges as the General Government is, and therefore ought to be
cautiously guarded against.344
Judge McConnell makes no reference to these remarks, which is consistent
with his failure even to mention Madison's proposed free exercise amend-
ment for the states. When one reads Madison's reasons for proposing a free
exercise right against the state governments, it is clear that his language was
not intended to convey a more limited right against state governments than
against the national government. In consequence, McConnell is simply in-
correct to suggest that the language "full and equal rights of conscience" '345
held any greater significance-at least for Madison-than did language pro-
tecting "the equal rights of conscience." McConnell's failure to address
340 Id.
141 Id. at 440.
342 Id.
343 Id. at 440-41.
344 Id. at 441.
345 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 6, at 1443, 1481-83.
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this aspect of Madison's proposal, and the reasons Madison offered in sup-
port of it, raises serious problems for McConnell's preferred interpretation
of the text.
On July 21, 1789, the House of Representatives referred Madison's
resolution proposing amendments to the Constitution to a special committee
"to consist of a member from each State, with instruction to take the subject
of amendments to the Constitution of the United States generally into their
consideration and to report thereupon to the House." '346 The House ap-
pointed Madison to serve as Virginia's member of the special committee,
along with Representatives Vining, Baldwin, Sherman, Burke, Gilman,
Clymer, Benson, Goodhue, Boudinot, and Gale.347 The decision to consti-
tute a committee consisting of one representative per state merits a brief
comment. Given that the Framers established the House of Representatives
on a basis of proportional representation,348 it was, at least superficially, odd
to assign such an important task to a committee that did not itself reflect
proportional representation of the states. On reflection, however, because
ratification of amendments would require the consent of three-fourths of the
state legislatures (or conventions in the states called for the purpose of con-
sidering the amendments),349 it undoubtedly made sense to create a commit-
tee constituted in a fashion that would lead to the drafting of amendments
that might enjoy the broadest support among the states. A committee
dominated by members from the more populous states, such as Virginia,
New York, and Massachusetts, might not be as effective at crafting
amendments likely to secure the necessary support to ensure ratification.
On Saturday, August 15, 1789, the House of Representatives consid-
ered an amendment proposed by the special committee that would amend
Article I, Section 9, by adding a new provision between the existing third
and fourth clauses, to read "no religion shall be established by law, nor shall
the equal rights of conscience by infringed.""35 Thus, the committee essen-
tially adopted Madison's language, although it dropped the "full and" lan-
guage from its proposed text, using instead the language that Madison had
proposed for incorporation against the state governments in Article I, Sec-
tion 10.3"' Most of the debate over the proposed amendment related to the
prohibition against establishments, rather than to the "equal rights of con-
science."
Madison, who served on the drafting committee, noted that ratifying
conventions in the states had requested a textual prohibition against an es-
346 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 326, at 665 (July 21, 1789).
347 Id.
348 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
349 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
350 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 326, at 729 (Aug. 15, 1789).
351 Id.; see also id. at 435 (June 8, 1789).
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tablished national church.352 He also observed that some ratifying conven-
tions worried that the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 18 "enabled [Congress] to make laws of such a nature as might in-
fringe the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion; to prevent
these effects he presumed the amendment was intended, and he thought it as
well expressed as the nature of language would admit." '353 This once again
frames the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as mirror images of
one another: one prevents Congress from imposing a religion on the citi-
zenry, while the other prevents Congress from attempting to burden particu-
lar religious groups in a discriminatory way by infringing the rights of
conscience. Subsequent debate continued to use the nomenclature "rights
of conscience" to express the idea of free exercise.354 Moreover, the work-
ing draft retained the nomenclature "rights of conscience" to express the
concept of free exercise of religion.355
On Thursday, August 20, 1789, the House of Representatives returned
to the subject of an amendment to secure religious freedom. Representative
Ames proposed amending the language to read "Congress shall make no
law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to in-
fringe the rights of conscience." '56 The members agreed to this language,
and debate moved on to other proposed amendments. The record contains
no explanation for the change of language or the intended substantive effect
of the new language. Given the absence of any explanation for the addition
of the new "free exercise" language, and no debate regarding its adoption,
one could reasonably conclude that the members viewed the changes as
merely technical, rather than as substantive in nature.
Significantly, however, immediately after adoption of this revised lan-
guage, which specifically referenced "the free exercise" of religion, the
House of Representatives considered a "sixth amendment," which provided:
"No person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." '357 If
the adoption of language safeguarding the free exercise of religion secured
religious exemptions from general laws, this amendment should have been
rejected as entirely redundant. At a minimum, if the just-adopted free exer-
cise language was thought to generate exemptions from general laws,
someone surely would have asked whether this more specific amendment
was redundant. That debate about this amendment immediately followed
352 Id. at 730 (Aug. 15, 1789).
353 Id.
354 See id. at 731 (reporting on a proposal by Representative Livermore to modify the committee's
language to provide that "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of con-
science").
355 Id. (noting that the House of Representatives adopted Representative Livermore's proposed lan-
guage by a vote of thirty-one to twenty).
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adoption of language protecting both the "rights of conscience" and "free
exercise" leaves little room for interpretive doubt.
Representative Scott opposed the conscientious objector amendment,
while Representative Boudinot supported it, questioning whether "any de-
pendence... [can] be placed in men who are conscientious in this re-
spect." '358 Representative Boudinot argued:
I hope that in establishing this Government, we may show the world that
proper care is taken that the Government may not interfere with the religious
sentiments of any person. Now, by striking out the clause [protecting consci-
entious objectors], people may be led to believe that there is an intention in the
General Government to compel all its citizens to bear arms.359
Representative Boudinot was evidently persuasive because after adding the
words "in person" after the words "bear arms," the House of Representa-
tives adopted the proposed amendment.36 °
Although Judge McConnell acknowledges the debate over a proposed
amendment securing rights of conscientious objection to military service,36
he does not bother to note that the debate followed immediately after the
adoption of an amendment that incorporated the language "free exercise"
for the first time into the House's working draft of the Religion Clauses.
The timing of this debate, as discussed above, is significant: if the adoption
of the "free exercise" language carried significant substantive weight re-
garding constitutional exemptions from general laws, one would have ex-
pected someone to suggest that the conscientious objector amendment was
unnecessary and redundant. Yet no one made such a suggestion. Both an
opponent and a proponent of the amendment assumed that the amendment
would be necessary to protect conscientious objectors from involuntary
conscription. The House as a whole even adopted an amendment that
would limit the exemption to an obligation of "in person" service in the
armed forces, leaving a conscriptee potentially liable for funding the cost of
his replacement.
McConnell offers three reasons why consideration of the conscription
amendment should not be read as precluding an autonomy-based, exemp-
tions-generating interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. He suggests
that (1) "the militias are arms of the state governments except when in ac-
tual service," so that the Free Exercise Clause might not apply to them; (2)
"it does not necessarily follow from the fact of the free exercise exemptions
that the particular case of military service will be held exempted"; and (3)
"if Congress struck out the militia exemption clause"-as it ultimately
did-"this would create an inference that there was an intention in the gen-
358 Id. at 766-67.
359 Id.
360 Id
361 See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 6, at 1500-03.
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eral government to compel all citizens to bear arms. 362  Remarkably,
McConnell argues that consideration of this provision "strongly suggests
that the general idea offree exercise exemptions was part of the [Framers']
legal culture.
3 63
Given that the first debate on this question occurred immediately after
adoption of the free exercise language (again, something McConnell ig-
nores), it is difficult to credit the notion that the free exercise language, of
its own accord, was understood to generate exemptions from neutral laws of
general applicability. In fairness to McConnell, he never expressly argues
that the only plausible interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is that the
Framers understood it to generate judicially cognizable exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability. For example, he notes that "[i]n many
contexts, the phrases 'rights of conscience' and 'free exercise of religion'
seem to have been used interchangeably."3" He also concedes that "[ilt is
possible that these changes in language [from "free and equal rights of con-
science" to "free exercise"] were without substantive meaning, for in many
of the debates in the preconstitutional period, the concepts of 'liberty of
conscience' and 'free exercise of religion' were used interchangeably. 365
Even with these important caveats, however, McConnell argues that
the free exercise nomenclature supports an exemptions-granting interpreta-
tion of the Clause.366 And he directly asserts that "[b]y using the term 'free
exercise,' the first amendment extended the broader freedom of action to all
believers" and that "the freedom of religion was almost universally under-
stood (with Jefferson being the prominent exception) to include conduct as
well as belief."'367 He concludes, accordingly, that "free exercise is more
likely than mere liberty of conscience to generate conflicts with, and claims
for exemptions from, general laws and social mores.'"368
If the meaning of "free exercise" was as clear as McConnell asserts,
however, then the debate about the military service exemption amendment
is wholly inexplicable. Having just adopted language that McConnell
claims incorporates religious exemptions from general laws, the House
turned to consider an amendment that has this effect in a particular con-
text-conscription. The timing of this debate is important, and it suggests
(rather strongly) that the House did not understand the just-adopted "free
exercise" language to generate exemptions from neutral laws of general ap-
plicability.
362 Id. at 1501.
363 Id. (emphasis added).
364 Id. at 1482-83.
365 Id. at 1488.
366 See id. at 1488-1500.
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Moreover, the complete absence of any debate regarding the change of
language is striking if the new language had the substantive effect that
McConnell claims. If McConnell is correct, then Representative Ames's
amendment had the effect of radically expanding the scope of the proposed
religious freedom amendment, effectively disallowing any law the impedes
religiously motivated conduct. For such a sweeping change, the absence of
any debate is simply stunning. Moreover, the House of Representatives
adopted a military exemption clause that protected only against personal in-
duction, and not against an obligation to find and fund a surrogate. The
adoption of the "in person" limitation would have made the exemption rela-
tively weak. If a person has a religious objection to all wars, it seems odd
to honor that objection by forcing him to fund personally another person to
fight in his stead; yet that seems to be exactly the import of the "in person"
amendment.369
On September 24, 1789, the House of Representatives considered and
adopted a proposed amendment that provided "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances. '"37 The House agreed to this language, as did the Sen-
ate, and it was ratified as the First Amendment.
3 71
What is clear from Madison's proposal and the subsequent House de-
bates is that the Free Exercise Clause exists to protect against any form of
government-sponsored religious discrimination that violates "the full and
equal rights of conscience." An interpretation of the Clause that offers any-
thing less than full protection against both overt and covert forms of dis-
crimination cannot be squared with the Framers' intentions.
369 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 326, at 767 (Aug. 20, 1789).
370 Id. at 913 (Sept. 24, 1789).
371 It bears noting that the legislative history of the Free Exercise Clause in the Senate is largely lost
to history because "the Legislative as well as Executive sittings of the Senate were held with closed
doors until the second session of the third Congress, with the single exception of the discussion of the
contested election of A. Gallatin, as Senator from Pennsylvania, during which discussion the galleries
were opened by a special order of the Senate." Id. at 15. The closed nature of Senate deliberations in
the first Congress accordingly explains "the meagerness of the report of the Senate proceedings." Id.
Moreover, James Madison, then a member of the House of Representatives, has generally been credited
as the principal architect of the Bill of Rights. See supra note 330. Accordingly, even without the lack
of a similar record of the Senate's proceedings, Madison's views should be of particular relevance to
understanding the original intention of the Free Exercise Clause.
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B. An Equalitarian Reading of the Free Exercise Clause Helps to Resolve
the Tension Between the Religion Clauses
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that "play in the joints" exists
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.372 That is,
a potential conflict exists between a clause that disallows governmental
preferences in favor of religion (the Establishment Clause) and a companion
clause that explicitly safeguards religion from adverse governmental action
(the Free Exercise Clause). If one reads the Free Exercise Clause broadly to
generate exemptions for religiously motivated violations of general laws,
the potential tension between the Clauses increases significantly.
At the same time, however, both the Clauses must have independent
significance that gives each provision meaningful force and effect. Al-
though the textualist objection to Smith lacks merit because Smith does not
entirely strand the Clause,373 a broader equalitarian reading of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause could be maintained without raising an irreconcilable conflict
with the Establishment Clause. In other words, the potential conflict be-
tween the Clauses does not preclude a stronger reading of the Free Exercise
Clause than Smith offered.
As this Article argues, a perfectly plausible reading of the Free Exer-
cise Clause, and one consistent with the Clause's legislative history, would
focus on the prevention and eradication of discrimination against unpopular
religions and religionists.374 Such a reading would not exacerbate the con-
flict between the Religion Clauses. Instead, an equalitarian reading of the
Free Exercise Clause would render the Clause a mirror image of the Estab-
lishment Clause: One clause prohibits governmental efforts to impose relig-
ion, whereas the other prohibits governmental efforts to discriminate among
religions and religionists.
Justice Stevens has been a proponent of interpreting the Free Exercise
Clause in equalitarian terms. For example, in Lee, Justice Stevens con-
curred in the result, not because government has a compelling interest in
collecting payroll taxes to support the Social Security system, but rather be-
cause of an "overriding interest in keeping the government-whether it be
the legislature or the courts-out of the business of evaluating the relative
372 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) ("Short of those expressly proscribed govern-
mental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference."); see also Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712, 718-19 (2004) (quoting and applying the "play in the joints" metaphor to sustain the exclusion
of divinity school studies related to preparation for a career in the ministry from a Washington State
scholarship program). See generally Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 3-4, 24-34 (discussing permissible governmental accommodation of religion, which repre-
sents the operationalization of the "play in the joints").
373 See supra notes 123-45 and accompanying text.
374 Leo Pfeffer, Equal Protection for Unpopular Sects, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 9, 11
(1980-1981) ("The purpose of the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion was and is the
protection of unpopular creeds and faiths.").
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merits of differing religious claims." '375 He cautioned that "[t]he risk that
governmental approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived
as favoring one religion over another is an important risk the Establishment
Clause was designed to preclude." '376 Similarly, in Roy, Justice Stevens ob-
served that "[m]embers of the Abenaki Indian Tribe are unquestionably en-
titled to the same constitutional protection against governmental action
'prohibiting the free exercise' of their religion as are the adherents of other
faiths."377
Justice Stevens fears that differential grants of religious exemptions
from general laws, in the name of advancing religious liberty, could have
the perverse consequence of effectively distinguishing genuine, legitimate
religions from ersatz religions-which undoubtedly will be newer faiths
with which members of the Judiciary have less personal familiarity. Never-
theless, "[i]f Smith were overruled or limited, courts would be back in the
business of weighing governmental interest against individual interest to
decide whether to compel religious exemptions from otherwise valid laws
under the Free Exercise Clause.""37 This balancing, in turn, would necessi-
tate a subjective evaluation of the plausibility of the religionists' claims and
a weighing of those claims against the interests of the government.
C. Smith Better Advances the Equalitarian Project than Does
Sherbert-Yoder
An approach to the Free Exercise Clause that requires subjective
evaluation and weighing of religious and governmental interests does not
often redound to the benefit of groups or organizations at the outer margins
of American culture. Instead-and as was the case in the pre-Smith era-
courts are far more likely to find merit in claims brought by religious or-
ganizations located squarely within the cultural mainstream than in claims
brought by cultural outliers. This produces the ironic effect of turning a
countermajoritarian protection into a means of enhancing relative majori-
tarian privilege.379
Part of the problem inheres in the difficulty of taking seriously reli-
gious views that are foreign, strange, or even offensive. As Justice Jackson,
in his dissenting opinion in Ballard, explained, "I do not see how we can
375 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
376 Id.
377 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 716 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
378 Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE LJ. 1611, 1626
(1993).
379 See Pfeffer, supra note 374, at I I ("It needs no constitution to assure security for the Episcopali-
ans, Methodists, Presbyterians, or other well-established and long-accepted religions. The heart of the
first amendment would be mortally wounded if the religions we now call cults were excluded from the
zone of its protection because of their disfavor in the eyes of government officials or of the majority of
Americans.").
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separate an issue of what is believed from considerations as to what is be-
lievable."38 Any open-ended test for measuring the reasonableness of bur-
dens on religious practice cannot fail to take into account the
reasonableness of the religious belief. But unlike questions of math or sci-
ence, subjective and cultural norms prefigure the willingness of judges to
find merit in a particular claim for a religious exemption to a neutral law of
general applicability.
One means of solving the problem is simply to make it the plaintiff's
problem. As Professor Pepper puts it, "[j]udging credibility is a staple of
the adjudicatory process and administrative processes, and there is no rea-
son why the burden of proof on this issue ought not be on the claimant."38'
He suggests that religious exemption claims could be sorted by considering
"[c]onsistency of the claimed belief with past conduct, with current conduct
other than that at issue, and corroborating witnesses," and that "[i]ncorrectly
denying some sincere persons shelter for their religious conduct, an occa-
sionally necessary result if sincerity is to be judged, will simply be a cost of
granting a meaningful constitutional privilege in this area.
382
Professor Pepper is correct if the core purpose of the Free Exercise
Clause is maximizing religious autonomy, but he is badly mistaken if the
objective of the Clause is ensuring religious equality. Judges' mistakes re-
garding the sincerity or centrality of religious beliefs and practices will not
fall randomly across all believers; those with the most bizarre, most fantas-
tic beliefs will face the highest probability of an erroneous rejection. 83 If
free exercise jurisprudence should advance equality in equal measure with
liberty, it must take into account the limits of judges to evaluate fairly that
which is radically unfamiliar, strange, and perhaps even vaguely threaten-
ing.
I have previously suggested that "[t]he First Amendment right to the
free exercise of religion permits some deviance from community norms; the
degree and kind of deviance permitted under Yoder (and now the RFRA)
will be a function of the cultural sensibilities of individual federal
judges." '384 Accordingly, "the substantive meaning of the 'right to free exer-
cise' is (at least in part) culturally determined." '385 If these arguments are
correct, free exercise doctrine must take into account the probability of cul-
tural bias and somehow correct for it.
An open-ended balancing test with few firm guideposts limiting the
discretion of an individual judge is not the best way to correct the problem
380 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
381 Pepper, supra note 134, at 328.
382 Id.
383 See supra notes 189-233 and 236-66 and accompanying text.
384 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Building Bridges and Overcoming Barricades: Exploring the Limits
of Law as an Agent of Transformational Social Change, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 423,440 (1997).
385 Id.; see supra notes 236-85 and accompanying text.
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of cultural bias. Instead, free exercise doctrine should be designed such that
the problem of bias (both by judges and other governmental actors) is the
central question in the inquiry. A theory of free exercise that relies on no-
tions of equality and equal treatment better achieves this purpose than does
the Sherbert-Yoder approach.
V. IMPLEMENTING AN EQUALITARIAN FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE:
A PROPOSED DOCTRINAL REVISION
If the Free Exercise Clause should be framed in equalitarian, rather
than libertarian or autonomy-enhancing terms, the next logical question is
whether existing legal doctrine adequately advances the equality project.
Thus, even assuming that the Free Exercise Clause should be so framed,
one must further inquire: Does existing legal doctrine adequately advance
the equality project? At least arguably, Smith, as clarified by Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, does not adequately protect against religious discrimi-
nation. Because Smith does not place any burden of justification on the
government when a neutral law of general applicability burdens religious
practice, it permits clever discriminators to fly under the radar screen." 6 An
equalitarian approach to the Free Exercise Clause should require that gov-
ernment shoulder a burden of justification whenever it elects to apply a neu-
tral law of general applicability in a way that burdens religiously motivated
conduct. This is not because the Clause, properly understood, conveys an
autonomy interest that trumps neutral laws of general applicability, but
rather because a meaningful commitment to religious equality requires not
386 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-85, 890 (1990) (holding that neutral laws of
general applicability receive only rationality review and do not trigger heightened judicial review in the
absence of evidence that the law or policy reflects religious animus, i.e., it was adopted because of, not
despite, its effect on a particular religious group, or that the claim implicates another coordinate consti-
tutional right, such as the freedom of speech or substantive due process, rendering it a "hybrid" claim);
see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 529-32 (1993) (ap-
plying strict scrutiny review to Hialeah, Florida ordinances prohibiting ritual animal sacrifice because
the plaintiffs successfully established that the ordinances facially targeted the practices of the Santerian
Church and that the legislative history of the enactments at the time of their adoption reflected perva-
sive, open, and outrageous hostility toward the Santerian Church); Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and the Blood
Supply: An Analysis of Law, Regulation, and Public Policy, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 913, 966 (1996) ("Be-
cause motives exist in the mind of the individual, they are subject to degrees of concealment and subter-
fuge. A prospective discriminator who is clever and reasonably well versed in the law can achieve a
discriminatory goal while leaving no evidence of discriminatory motives." (footnote omitted)). See gen-
erally Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 79 TEx. L. REV.
643 (2001) (arguing that effective enforcement of constitutional antidiscrimination norms requires a
more nuanced understanding of causation, such as the creative approaches used in tort law, because im-
posing a highly formalistic approach that places a heavy burden on government to show a clear causal
link, the "cause in fact," in tort nomenclature, between past participation in discriminatory outcomes and
a current remedy through affirmative action results in the systematic inability of government to correct
effectively for its past contributions to a less equal society). As Adam suggests, a highly formalistic ap-
proach to proving discriminatory intent has the same effect by precluding claims that have merit but lack
the overwhelming proof present in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye.
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merely formal neutrality, but also equality of application." 7 Accordingly, if
government cannot establish that application of a particular rule rationally
advances a legitimate governmental interest on the facts presented, a pre-
sumption of discriminatory motive would be justified.
A. Smith Does Not Adequately Protect Against Religious Discrimination
If the primary purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to prevent reli-
gious discrimination, the Smith-Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye standard
is not up to the task. Discriminators are seldom as shameless as the Hialeah
city council."' An approach to enforcing religious equality that requires
minority religionists to proffer a smoking gun--direct evidence of discrimi-
natory intent35g-provides insufficient protection.
When a facially neutral law of general applicability impinges on relig-
iously motivated conduct, courts should demand something more than
merely theoretical rationality from the government. Requiring the plaintiff
to refute any plausible rational basis for the enactment-whether or not it
was the actual basis for the law-allows many governmental religious dis-
criminators to avoid detection. Moreover, if one were to adopt Justice
Scalia's approach and look solely to the facial neutrality of laws in statute
books-as opposed to the actual enforcement of formally neutral laws-the
possibility of undetected religious discrimination would be further in-
creased.
One possible reason for the failure of courts to evenhandedly apply the
Sherbert-Yoder regime relates to the precise nature of a free exercise claim.
A free exercise claim, at least if premised on autonomy, requires a judge to
credit the idea that "Jehovah commands thusly." Crediting the plausibility
of a divine sanction for racism, sexism, or homophobia has to be more jar-
ring for the average federal judge than conceding that the Ku Klux Klan en-
gages in "speech." A free exercise claim, if credited, carries with it the
plausibility of the claimant's assertion of divine sanction. The social cost of
calling racist speech "speech" is not the same as holding that a group of re-
ligionists can plausibly claim that God commands segregation of the races
in all public places, or strict prohibitions against miscegenation, or the
387 See Perry, supra note 8, at 299-303 (discussing the free exercise norm as an antidiscrimination
norm).
388 At the meeting to consider one of the anti-animal sacrifice ordinances, representative comments
included statements by council members such as "'people were put in jail for practicing this religion"' in
pre-revolution Cuba, the statement that the Santerian Church's members "are in violation of everything
this country stands for," and "'What can we do to prevent the Church from opening?' Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 541. Indeed, comments from members of the city council, city offi-
cials, and members of the public all reflect strong and overt prejudice against the church and the Sante-
rian religion in general. See id. at 541-42.
389 Indeed, Justice Scalia would not even permit plaintiffs to rely on the legislative history of a fa-
cially neutral law to establish discriminatory purpose; instead, he would require plaintiffs to establish
discrimination on the face of the statute or ordinance. See id at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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shunning of gays and lesbians, including pervasive forms of employment
discrimination in violation of a particular state's human rights laws.
A judge naturally recoils when asked to credit the idea that God com-
mands racism, sexism, or homophobia. Yet an autonomy-based theory of
free exercise relies on the good faith of judges to credit radically transgres-
sive religious commitments. Federal judges proved unwilling to do this be-
fore Sherbert and Yoder; and they proved unable to do it during the
Sherbert-Yoder period. Any theory of the Free Exercise Clause that de-
pends on judges validating the divine provenance of bizarre or offensive be-
liefs will not lead to the routine protection of minority religionists.
Even if the Free Exercise Clause does not convey a right to religionists
to disregard laws that conflict with conscience, it should convey a meaning-
ful, and not merely theoretical, right to equal treatment. Requiring the
plaintiff in a free exercise case to refute any theoretical rational basis for a
law or its application puts the shoe on the wrong foot. Moreover, shifting
the burden to the government to establish the actual reason for the applica-
tion of a law or policy on the facts presented would distinguish the Free Ex-
ercise Clause from the Equal Protection Clause, giving the Free Exercise
Clause significant independent force. This approach also would resolve, at
least in part, the conflict between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause: both clauses exist to advance religious equality and to
safeguard this equality from arbitrary or discriminatory governmental ac-
tions.
B. Equality Should Require Government to Give Real Reasons When
Burdening Religiously Motivated Behavior
If one conceives of the Free Exercise Clause in equalitarian terms,39 °
adoption of the rationality with bite test would be a plausible means of ad-
vancing the project. To the extent that Smith leaves minority religionists
largely unprotected absent overt discrimination, it disserves the equality
project. The appropriate equalitarian test should require, at a minimum, that
government shoulder the burden of offering the actual reason for applying
the law on the facts presented, and a reasonable showing of how application
of the law on the facts presented rationally advances the government's pur-
pose in maintaining the law.
When the Supreme Court has feared bias against an unpopular group in
the equal protection context, it has sometimes required "rationality with
bite" in place of the traditional rationality test. Thus, in cases like Romer v.
Evans,"' City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,392 and Plyler v.
390 See Meyler, supra note 30, at 276 ("[A]pproaching the Free Exercise Clause from the vantage
point of equality-or, more specifically, equal protection-is neither new nor entirely susceptible to
those critiques that have been articulated.").
391 517 U.S. 620, 631-33 (1996).
392 473 U.S. 432,440-42, 447 (1985).
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Doe,393 the Supreme Court has required the government to offer the actual
reason for the enactment and to establish that the government's purpose was
actually advanced by the application of the law on the facts presented.394
Even when the government has not utilized a suspect or quasi-suspect clas-
sification, as was the case in Romer (sexual orientation), Cleburne (mental
retardation), and Plyler (children of illegal immigrants), the Justices are suf-
ficiently wary of bias that they shift the burden of justification from the
plaintiff to the government and demand a meaningful relationship between
means and ends."'
It is true, of course, that the standard of review need not track the par-
ticular theory that animates the Free Exercise Clause.396 One could adopt an
autonomy-enhancing theory of the Clause with a rationality with bite stan-
dard of review or, conversely, a form of strict scrutiny under an equalitarian
approach. If reducing the risk of cultural bias in the application of the Free
Exercise Clause is an important goal, an equality-based theory with a rela-
tively weak standard of review probably represents the most prudent ap-
proach.397
393 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 217 n.14, 223 (1982). Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring), also reflects a "rationality with
bite" approach, in that it demands a concrete policy, other than mere dislike of sexual minorities, to sus-
tain a ban on same-sex, but not opposite-sex, sodomy (whether as written or as enforced).
394 For a discussion of the various burdens of proof under tiered scrutiny, see supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text. See also Goldberg, supra note 15, at 484-94, 508-27.
395 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-36 (invoking the rationality standard of review, but putting the bur-
den of proof on the government to establish an actual reason for the classification at issue other than
simple animus toward gay and lesbian persons); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440 (same with re-
spect to mentally retarded persons); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-20, 223-24 (same with respect to the chil-
dren of illegal immigrants residing unlawfully in the United States); see also Peter J. Rubin,
Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and
Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12-18 (2000) (exploring the theoretical, doctrinal, and policy considera-
tions that could justify heightened judicial scrutiny of governmental actions; suggesting a truth in adver-
tising approach could better serve these interests; concluding that "[t]he theoretical inadequacies of any
approach based on consideration in the abstract of the characteristics of a particular class or classifica-
tion, and the Court's inability to apply this approach with any even apparent consistency, suggest that
there is a need for a different way of understanding what should and does trigger strict scrutiny"; and
positing that "an examination of the Court's cases provides just such an understanding," namely that "a
decision to examine a classification closely reflects a judgment that there are particular harms or risks
that may render the use of a characteristic in the particular way at issue inconsistent with basic principles
of human dignity").
396 1 am indebted to Michael Perry for making this point. It is true that the Supreme Court has de-
ployed identical standards of review to equality claims arising under the Equal Protection Clause and to
autonomy claims arising under the doctrine of substantive due process. There is no necessary relation-
ship between a right being premised on equality or autonomy and the specific standard of review to be
used in measuring the merits of a claim; thus, rationality review, rationality with bite, intermediate scru-
tiny, and strict scrutiny could apply to either autonomy- or equality-based claims. My concern is with
adopting a theory, and a standard of review, that both acknowledges and attempts to control for the fact
of cultural bias with respect to religious groups.
397 I do not insist that rationality with bite is the only possible standard or even the best standard of
review; my claim is more limited. We know that judges will not apply strict scrutiny in an evenhanded
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The equality theory shifts the judicial focus from the reasonableness of
a sect's beliefs to the reasonableness of the government's actions (particu-
larly when contrasted to others who are not members of the group). A stan-
dard of review that routinely imposed unacceptably high social costs
incident to protecting religious equality would simply invite artful (and not
so artful) judicial evasion. Better to adopt a less demanding standard of re-
view, but to apply that standard in evenhanded fashion to all, than to adopt
a more demanding standard of review, but to apply that standard on a
highly selective basis.
An alternative way of framing a revised standard of review for free ex-
ercise claims would be to look to administrative law cases applying the
Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" standard of re-
view.398 Although "[t]he scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard is narrow," the courts require an administrative agency to "exam-
ine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made." '399 Factors that point to an arbitrary and capricious decision include
a failure "to consider an important aspect of the problem," the presence of
"an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency," or a decision "so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a dif-
ference in view or the product of agency expertise."4 0 When an agency
changes its policies, moreover, it has a duty to provide a "reasoned analy-
sis" for the change.4 1 The essence of judicial review under the arbitrary
and capricious standard is a "searching and careful" application of a "nar-
row" standard of review.4 2
Another aspect of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard
that differs from traditional rationality review, and would better serve
equality concerns in free exercise cases, is the obligation to provide an ac-
tual reason for the agency's action, and not merely "'post hoc' rationaliza-
tions, which have traditionally been found to be an inadequate basis for
fashion and that true rationality review underprotects religious minorities. Rationality with bite would
be a logical standard of review, but arguably intermediate scrutiny might work equally well. The key
inquiry in either case would be whether judges are capable of applying the standard equally to all claim-
ants. See generally Pat Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1945 (1988) (discussing the difference between "good" bias and "bad" bias in judging).
398 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (a reviewing court must set aside agency action if the action is
found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law").
399 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
400 Id.
401 Id. at 42, 57.
402 Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974); see also Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("Although this inquiry into the facts
is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empow-
ered to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.").
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review."4 °3 Accordingly, a reviewing court "may not supply a reasoned ba-
sis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given. '
Requiring the government to give the actual reasons that motivated the
decision either to enact or to enforce a law that burdens religiously moti-
vated conduct would go a long way towards illuminating clever discrimina-
tors. If a law has moldered in the law books unused for decades, its sudden
deployment against a new sect of Gozer worshippers4 5 ought to raise a sus-
picious judicial eyebrow. The requirement of formal neutrality is not
enough; rather, attention must be paid to the actual enforcement of facially
neutral laws against minority religionists.
In addition, maintaining a theoretical standard of review that courts
could manipulate (either by imposing threshold requirements to invoke the
Free Exercise Clause or by treating the exemption as universally available)
should be rejected in favor of adopting a standard of review that produces
results that judges are willing to live with. Professor Lupu has suggested
that the social costs of free exercise claims led courts to manipulate the ap-
plication of strict scrutiny. As he put the matter, "[b]ehind every free exer-
cise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each
judge, and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption de-
mands from religious deviants of every stripe."4 6 This concern about social
costs incentivized judges, during the pre-Smith era, to avoid claims through
subterfuge.4 7
It bears noting that Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith directly embraces
this concern. Justice Scalia wrote:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must
be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of
all religious beliefs.4"8
Scalia also categorically rejected an approach to the Free Exercise Clause
that requires judges to ascertain the "centrality" of a particular religious be-
lief as a prerequisite to applying strict scrutiny. "Repeatedly and in many
different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to deter-
mine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a reli-
gious claim."4 9
403 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419 (citation omitted).
404 Bowman Transp., Inc., 419 U.S. at 285-86.
405 See supra note 33.
406 Lupu, supra note 286, at 947.
407 See supra notes 195-233 and accompanying text.
408 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (emphasis added).
409 Id. at 887.
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The problem with Justice Scalia's approach is that it makes little sense
to concede that the uncertainties of judicial enforcement of the Free Exer-
cise Clause justify complete judicial abdication. Even if judges are not bet-
ter positioned to weigh abstract autonomy claims than are legislators,
judges are better positioned to ferret out discriminatory governmental be-
havior than are legislators."'
C. Heightened Scrutiny Review (Short of Strict Scrutiny) Would Probably
Benefit Majority Religionists More than Minority Religionists, but Perhaps
the Equalitarian Focus Would Help Judges Past the Problem of Cognitive
Dissonance and Eccentric Religious Believers
To be sure, majority religions might well derive a greater benefit from
any system of heightened scrutiny. In this sense, then, the suggestion to
apply rationality with bite might be subject to the same objections that I
make against the strict scrutiny regime of Sherbert-Yoder. Is it reasonable
to believe that judges will do a better job of applying an equality rule to un-
popular, marginalized groups than they have done, or would do, with an
autonomy rule? Such a premise seems entirely plausible.4" Equality rules
do not require judges to establish the same material equivalency between
minority religious practices and their own. Moreover, if the paradigmatic
free exercise case involves discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral,
general laws (i.e., Hernandez4 )-rather than enforcement of laws targeting
a specific sect (i.e., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ayea 13)-a requirement of
410 See McConnell, supra note 2, at 139 (arguing that religions "close to the center of prevailing
culture in America" will either be unregulated or will obtain legislative exemptions whereas "[r]eligous
groups whose practices and beliefs are outside the mainstream are most likely to need exemptions" but
will not receive them); id. (arguing that Smith is objectionable because "it introduces a bias in favor of
mainstream over non-mainstream religions" and that this bias "is not consistent with the original theory
of the Religion Clauses"). But see Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle ofAccommodation of Relig-
ion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1700 (1988) (arguing that legislative accommodations of religion
will produce an "overall distribution of benefits and burdens [that] is likely to be reasonably fair").
411 See SULLIVAN, supra note 118, at 149-50 (questioning the use of religion as a construct for pro-
tecting human rights because "[flair legal accommodation of differences among humans is a major prob-
lem for the law"; asking "[w]hat would be lost if the law focused not on the special category of religion
but on the accommodation of difference generally, and what compromises any such accommodations
imply for commitments to equality?"; and asserting that "equality has arguably been and continues to be
the dominant political value of American politics and of constitutional jurisprudence").
412 Hemandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-700 (1989) (affirming the IRS's decision to deny
members of the Church of Scientology the ability to deduct payments for Church-provided "auditing"
sessions because of the quid pro quo nature of the payments and refusing to consider seriously whether
the IRS has permitted the deductibility of arguably indistinguishable quid pro quo payments for religious
services procured by adherents of more traditional religious groups).
413 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-48 (1993) (in-
validating local ordinances dealing with the ritual slaughter of animals by Santerians because the city
council manifested overt and obvious religious bias against the Santerians at the time it adopted the or-
dinances and, moreover, because the city council tailored the ordinances to target religious practices in
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rationality with bite might well benefit minority religions more than it bene-
fits nonminority religions precisely because problems of discriminatory en-
forcement are far more likely to arise in the context of minority religions.
Popularly elected public officials, public prosecutors, and the police
are less likely to enforce generic rules against loitering, disturbing the
peace, littering, or tax evasion when the potential defendants are popular in-
stitutions within the community.4"4 Targeted enforcement of generic laws,
through selective prosecution, would provide an easy means of attempting
to discourage an unpopular religious group from remaining within the
community. And to the extent that efforts to discriminate rely on generic,
neutral laws of general applicability, proving discriminatory intent to trig-
ger strict scrutiny will be impossible in most cases (again, consider the
IRS's denial of charitable deductions from personal income taxes to target
the Church of Scientology in Hernandez).
Because of the problem of discriminatory enforcement of the strict
scrutiny regime, some prominent constitutionalists, notably Professor Mark
Tushnet and Professor William Marshall, have endorsed Smith as an im-
provement over Sherbert and Yoder. Professor Tushnet explains that "the
pattern of the [Supreme] Court's results in mandatory accommodation is
general, and Santerian animal sacrifice in particular, but specifically excluded from the scope of the laws
some religiously motivated rules that address the killing of animals).
414 See Angela P. Harris, Foreword.- The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741,
745-50 (1994); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dissent, Free Speech, and the Continuing Search for the
"Central Meaning" of the First Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1625 (2000); Joseph W. Singer,
The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 6, 9-25 (1984); see also Kim
Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Jurors Through Community Representation,
52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 354-58, 360-65, 385-89 (1999) (discussing the systematic exclusion of minori-
ties from juries and the implications of the failure to adequately represent various groups on juries, nota-
bly including inaccurate or unjust jury verdicts); Heather K. Gerken, Second Order Diversity, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1106-08, 1121-26, 1134-35, 1144-45 (2005) (discussing how majority rule often
implies bad things for minorities, with particular attention to problems of discrimination against elec-
toral minorities (however constituted); and arguing that rethinking the structures of government to vest
minorities with decisional authority over smaller units of government might achieve fair outcomes more
reliably than would placing more minorities in majority-dominated institutions, where their voices will
necessarily be rather muted); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial
Profiling and Stops and Seizures Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 296-304, 307 (2001) (de-
scribing and critiquing the myriad studies that show persistent race bias in law enforcement across juris-
dictions (local, state, and federal) and at all points in the criminal process, from police stops, to
prosecutorial charging and plea negotiations, to jury behavior, to judicial sentencing practices); Steven
H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning ofAmerica, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
43, 81-84 (1994) (discussing the importance of facilitating the participation of minorities, whether ra-
cial, religious, cultural, or otherwise, in the process of democratic deliberation, and arguing that courts
should strive to confer the broadest First Amendment protection on dissenting speech by members of
such groups because they face the highest prospect of governmental efforts to silence them); Floyd D.
Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Justice System on the Status of African American Males:
An Overview, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 23 (1994) (documenting and critiquing disturbing patterns of bias by
juries in cases with racial minority defendants); Note, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecu-
tion of "Racially Motivated Violence, " 99 YALE L.J. 845 (1990) (arguing that, perhaps ironically, racial
bias affects the legal system's effort to enforce laws aimed at eradicating hate crimes).
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troubling because, put bluntly, the pattern is that sometimes Christians win
but non-Christians never do." '415 Tushnet posits that courts will establish
and enforce lines that distinguish "between religion and non-religion, and
on occasion some adherents of what the Court regards as non-religion will
be insulted by that judgment.""4 6 Moreover, "the fewer adherents there are
to a denomination or a sect, the more likely it is that the Court will uncon-
sciously undervalue the harm done to the individual believer by rigid appli-
cation of the state's rules." '417 Tushnet warns that "[u]nfamiliarity, here,
may breed not respect, but, as is usually the case, insensitivity." '418
In particular, Tushnet argues that Yoder's majority opinion comes per-
ilously close to "saying that the claims of the Amish prevailed because they
were a 'good' religion." '419 This sort of bias is inevitable because "there is a
systematic connection between the mandatory accommodation doctrine, at
least when the doctrine incorporates a balancing test, and invidious com-
parisons among religions, to the disadvantage of non-mainstream denomi-
nations, sects, and cults."42 Thus, "it is a normal human reaction to be
skeptical about the sincerity of a person who claims to hold unconventional
beliefs."42' The strict scrutiny doctrine builds in "a subtle preference for
claims readily understandable by those adherents of mainstream religions
who are likely to administer the mandatory accommodation doctrine." '422
William Marshall makes similar arguments in favor of Smith. After
noting the difficulties associated with defining "religion" and "religious be-
liefs," '423 Marshall observes that:
Minority belief systems-not majority belief systems-will bear the brunt of
the definition and the sincerity inquiries. A Court is more likely to find against
a claimant on definitional grounds when the religion is bizarre, relative to the
cultural norm, and is more likely to find that a religious belief is insincere
when the belief in question is, by cultural norms, incredulous.424
The outcome of accommodation cases, accordingly, will "closely parallel or
directly relate to the culture's predominant religious traditions." '425
415 Tushnet, supra note 236, at 381.
416 Id. at 380.
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 Id. at 382.
420 Id.
421 Id.; see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("If we
try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very considerations
which in common experience provide its most reliable answer.").
422 Tushnet, supra note 236, at 382.
423 Marshall, supra note 32, at 310-11.
424 Id. at 311 (footnote omitted).
425 Id.
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Marshall agrees with critics of Smith that reliance on legislatures to
protect minority religionists is not a reliable means of securing meaningful
protection:
A society is never likely to find a strong regulatory interest in a measure that is
hostile to the majoritarian tradition, and accordingly is unlikely to pass such a
measure in the first place.... Legislators are more likely to be aware of ma-
joritarian religious practices (their own) when they fashion general regulations,
and thus are unlikely to place disabilities on those practices.426
Conversely, legislators "are less likely to be concerned with religious prac-
tices outside their religious tradition and accordingly more likely to place
burdens on those practices inadvertently. '"427
I agree with much of what Tushnet and Marshall have to say about
mandatory judicial accommodations under Sherbert and Yoder.428 It bears
noting, however, that Tushnet and Marshall assume a free exercise juris-
prudence premised on a theory of religious autonomy, rather than on a the-
ory of religious equality. Judges should be more willing to undertake
inquiries into whether government has afforded a particular group equal
treatment than into whether a particular belief is "religious" in nature under
a plausible demand for autonomy. In addition, the failure of generic statu-
tory accommodation statutes, such as the federal RFRA, to substantially
benefit minority religionists suggests that any autonomy-based scheme of
protecting free exercise presents serious enforcement problems. Even when
Congress enacts a statute like RFRA, instructing courts to apply strict scru-
tiny in the aid of religious autonomy, problems of cultural bias subvert the
ability of minority religionists to claim an equal benefit under the law.
Neither Tushnet nor Marshall has much to say about the fact that legis-
latures are unlikely to protect minority religionists, even if judges failed to
do so reliably under the pre-Smith regime of mandatory accommodations
under a regime of strict scrutiny. Because Smith does so little to curb covert
discrimination, it leaves minority religionists at the mercy of legislators that
everyone agrees are unlikely to be sympathetic.429 In my view, a third way
presents the logical response to the concerns of academics like Greenawalt,
Laycock, and McConnell for minority religionists and the equally valid
concerns of Tushnet and Marshall that cultural factors will make even-
426 Id. at 316, 318.
427 Id.
428 So does Judge McConnell. See McConnell, supra note 2, at 127-28 (noting that the Supreme
Court rejected most mandatory accommodation requests and that "the Supreme Court rejected all but
one claim for free exercise exemption outside the field of unemployment compensation"). McConnell
observes that "[t]he doctrine was supportive, but its enforcement was half-hearted or worse." Id. at 128.
429 See Laycock, supra note 108, at 1015-16; Laycock, supra note 2, at 10-15, 42-43; Marshall,
supra note 32, at 318-19; McConnell, supra note 2, at 139; Perry, supra note 8, at 299-301; Tushnet,
supra note 410, 1700-01. Thus, both supporters and opponents of Smith agree that legislative indiffer-
ence to minority religions and religionists presents a serious problem for securing religious equality.
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handed enforcement of a regime of mandatory accommodation impossible.
A doctrinal approach that places a greater burden on government to justify
discretionary applications of law, without the prospect of the parade of hor-
ribles associated with the full and fair application of strict scrutiny,43 ° may
well achieve a more equal measure of justice for minority religionists. Fi-
nally, it also would reflect the cultural reality that asking a court to vindi-
cate a free exercise claim implicates a more profound cultural commitment
than does asking a court to credit a racist screed as "speech" for purpose of
the Free Speech Clause.
Would an overtly equalitarian approach, with a less demanding stan-
dard of review, make a difference? Possibly. First, an equality-based ap-
proach inquires first and foremost into the government's actions, not the
religionist's beliefs. To be sure, some preliminary assessment of the exis-
tence of a sincere religious belief would still be necessary. But the
gravamen of a free exercise claim would be unjustified disparate treatment,
not the legitimacy of the religionist's autonomy claim. A focus on unequal
treatment is more likely to produce consistent results than is a highly ab-
stract inquiry into unfair or unjust treatment.
Even during the Jim Crow era, the Supreme Court was willing to en-
force equal protection principles against overt forms of racial discrimina-
tion43' and the discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral rules.432
Simply put, the notion that government must treat all citizens equally has
more cultural salience than the proposition that the community must respect
any and all forms of religiously motivated behavior. Whether the basis of a
free exercise claim is constitutional or statutory, such claims would likely
fare better if framed in terms of equal treatment, rather than in terms of se-
lective exemptions. Equality has a cultural salience that religious autonomy
simply lacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
The best reading of the Free Exercise Clause, and the reading most
consistent with the Framers' intent, casts it as the mirror image of the Es-
tablishment Clause. Just as the Establishment Clause prevents the govern-
ment from advancing particular religious principles or sects, the Free
Exercise Clause prevents the government from suppressing particular reli-
gious principles or sects. Advancing religious equality, rather than reli-
gious autonomy, should inform the Supreme Court's reading of both the
430 The Supreme Court's standard modus operandi is, of course, to assume the universal availability
of an exemption and to weigh the government's interest from this vantage point. See, e.g., Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986); United
States v. Lee, 458 U.S. 252, 258-61 (1982); see also supra notes 195-233 and accompanying text; cf.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972).
431 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
432 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Smith was fundamentally correct
to reject the autonomy-based vision of Sherbert and Yoder, which, as the
empirical evidence demonstrates, ill served religious minorities and had the
perverse effect of increasing disparities in religious liberty between major-
ity and minority religious sects. Even so, Smith fails to attend adequately to
the nondiscrimination project.
A serious commitment to eradicating religiously motivated discrimina-
tion requires more than mere facially neutral laws passed in the absence of
overt religious hostility; instead, such a commitment requires equal applica-
tion of such laws. Smith's failure to address this aspect of the equality pro-
ject makes its effort to reshape free exercise jurisprudence unacceptably
incomplete. Paradoxically, however, a return to the pre-Smith regime of
Sherbert and Yoder would disserve the equality project even more than does
Smith. An approach to the Free Exercise Clause that removes the burden
from a religionist claiming discriminatory treatment and that places it in-
stead on the government would constitute a significant step in the right di-
rection. Thus, courts, in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, should
require the government to establish at least the rationality of applying a
neutral law of general applicability to prevent religiously motivated con-
duct; such an approach would advance the nondiscrimination project more
effectively than does Smith.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Free Exercise Cases of Majority and Minority Religions in Three
Circuits433
Losses Wins Loss Percent Win Percent Cases
4th Cir. Minority 8 3 72.72 27.28 11
Pre-Smith
4th Cir. Minority 4 1 80 20 5
Post-Smith
4th Cir. Majority 5 1 83.33 16.67 6
Pre-Smith
4th Cir. Majority 6 3 66.67 33.33 9
Post-Smith
4th Cir. Maj.-Min. -3 -2 10.61 -10.61 n/a
Pre-Smith
4th Cir. Maj.-Min. 2 2 -13.33 13.33 n/a
Post-Smith
6th Cir. Minority 13 2 86.67 13.33 15
Pre-Smith
6th Cir. Minority 5 1 83.33 16.67 6
Post-Smith
433 The results come from two searches on LexisNexis. The first one was a narrow search using the
terms "religion and free exercise and neutral and discrimination," which was performed in each of the
three circuits. The second search was a broader search for the terms "free exercise and religion," which
also covered each circuit. All searches were limited in time from January 1, 1890 (shortly after Rey-
nolds) to May 24, 2006. All searches were Shephardized in an effort to minimize the risk of missing
important cases. Only cases in the U.S. courts of appeals for a given circuit were recorded, and no data
were recorded on any state court cases, U.S. district court cases, or U.S. Supreme Court cases. The re-
searcher disregarded all unpublished opinions, all opinions to which citation is limited by the local or
federal rules of procedure, and all cases in which the opinion does not reveal the religious beliefs or af-
filiations of the litigants. All litigants who were not mainstream Protestants, Catholics, or Jews were
considered minorities for this study, with the excepted religions being considered majorities.
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6th Cir. Majority 2 3 40 60 5
Pre-Smith
6th Cir. Majority 4 2 66.67 33.33 6
Post-Smith
6th Cir. Maj.-Min. -11 1 -46.67 46.67 n/a
Pre-Smith
6th Cir. Maj.-Min. -5 1 -16.66 16.66 n/a
Post-Smith
9th Cir. Minority 19 3 86.36 13.64 22
Pre-Smith
9th Cir. Minority 14 4 77.78 22.22 18
Post-Smith
9th Cir. Majority 10 0 100 0 10
Pre-Smith
9th Cir. Majority 19 6 76 24 25
Post-Smith
9th Cir. Maj.-Min. -9 -3 13.64 -13.64 n/a
Pre-Smith
9th Cir. Maj.-Min. 5 2 -1.78 1.78 n/a
Post-Smith
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